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 I combine domestic politics with foreign policy and security interactions. There is a 
role for international institutions in helping nations achieve wider interests, but there 
is also a role for domestic political preferences and purely national conceptions of 
the national interest. 
– Personal Statement, Rackham Application 
January 2001 
  
Some of the earliest advice that I got at Michigan was from a senior student, who 
cautioned me that “practically nobody writes a dissertation on what they came in thinking 
they wanted to do. Your interests will change a lot during graduate school.” In light of 
that advice, I still find it a bit amazing that I have come full circle and ended right where I 
started: the international and domestic politics of overlapping European security 
institutions. During the term that I was at American University’s Brussels Center 
(AUBC), I wrote two major pieces about the European Union’s emergent security policy 
structures and how they would interact with existing bodies. Elements of those analyses 
and that experience color the work in this dissertation. At that point, few policymakers 
had begun to grapple with the question of how the institutions would relate to one 
another, now that their jurisdictions were beginning to blur and overlap more than they 
had in the early post-Cold War period. So the first debt of this dissertation, 
chronologically at least, goes to Jerry Sherdian of AUBC for his encouragement of both 
my extensive research and my graduate school plans. 
iii 
The route from the application statement of interests to this dissertation, though, 
was hardly direct; “circuitous” or “torturous” are perhaps more accurate. The second debt 
of this dissertation goes to the now-nameless undergrad in a PS 160 section who asked 
the fateful question, “What are all the stages of coperation and how do they fit 
together?” That question, asked in my second term of teaching, is responsible for getting 
me to think about cooperation as process and as a giant selection problem. I set that idea 
aside when it alone failed to turn into a dissertation, but I am glad to have pulled it out 
and incorporated it into the final project.  
Completing a dissertation in an emerging research agenda and with a new 
approach to case selection, as I have done, required the collection of two extensive new 
datasets. The forum shopping chapter in particular benefited greatly from research 
assistants from UM’s Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program (UROP). Michael 
Fialkoff, Silvia Stoljevska, and Laura Taylor (all of UROP) were enormous assets in this 
process, and Bob Mushroe and Pam Kiel also provided additional help. Jane Lawrence 
joined the project in its last term, but she went above and beyond the call of duty in her 
help. Besides doing a large amount of data collection (about a quarter of the observations 
in the dataset are her work), she helped immensely in the later states of the project by 
converting results to tables, managing references and citations, locating obscure facts in 
foreign language sources, and much more.  
Many colleagues provided much-appreciated input on various parts of this 
project. Conference discussants Roy Ginsberg and Claes de Vreese, and job talk 
audiences at California Polytechnic University and Oakland University (Rochester, MI), 
made valuable comments on Chapter 3. Michael E. Smith challenged me on important 
iv 
parts of the CFSP argument, and Michael Koch gave much helpful advice on using 
standardized measures of government preferences. John Jackson first suggested using the 
seemingly unrelated framework; that insight was crucial in enabling me to test my claims. 
More of my colleagues than I can count have read parts of this dissertation, but 
only one has read it all. Sarah Croco read virtually every word I have ever written about 
this project – sometimes repeatedly – and she was infinitely patient with this Stata-
challenged researcher. The graduate students at Maryland will be very lucky to have her 
as an advisor. Early drafts of the project benefited from comments from Michelle 
Allendoerfer, Hyeran Jo, Joel Simmons, Tana Johnson, Ryan Kennedy, Sarah Fischer, 
Jennifer Sese, and Laura Akers. Grace Cho, Kenyatha Loftis, Cliff Lightfoot, Natalia 
Buniewicz, Manny Teodoro, Sam Snideman, and a number of non-academic friends and 
colleagues helped me refine the later editions.  
My committee’s knowledge and insights were especially valuable as I moved into 
the later stages of the project and tried to implement (or impose) my plan on my rather 
reluctant data. I completed the write-up under severe time constraints, and they all 
deserve many thanks for their willingness to work with that timeline and provide 
feedback so rapidly. My committee chair Jim Morrow has an uncanny knack for 
identifying the core research problem in a given question, and his encyclopedic mastery 
of such a huge range of the international relations literature has been of immense value to 
all of his graduate students. Jim took me on as an advisee at a point where I was on the 
brink of dropping out of the program. He very gently gave me the feedback and 
encouragement I needed to move forward at that difficult time. Without his support for 
both my research and my teaching interests, I would never have completed this program. 
v 
Rob Franzese is every bit the statistics guru he is claimed to be. He can not only 
spot the methodological problems in work well outside his area of expertise and propose 
solutions for them, but he can also manage to explain those solutions in plain text email. I 
am not entirely sure which of those two skills is the more impressive. Jana von Stein’s 
familiarity with the cooperation literature and her generosity with her time and comments 
vastly improved key parts of this dissertation. Finally, Dario Gaggio of the History 
Department provided both an outsider’s perspective on the overall argument and also 
valuable feedback on the Albanian case study. 
Four other current and former faculty members at Michigan deserve special 
mention. I was fortunate enough to spend three years wo king for Jennifer Widner on two 
large data collection projects. The projects themselve  were well outside my area of 
expertise, but they gave me invaluable skills in data collection, dataset creation, and 
project management. Nancy Burns’ rapid-fire teaching style in PS 599 helped me 
overcome my statistophobia early in the program. Chris Achen and Don Kinder gave me 
confidence in my ability to talk and think about research design and research methods in 
a critical manner. Taking PS 699 with Chris taught me to trust my instincts, and PS 680 
with Don gave names to those instincts. This dissertation literally would not have been 
possible without their important contributions, both to my knowledge and my confidence. 
 The Department of Political Science, and especially Michelle Spornhauer, were 
critical in making this dissertation (and even gradu te school) possible. Michelle 
managed to keep me fully funded the entire way through my seven-year journey, and I 
am grateful for her helpfulness and friendship throughout the process. A grant from the 
Department’s Harold K. Jacobson Research Fund enabld additional data collection for 
vi 
the Albania and forum shopping chapters. I also benefited from funding from the 
Rackham School of Graduate Studies. This included a research grant and a One-Term 
Dissertation Fellowship, which enabled me to finish and defend the dissertation in a 
single term of fully-funded enrollment. Finally, the UM International Institute and 
Rackham provided crucial travel funding to allow meto obtain feedback in earlier stages. 
I never would have survived the write-up process (and graduate school in general) 
without the help of a wonderful group of friends. Sarah Croco, Grace Cho, Michelle 
Allendoerfer, Jessi Grieser, Caitlin O’Roarke and the rest of the Honors gang were 
always ready to work in a coffee shop, gather for mvie night, commiserate over lunch, 
or just have a good laugh. Manny Teodoro, Tom Flores, Joel Simmons, Hyeran Jo, and 
Irfan Nooruddin could always be counted on to provide a laugh or a helpful hint or a 
word of encouragement at the worst of times. They all believed I could do this, even 
when I did not. Finally, the fun baristas at Beaner's (oh, sorry, Biggby's) and Espresso 
Royale, and their fantastic coffee and tea drinks, made writing this dissertation in less 
than four months bearable. 
 Finally, I want to extend my biggest thanks to my parents, Tom and Janis Powner 
(and Angie and Grandma Rose and Velvet), for their support during the seven years I 
have spent on this journey. They supported me through everything, even the times when 
my heath situation deteriorated and when I was considering leaving graduate school. 
Without their unwavering commitment to seeing me do what was best for me, I never 
would have stayed in graduate school long enough to wri e this today. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
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Introduction: A Mess, a Muddle, and a Maze 
 
In early 1997, the situation in Albania looked dire. Some two-thirds of the 
country’s citizens had invested in fraudulent “pyramid” investment schemes, and the 
schemes’ collapse left citizens destitute and the already-weak economy in shambles. The 
government – already under pressure from inside and out for its blatant rigging of 
elections the previous May – was implicated in the pyramid schemes. In response, 
citizens in the south looted weapons from military mories, and armed rioting ensued 
around the country. Amid the opposition's calls for the president to resign, armed groups 
overthrew the ruling party's officials in town after town and advanced steadily on the 
capital, Tirana. The government declared a state of mergency and severely restricted 
civil and political liberties. In response, some 13,000 refugees crossed the Adriatic by 
boat to Italy, overwhelming local social service providers, and many more arrived 
elsewhere by other means.1 
 The states of Western Europe faced a dilemma about how to react to this crisis. 
NATO could help coordinate a military-based crisis intervention or provide airlift and 
support facilities for a civilian mission, but the distribution of capabilities within NATO 
meant that this option would require US agreement and participation. NATO or the 
Western European Union (WEU)2 could patrol the Adriatic to intercept refugees, but not 
                                                
1 The Albanian crisis is substantially under-studied in the literature, but good summaries of various aspects 
are Pettifer and Vickers (2007), Perlmutter (1998), Jarvis (2000), and Vaughan-Whitehead (1999).  
2 The Western European Union is a smaller military defense alliance whose membership is restricted to 




all concerned states were members of either of these organizations. Members of the 
European Union (EU) had the ships to man an Adriatic patrol themselves, but only if they 
could access NATO command-and-control facilities. The UN could authorize and equip a 
humanitarian mission, though such actions were notoriously slow. Moreover, UN action 
would require extensive leadership and participation by the European states, and still 
risked foot-dragging by the reluctant US and other p rmanent members of the Security 
Council. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)3 could also 
authorize an intervention, but getting the agreement of all 54 members still presented a 
major hurdle, and the organization itself lacked any military capabilities or experience. 
Finally, alongside all these institutional alternatives, the states had the options to 
assemble an ad hoc “coalition of the willing,” or even to act unilaterally.  
 The question for the states of Western Europe, and for political scientists, is this: 
How do states choose a particular solution or respon e to a problem when many potential 
solutions exist? Choices in foreign policy are rarely “do x or do nothing”; choices more 
frequently resemble “do x, do y, do z, or do nothing,” and cooperation is only one of 
those options. Other options – indeed the most commnly selected options – include 
doing nothing and acting unilaterally. Scholars have suggested a few reasons why 
cooperation might emerge under some circumstances, but they have generally failed to 
specify when states might prefer cooperation to the myriad other options available.4 Even 
within the single option of “cooperation” a wide range of options exist: outside of an 
                                                                                                                                      
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal joined in 
1990 and Greece in 1995. Other members of the EU have associate or observer status, and at the time the 
WEU had close ties to the European Union itself. 
3 Until 1995, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
4 See, e.g. (K. E. Smith 1999), (Ginsberg 1989), (Ginsberg 2001), and the case studies in (Evans, Jacobson 




institution or in one, and if in an institution, whic  one? Expanding from a dichotomous 
choice set (cooperate or not) to a larger pool of options (cooperate, unilateral action, do 
nothing) becomes theoretically knotty, especially when the choices are not mutually 
exclusive and can both substitute and complement one another. 
Scholars have also failed to appreciate the complexities introduced by the 
existence of multiple organizations. Political scient sts have theorized that the choice to 
cooperate in foreign policy is often driven by the “politics of scale,”5 where states 
collaborate to achieve benefits or goals that they could not unilaterally obtain. In theory, 
such gains from cooperation do not require a formal organization, but institutions can 
help states to achieve these scale benefits through the centralization and/or delegation of 
tasks.6 By pooling resources and delegating some functions t  specialized staff, states can 
capture more of the possible gains from cooperation. This scholarship, however, either 
explicitly assumes that a single focal institution exists,7 or implicitly assumes that any 
existing institutions are functionally equivalent ad interchangeable – that they would all 
have the same magnitude of effects on state gain.8  
In the presence of multiple organizations whose jurisdictions overlap, however, 
this straightforward set of explanations begins to falter. Which organization should states 
use?9 The case of Albania demonstrates that both assumptions of a single focal institution 
                                                
5 (Ginsberg 1989). 
6 (Abbott and Snidal 1998). 
7 (Jupille and Snidal 2006). 
8 (Abbott and Snidal 1998) 
9 The existence of multiple institutions with highly similar memberships and substantive issue area 
jurisdictions is in itself a puzzle to scholars of international cooperation, and the puzzle is only 
compounded by the institutions’ differing decision processes and internal structures. The work of 
Koremenos ( (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001); (Koremenos 2005)) and her collaborators in particular 
suggests that institutions in the same issue area should look the same, but the same logic of efficieny and 
utility maximization that produces this result should also argue against the existence of competing, 




and functional interchangeability do not hold in European foreign policy cooperation in 
particular.10 The Council of Europe, OSCE, EU, WEU, and NATO took up the issue in 
turns, and none acted for a variety of reasons. The EU and WEU lacked the capacity to 
act independently in Albania, and certain EU members were reluctant to become 
involved. NATO and the UN had the capability to intervene but also lacked sufficient 
consensus to act. Any of these would have been appropriate focal institutions, but the 
lack of consensus in some and capacity in others prvented cooperation from emerging.11 
Adding to this, cooperation in an i stitution was not the only possible response. 
States could have, and indeed did, choose to act in coordinated groups outside of formal 
institutions. These “coalitions of the willing,” or ad hoc groupings, represent a self-
selected pool of members. This fundamental feature makes explaining cooperation 
outside institutions different – and more complex – than explaining cooperation inside 
institutions. Membership in the ad hoc group becomes a variable subject to strategic 
manipulation, not a given. Strategic manipulation of membership may be subject to 
constraints imposed by the requirements of capacity; expending the political capital to 
form a coalition of the willing is useless if the coalition lacks the ability to achieve its 
stated goals.  
This dissertation presents a framework for analyzing foreign policy behavior 
choices across the full set of potential outcomes: no action, unilateral action, cooperation 
                                                
10 The same can be said for many other regions and for many other more specific issue areas. For example, 
the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), and the UN and its agencies, were frequent 
fora for African cooperation and dispute settlement. O her parts of this region had access to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, the (British) Commonwealth, or the Organisation de la 
Francophonie, or sub-regional bodies like the Mano River Union, to coordinate their activity. 
11 In the end, Italy and other neighboring states acted unilaterally to intercept refugees, while most Western 
powers evacuated their nationals by boat and helicopter. Substantially after the onset of the crisis and the 
unilateral interception efforts, Italy and some EU and non-EU states led an OSCE-organized, UN-
authorized, mission into Albania to provide humanitrian aid and to prepare for parliamentary elections. 




outside institutions, and cooperation inside (and the choice between) institutions. 
Exploring and explaining the complete range of state behavior choices allows scholars to 
begin integrating existing literatures on segments of the process to create a fuller 
understanding of foreign policy behavior. I argue that by focusing on two necessary 
conditions for cooperation – the existence of consensus and the existence of capacity – 
we can predict behavior in the absence of either or both, something existing work has not 
been able to do well. The remainder of this chapter r sents arguments for the choices of 
foreign policy as a topic of study, and Europe as the focal region. It concludes by noting 
the contributions of this dissertation and presents a plan for the remaining chapters. 
 
Why Study Foreign Policy? 
For the purposes of this project, foreign policy cooperation is collaboration by 
states to enact joint or common policy on non-economic issues of interest that generally 
occur outside or across their borders. This can take a number of forms, from enacting a 
common or joint statement or conclusion, to adopting some form of collective action like 
withdrawing ambassadors, enacting economic sanctions, or using military force. Foreign 
policy cooperation may occur within an existing inter ational institution, or it may occur 
outside any standing body. Substantively, foreign policy cooperation may include issues 
of human rights promotion, humanitarian and other foreign aid, issues of interstate and 
domestic conflict or conflict resolution, support for democratization, and many other 
issue areas. It also includes issues of relevance to economics but not directly part of it, 




Why is such a broad definition of “foreign policy” a good place to test arguments 
about state foreign policy behavior? Studies of cooperation behavior have normally tested 
their arguments in well-defined, single-issue subfields of foreign policy: trade and tariffs 
policy, sanctions policy, standards-setting, FTA formation, human rights behavior, or 
environmental policy.12 Many of these studies, including most of the highly rigorous 
ones, focus on issues that fall within the broader class of foreign economic policy.13 This 
is unfortunate because non-economic foreign policy has three key characteristics that 
differentiate it from foreign economic policy: Domestic audiences rarely receive direct 
gains, the benefits of cooperation are unclear or minimal, and cooperation itself carries 
sovereignty costs. As a result, incentives to cooperate in general foreign policy are very 
different from those that prevail in foreign economic policy. This section addresses each 
of these substantive reasons to study foreign policy, and then presents an additional 
methodological justification for this choice. 
 
Substantive Reasons for Studying Foreign Policy, Broadly Defined  
As the section above suggested, foreign policy cooperation incentives differ from 
foreign economic policy cooperation incentives in three key ways: by lacking direct 
incentives for citizens to advocate cooperation, by lacking clear gains for states 
themselves, and by causing states to incur (or risk) substantial sovereignty costs. 
                                                
12 (Busch 2005); (Busby 2007); (Damro 2006); (Davis 2006); (Hafner-Burton 2005); (Mattli 2005). 
13 Studies on non-economic issues are slowly increasing in rigor but have not yet reached the same level as 




Few or No Direct Gains for Citizens 
Studies have consistently demonstrated that state behavior in foreign economic 
policy is strongly driven by the interests of key domestic groups.14 Domestic advocacy or 
pressure groups, acting in their own self-interest, have incentives to encourage states to 
cooperate on many economic matters. The situation in foreign policy is often different, 
however. Foreign policy activity itself may result in gains in the international arena, but 
no theoretical reason exists to expect cooperation on, say, a joint statement about human 
rights in a particular country or a trans-boundary environmental project to produce 
substantially greater gains for domestic constituents than acting alone may bring.15 As a 
result of this (likely) absence of direct domestic gains from cooperation itself, no self-
interested group of citizens would likely have an incentive to advocate cooperation on 
foreign policy issues. Without direct citizen pressure to cooperate (and the resulting lack 
of constituent interest in the matter), governments re ain a high degree of flexibility in 
their choice of foreign policy behavior.16 As a result, domestic pressure – if any exists – 
influences or constrains the goals of foreign policy in a broad sense but does not typically 
constrain the specific strategies used to pursue those goals.  
Unclear Gains from Cooperation for States 
States’ own gains from cooperation are also unclear in many non-economic 
issues, which further complicates the decision.17 To use the example from the previous 
paragraph, do states have a clear reason to believe that a joint statement about human 
                                                
14 See, e.g., (Davis 2006); (Milner 1997); (Pekkanen, Solis and Katada 2006); (Limbago 2004).  
15 Indeed, citizens rarely experience direct benefit from foreign policy at all; scholars widely cite it as an 
example of a pure public good. The benefits accrue diffusely to all, rather than to a specific group who 
might then advocate for it. On foreign policy as a public good, see (Meernik and Oldmixon 2008); (Bueno 
de Mesquita, et al. 2004). 
16 (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989). 




rights is more likely to evoke a change in behavior than a unilateral one? One claim, 
which appears frequently in literature on the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP), is that more voices speaking together amplify the message and have more 
influence than unilateral statements by the same number of states.18 On the other hand, 
one can imagine a situation where the acting state h s strong ties – historical, economic, 
ethnic, etc. – to the target state. In this situation, a forceful unilateral statement from the 
actor may actually carry more influence with the target than a watered-down statement 
from the actor in collaboration with other states. In foreign economic policy, however, 
economic theory gives good reason to believe that te gains from cooperation will be 
significant, divisible, and targeted. States can estimate their own benefit fairly precisely, 
even in situations where the agreement may deviate from their own ideal point. 
Two additional factors compound this situation of unclear state gains from 
cooperation. First, most forms of foreign policy cooperation are about sharing costs rather 
than increasing and dividing benefits. While the goal is still to achieve a better outcome 
than would be possible under non-cooperation, the benefits of cooperation typically 
amount to keeping a situation from getting worse (i. ., averting future higher costs) rather 
than capturing explicit gains in the current period. Incentives for cooperation are 
dampened by the lack of any new or additional benefits to distribute. That the benefits of 
foreign policy cooperation are largely in expectation compounds this dampening effect.19 
The primary benefits come from averting higher costs in the future, but discounted 
                                                
18 For this argument, see, e.g., (Hill 2001); (Hey, 2003). Even if some benefit accrues from this 
amplification, though, states must still incur (someti es substantial) transaction costs to negotiate a 
unanimously-accepted text. These costs could potentially offset the amplification gains. 
19 Cooperating can increase success in two ways: by increasing the total capacity brought to bear on the 
problem and by decreasing the per-state cost of action, making a more extensive range of actions possible. 
As an example, four states running separate $500 million humanitarian relief and mediation missions in a 
conflict zone could provide a much more direct effort t  end fighting by instead conducting a joint $2




avoided costs are not particularly motivating. In the short term, cooperation can make 
success more likely by increasing the total amount of resources available and making a 
wider range of options possible, but it is by no means guaranteed. This might make states 
less willing to take risks on a high-visibility, high-cost, high-stakes cooperative mission 
and instead increase the attractiveness of low-visibility, low-cost, low-stakes unilateral 
actions such as declarations. 
Second, even in those cases where states choose to cooperate on foreign policy, 
theory suggests several reasons why states might prefer not to conduct this cooperation 
through a formal international organization. If cooperation is mostly a “problem of 
coordination” (Stein 1990), as Ginsberg (1989) and others suggest, then the main obstacle 
to cooperation is informational. While institutions can help to facilitate information flow 
to solve these problems, they are not necessary conditions for cooperation. States can 
overcome communication problems without institutions more easily than they could 
overcome, e.g., enforcement problems.  
If, however, foreign policy cooperation involves distr bution problems 
(differences between states over which outcome is most preferred) as well as 
coordination problems, then the option of cooperation hrough an institution can become 
much less desirable. As Fearon (1998) demonstrates, institutions lengthen the shadow of 
the future, and in the presence of distribution problems this can severely impede 
bargaining. Cooperation in an institution with a long shadow of the future may also 
restrict states’ policy flexibility as conditions on the ground change. As a result, 




attractive than extra-institutional activity, even with the additional transaction costs the 
latter option imposes. 
Sovereignty Costs 
Finally, Realist theory draws our attention to concer s about the national interest 
and sovereignty that states are thought to have. If states are concerned about maintaining 
their own sovereignty, then foreign policy is a least-likely case for cooperation.20 
External sovereignty, or the exclusive right to make policy towards other units in the 
international system, is a defining characteristic of a Westphalian state.21 Foreign policy 
cooperation necessarily restricts freedom of action in external affairs, and this is 
particularly true when enacted through an institution where agreements are politically or 
legally binding. Perhaps as evidence of state concern about this, none of the institutions 
in this study can issue legally binding foreign policy agreements, thought they all can 
(and often do) establish politically binding ones.22 If states are quite protective of their 
sovereignty – and patterns of defections from colletiv  agreements and of failed 
attempts at cooperation suggest that they are – then predicting and explaining cooperation 
in a broad set of foreign policy issues should be very difficult since states should have 
little incentive to cooperate at all. 
 
A Methodological Reason to Study Foreign Policy, Broadly Defined 
Finally, an important methodological justification for studying a broadly defined 
field such as “foreign policy” exists. Most studies of cooperation behavior focus on a 
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21 (Krasner 1999); see also (Koenig-Archibugi 2004) on s vereignty concerns as a variable, not a constant. 
22 Politically binding agreements do not take the form of international treaties. They do not often require 




single issue, a sub-issue within the broader pool of foreign policy issues (e.g., human 
rights, free trade areas or the environment). While this choice is defensible given the 
scarcity of systematic data about international cooperation, it has the unfortunate 
methodological downside of producing theory and findings that do not necessarily 
generalize well to other subfields. Single-issue studies provide no way for analysts to 
determine if the findings result from underlying characteristics of the issues themselves 
(e.g., the relative non-salience of most UN Food an Agricultural Organization decisions 
or the highly technical nature and relative invisibility of national current account 
restrictions),23 rather than as general characteristics about states’ incentives to cooperate. 
The use of a data pool whose contents span multiple issue areas provides variation on 
these underlying characteristics, and helps us to ensur  that the findings are about 
cooperation in a general sense and are not simply functions of these underlying 
characteristics.24  
 
Implications for Research 
The result of these unusual substantive characteristics of foreign policy is a 
situation where non-institutional cooperation and unilateral action remain substantially 
more attractive than in many economic issues. As a result, efforts to predict and explain 
foreign policy behavior, broadly defined, face a more difficult test than in narrower issue 
areas. The methodological reason for studying foreign policy also suggests the need for 
(and increased challenge of) testing on a broader, representative sample of issues. 
Arguments that withstand testing here are particularly robust and should be well-
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supported in further studies of specific subfields of cooperation such as human rights, 
trade, and the environment. To paraphrase Bennett ad Elman (2006), studying foreign 
policy cooperation in such a broad definition allows us to make the ‘Sinatra inference’: If 
the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere.25  
 
Why Europe? 
Three reasons that address both theoretical and methodological concerns support 
the choice of Europe as a testing ground for theories of foreign policy behavior. First, the 
European foreign policy space has a very high density of institutions. At least five, and as 
many as eight, different institutions or bodies claim jurisdiction over some portion of 
foreign policy issues in that region. This range of b dies allows states the opportunity to 
choose between them, as well as to choose between institutional cooperation and other 
outside options. Second, these organizations exhibit var ation on theoretically relevant 
variables such as the extent of their institutionalization, their memberships, and their 
substantive jurisdictions. At the same time, however, they are similar enough to remain 
comparable in a large-n framework. They fulfill similar functions in international 
relations and perform the same kinds of duties in the international system that we can 
plausibly treat them as similar units for comparison.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, European state  exhibit considerable 
variation in their capacity to act independently. This is a theoretically critical point for 
evaluating a general theory of foreign policy behavior and foreign policy cooperation: 
Independent activity must be a viable option for at least some members of the group. 
Without viable outside options, the choice set shrinks dramatically to “do nothing” and 
                                                




“cooperate.” For states without independent action capacity, the incentives to cooperate 
and compromise one’s ideal point may be stronger than t e choice of doing nothing. 
When the ability to act without extensive support from institutions or other states exists, 
however, the imperative of cooperation to achieve goals decreases. Indeed, European 
states have a long tradition of ad hoc groupings and coalitions of the willing, from 
Bosnia’s “Contact Group” to the Multinational Protection Force in Albania.26 Europe is 
one of the few regions to have multiple states that have the capacity to act independently 
in international affairs. This makes it a strong candidate for evaluating a theory that 
emphasizes the non-dichotomous nature of foreign policy choices.  
 
An Introduction to the Consensus and Capacity Framework 
The consensus-capacity framework explains states’ foreign policy choices at both 
the unilateral and multilateral levels as a sequence of decisions. By treating foreign policy 
as a sequence of discrete decisions, rather than a si gle dichotomous ‘cooperate-or-not’ 
decision, it identifies a range of other behaviors that can emerge from the foreign policy 
decision-making process. The framework’s predictions thus allow us to predict when 
states would choose to act unilaterally, and also when they would choose to act 
multilaterally both inside and outside institutions. 
In brief, I argue that both consensus and capacity re jointly necessary but neither 
singly nor jointly sufficient conditions for international cooperation. When one or both 
are absent, behaviors other than may cooperation emerge. The absence of capacity in a 
particular institution or group often results in low-resource-intensity declarations by the 
institution or unilateral actions by capable states. The absence of consensus in an 
                                                




organization prohibits cooperation and can result in unilateral actions, extra-institutional 
cooperation, or decisions to do nothing. The absence of both consensus and capacity in an 
international group or organization can only result in unilateral activity or choices to do 
nothing.27 
 
Contribution and Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter Two begins by expanding the notions of consensus and capacity in 
foreign policy behavior, and establishes how these ideas will help to predict and explain 
state foreign policy behavior. It then turns to the m thodological aspects of testing a 
general explanation of foreign policy behavior, and i  particular the problem of how to 
obtain an unbiased data set even in the presence of s lection effects. We cannot study 
choices of foreign policy behaviors without also studying instances where no behavior 
happened, but it could plausibly have. Negative cases or “non-events” are int gral to 
testing the consensus-capacity framework, and to testing many other theories of state 
behavior. This chapter contributes a strategy for how one might obtain them in the study 
of cooperation and similar topics. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five are the empirical heart of the dissertation. Chapter 
Three begins by exploring the earliest observable decision in the foreign policy 
cooperation process, the initial decision to cooperate through an institution. In particular, 
I study the decision to cooperate in the European Union, since its unlimited jurisdiction 
makes it a reasonable choice for action on any given event or issue. In answering the 
question “When do states cooperate?,” this chapter integrates arguments from the 
literatures on European integration and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
                                                




itself with a range of other theories in the broader political science literature. The goal is 
to understand what kinds of issues, and what kinds of other factors, prompt cooperation 
through institutions – or at least through this particular institution. To do this, I apply 
quantitative methods to a newly developed dataset of 300 randomly chosen world events 
to examine which types of events receive cooperation. This chapter reveals the critical 
role of pre-crisis preference convergence mechanisms n promoting cooperation. It also 
finds, contrary to expectations in the CFSP literature, that presidency ideologies have a 
notable influence under some conditions. 
Armed with this knowledge, we can then examine if these same factors also 
prompt unilateral or extra-institutional cooperation, or if the set of influential factors 
differ across venues. Chapter Four considers these questions, examining the full range of 
potential foreign policy outcomes, from unilateral behavior to the use of multiple 
institutions. If Realist arguments are correct, unilateral action should be most likely to 
occur when strong and differentiated national interests are at stake; as national interests 
get stronger and more divergent, other forms of foreign policy activity should become 
less likely. If institutionalist arguments are correct, the same factors should generally 
predict cooperation in all institutions, and cooperation patterns across institutions should 
differ systematically in relation to the institutions’ values on those variables. Finally, this 
chapter examines patterns of complementarity and substit tion across events and 
institutions. In particular, I explore patterns of outcomes for sign  of ‘forum shopping,’ or 
the strategic choice among institutions to maximize gains. 
Chapter Five examines forum shopping behavior in a qu litative manner, 




The European response to this crisis was incredibly complex. A UN-authorized, OSCE-
organized, Italian-led ad hoc coalition went into Albania on a peacekeeping mission to 
organize and oversee elections, while the Council of Europe cheered loudly from the 
sidelines and provided logistical support for the el ctions and the constitution-drafting 
process that was to follow. States can clearly distinguish between these institutions at a 
very fine level of detail, even if – to analysts at least – the institutions appear very similar 
in their membership, jurisdiction, capacity and other characteristics of theoretical interest. 
But how do states do this, and why? This chapter returns to the previously-bracketed 
question of how individual state preferences and behavior influenced the final outcome in 
this crisis by examining several states’ behavior at different stages of the crisis, a topic 
for which the methods of earlier chapters were ill-suited. It reveals particularly strong 
evidence of capacity concerns on the part of some (but not all) states, and some intriguing 
instances of sequential forum shopping behavior as st tes revealed their preferences over 
the course of the crisis.  
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by evaluating he usefulness of the 
consensus-capacity framework for understanding state foreign policy behavior at the 
levels of both state behavior and international outc mes. It notes gaps in the theory’s 
predictions and findings that counter expectations, such as the role of inter-temporal 
linkage. Finally, it identifies particular contributions to our understanding of foreign 








Theorizing and Explaining Foreign Policy Choice 
 
The previous chapter made a case for studying cooperation in the context of 
Europe and in the issue areas of foreign policy. This c apter continues by presenting a 
framework for understanding when states choose to cooperate – and by extension, when 
they choose to act unilaterally – on foreign policy ssues. This framework emphasizes 
two important insights: that cooperation is a process or sequence of moves with multiple 
potential outcomes besides “cooperate” and “not cooperate,” and that we can understand 
which of these outcomes emerge by considering the role of consensus and capacity.  
This chapter first establishes the case for treating cooperation as a sequence of 
decisions with multiple outcomes. The second section c nsiders the current state of 
theory about international cooperation, and about freign policy cooperation specifically. 
It also addresses the theoretical complications that overlapping or duplicative 
international institutions present. The third section presents the consensus and capacity 
framework and establishes expectations for the empirical chapters, including when states 
might choose actions other than cooperation in institutions. The fourth section addresses 
methodological obstacles to studying cooperation empirically, namely the problems of 
case selection and identifying negative cases. The penultimate section presents a mixed-




Theorizing Foreign Policy Choices 
Foreign policy cooperation emerges at the end of an extensive chain of decisions. 
The decision to cooperate itself is a strategic choice in which states anticipate the likely 
reactions of their potential partners before proposing collective activity. If states believe 
that their partners are unlikely to agree, then the event may exit the decision process at an 
outcome other than ‘cooperation.’ Figures 2-1 to 2-3 graphically depict the decision 
sequence and the alternative outcomes. To illustrate the complexity of this decision 
process, this section will briefly review the literature on the decision to cooperate, the 
decision to do so through an institution, and the decision of which institution to use. 
 
Figure 2-1. The Decision to Cooperate. 
 
The Decision to Cooperate 
Early scholarship on cooperation focused on identifyi g the conditions under 
which cooperation could arise, that is, under what conditions states would choose to raise 
an issue at choice point 1 (Figure 2-1) and advance to the bargaining stage at choice point 




Figure 2-1), but it generally neglected what happens when cooperation does not occur. 
These other decisions and outcomes are gray in the figur .  
These works focused on the role of payoff structures (i. ., interest configurations) 
and power configurations in the emergence of cooperation, and they emphasized 
cooperation to provide public goods, particularly fee trade in the international system.28 
The study of public goods issues, which have the classic ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ payoff 
structure where all actors have incentives to defect, eventually gave way to the study of a 
broader range of payoff configurations.29 This scholarship clarified the role of 
distribution problems, or differences in preferences over the set of possible agreements, 
as obstacles to cooperation. Stein (1990) also established that some configurations of 
interests do not support cooperation, even with repeated cooperation over time. Together, 
these works created an initial understanding of when issues might reach outcomes A or B. 
Subsequent scholarship considered the implications of later stages of cooperation 
on the initial decision to cooperate. Fearon (1998) considered how concerns about the 
enforceability of an agreement might influence bargaining over the agreement itself.30 
Others introduced the ratification stage to consider how configurations of domestic 
interests or institutions influence states’ ability to conclude agreements successfully.31 
These authors acknowledge the process or multi-stage nature of international 
                                                
28 (Keohane 1984); (Olson 1982); (Axelrod 1984). 
29 (Stein 1990); (Morrow 1994). 
30 Enforcement decisions extend two choices to the right of the “cooperation” outcomes in Figure 2-1: one 
where states decide to implement the agreement and a second where the other states then decide to enforc  
if the first state chose not to implement. 
31 Putnam (1988) is the best-known statement of this modern second-image approach, but see also Milner 
(1997) for a formal treatment of asymmetric ratificat on constraints. Tarar (2001) considers a model where 
both sides require domestic ratification. In a recent piece, Earnest (2008) uses an agent-based model with a 
relatively large number of players, all of whom require domestic ratification, and also multiple outcome 
possibilities. His analysis addresses when cooperation emerges rather than how states choose between th  




cooperation, but they continue to limit the set of p ssible choices to ‘cooperate vs. not 
cooperate’ rather than allowing the form and venue of the cooperation to be a variable.  
Gruber (2000) and Gilligan (2004) take some steps in this direction by treating the 
set of potential cooperation partners as a variable. Gruber’s argument centers around his 
conception of ‘go-it-alone power,’ or the ability to alter the status quo either alone or in a 
small group. Joiners, he claims, can often be motivated not by their own gains from 
participation. Instead, they join because their true preference – the pre-agreement status 
quo – is no longer available, and the status quo under the new agreement is better than 
exclusion. Gilligan, on the other hand, considers how the set of states included in a 
multilateral cooperation event affects the shape of the resulting agreement. In particular, 
he investigates how even large organizations can achieve fairly deep levels of 
cooperation over time by manipulating the set of new players. This n-player model is one 
of few that studies how group preferences translate into the form of an agreement.32 
The literature thus provides a fairly clear sense of what kinds of conditions would 
facilitate cooperation and so implicitly provides exp ctations for conditions where it 
would be unlikely. Where it is less useful, however, is in understanding the complexity of 
the ‘not cooperate’ option (i.e., the gray text in F gure 2-1). The ‘not cooperate’ category 
masks a wide range of behaviors; these might include no action (the status quo, outcome 
B in Figure 2-1), or some form of unilateral action (choice 3 outcome C). The unilateral 
action might be a ‘defect’ or ‘not-cooperate’ behavior (i.e., doing something other than 
                                                
32 For Gruber, the form of the agreement is a functio of the preferences of the go-it-alone coalition and the 
potential domestic losers in each. Recent work by Stone, Slantchev, and London (2008) also explores th 
issue of who will participate in cooperation in a repeated collective action problem. Outcomes here, though, 
are not determined by the preferences of the players. Instead, the distribution of power in the international 
system explains both provision of the public good an creation of institutions. Chapter 3 of this dissertation 




the agreed or cooperative action). Unilateral action might also occur, however, without 
the state in question having considered ‘cooperate’ (i.e., without opening negotiations or 
approaching potential partners); both failed and unope ed negotiations effectively choose 
‘no’ at choice point 2. This could occur if, for example, the acting state believed no other 
partners would be interested. This type of strategic behavior truncates the set of issues on 
which any attempted cooperation emerges and suggests a need for particular attention to 
selection bias at very early stages in the cooperation process. 
 
The Decision to Cooperate in an Institution 
The previous section discussed literature on the emrgence of cooperation in 
general. This section extends to the next stage in cooperation decision-making, the choice 
to conduct the cooperation through or in a formal international organization (choice 4 in 
Figure 2-2, to reach outcome E).33 As above, this collective decision is made by all the
institution’s members, but it presumes that states have already reached a decision to 
cooperate (choice point 2). 
Figure 2-2. The Decision to Cooperate in an Institution. 
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The properties of institutions are fairly well understood. Axelrod (1984) and 
Keohane (1984) show how institutions can lengthen the shadow of the future and 
facilitate cooperation even under less auspicious payoff structures like the prisoners’ 
dilemma. Institutions increase the probability of repeated interaction with a partner and 
thus make possible reciprocal punishment of defection. Even when preventing defection 
is less of a concern, states can still benefit from cooperating through institutions. Abbott 
and Snidal (1998) explain that centralization and delegation within formal international 
organizations allow states to capture more of the gains from cooperation; institutions 
intervene between cooperating states and the substantive issues on which the states 
cooperate. By providing centralized information collection and distribution, and a forum 
for multilateral bargaining, institutions can reduce the transaction costs of cooperation. 
By delegating monitoring to the institution, states can increase the credibility of reports of 
compliance and defection, even when noise disrupts direct state-to-state observation.34 
The decision to cooperate outside of an institution, however, is substantially 
under-theorized. Extra-institutional cooperation occurs (i.e., events reach outcome D) 
when a coalition of willing states coordinate policy outside the framework of an 
established formal organization. If institutions are so beneficial to cooperation, though, 
why do we still observe cooperation outside of them? Cooperation outside a formal 
institution may be attractive because no additional gains exist, i.e., because states have 
already achieved fully efficient cooperation on that issue.35 In the case of some forms of 
bilateral cooperation – on standards, perhaps, where d fection from the cooperative 
equilibrium is not in an actor’s self-interest – such a situation may be plausible. Extra-
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institutional cooperation may also be attractive, though, because states cannot access the 
additional gains even with the use of an institution, r because the costs of the institution 
would exceed the benefits it would bring. The increased shadow of the future that 
institutions provide may also create a barrier to co peration by locking states into lesser-
preferred outcomes or outcomes whose value is uncertain at the time of agreement.36 
For states, an additional benefit of cooperating outside a formal structure is the 
ability to be selective about one’s partners.37 Cooperation through an institution usually 
involves all members of the institution, meaning that the set of preferences which any 
agreement must satisfy is fixed. Moreover, decision rules in most formal international 
organizations typically allow any member to exercise a veto, which gives every actor an 
opportunity to frustrate attempts at consensus. Cooperating outside an institution allows 
states to choose as partners only those states whose preferred policy outcomes are similar 
to their own.38 The benefits of a policy outcome closer to their own ideal points may well 
outweigh the gains available through an existing formal organization. 
 
The Decision on Which Institution to Use 
As the last two sections have suggested, states have alternative foreign policy 
options besides cooperation through an institution. The least-theorized choice, though, is 
how states choose between the various institutions that are available for use on any given 
issue. The proliferation of international organizations, particularly through the 1990s, 
means that identifying an issue on which only a single institution has jurisdiction is 
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37 If the benefits of cooperation through an institution are great enough, the ad hoc coalition of state has 
the choice to create a new institution for its cooperation. The question of institutional creation, however, is 
outside the scope of this dissertation.  




increasingly difficult.39 The choice is no longer ‘not cooperate’ versus ‘cooperate’; it is 
now ‘not cooperate,’ ‘cooperate here,’ or ‘cooperat elsewhere.’40 Figure 2-3 shows an 
expansion of what was formerly outcome E, now shown as a choice point where states 
choose yes or no for each international institution under consideration. This extension of 
the figure means that strategic states must now consider a further stage of decision-
making when they plan their own strategies. 
In an early piece on how states choose between institutions, Jupille and Snidal 
(2006) posit that states’ choices are four-fold. They can choose to use an existing 
institution, modify an existing institution, select between existing institutions, or create a 
new institution. A key assumption of this work, however, is that a single focal institution 
exists, against which states weigh their other options. But when multiple plausible fora 
exist, how do states choose between them? Jupille and Snidal treat this issue only in 
passing and instead focus on their choices of modifying or creating new institutions.  
 
Figure 2-3. The Decision on Which Institution to Use. 
 
                                                
39 See, e.g., Raustiala and Victor (2004, 306) on institutional density in the international system. 
40 Recognition of this alternate outcome is akin to Stam’s (1996) re-coding of war outcomes from ‘win’ ad 
‘lose’ to ‘win, lose, or draw.’ Unlike Stam’s outcomes, however, these choices are not mutually exclusive; 




Pekkanen, Solis, and Katada (2006) and Ortiz Mena (2005) address this question 
from a different angle, presenting arguments about f rum choice rooted in domestic 
politics. For Pekkanen et al., Japanese forum preferenc s for a trade agreement emerged 
from a need to control the agreement’s content to placate domestic interests while still 
capturing as much of the gain from free trade as possible. The resulting bilateral free 
trade agreement with Mexico continued heavy protection for Japanese rice producers but 
obtained free access for Japanese manufactured goods; such a partial agreement would 
not have been possible in either the World Trade Organization or regional fora available 
at the time. Ortiz Mena responded to this from the M xican perspective, arguing that 
desires for neither gains nor control drove the Mexican decision. Instead, accepting a 
bilateral agreement with Japan was part of the Mexican government’s efforts to 
consolidate domestic reforms by entrenching them in international law.  
In a curious development, though, neither side in this debate appears to 
acknowledge that forum choice is a collective decision between all of the participants, not 
just the unilateral choice of one participant.41 Pursuing a bilateral preferential trade 
agreement with Mexico was a viable option for Japan only because Mexico was willing 
to accept that type of forum. This tacit consensus on the appropriate forum was critical: 
Had Mexico desired otherwise, Japan would not have be n able to achieve its most 
preferred outcome. Achieving cooperation requires convergence on strategies – on which 
forum or type of agreement to choose – as well as on outcomes.  
Other work considers forum choice from an international angle, with some 
attention to the collective nature of forum decision . Daniel Drezner (2003), for instance, 
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provides an explanation of collective choice when the outcome is not in the immediate 
interests of all parties. In Drezner’s study of inter ational financial regulation, the larger 
and more powerful states in the international system had similar preferred policy 
outcomes. As a result, they all had similar forum preferences – one where they could 
achieve an outcome close to their ideal points. Weaker states, in contrast, preferred to use 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where they could demand concessions favoring 
their own interests in return for accepting the powerful states’ preferences. 
The market power of the larger states, however, allowed them to disregard the 
preferences of the developing world and establish an agreement at their own ideal point 
through an alternate institution where the developing states had no voice, the Bank of 
International Settlements. Power asymmetry then led to the weaker states’ acquiescence 
to the new rules, although they themselves desired otherwise. The benefits of 
participating in the new regime outweighed potential costs and/or benefits of fighting for 
their own preferred forum, especially once the great powers arranged for the IMF to 
enforce the agreement and make access to some assistance contingent on compliance.42  
In an additional contribution, Raustiala and Victor (2004) study a ‘regime 
complex’ of overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes in the broad field of plant genetic 
resources. They find evidence about forum shopping s milar to Drezner’s: Groups of 
states pushed for the use of institutions whose framing of common problems was 
beneficial to their own interests. Raustiala and Victor also find evidence of distinct 
differences in the benefits and costs of pursuing issues in substantively broader versus 
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narrower fora – for example, that credibility of promises matters more than issue linkage 
in broader fora43 – and these differences may also drive state venue choices.44 
 
The Consensus-Capacity Framework 
In this dissertation, I argue that the need for both consensus and capacity shape all 
forms of foreign policy behavior – including both te choices to act alone and/or to 
cooperate, and if they choose to cooperate, then throug  which (if any) institution(s). 
Without consensus, agreement is impossible; without capacity, action is impossible. In 
this section I further elaborate on the concepts of consensus and capacity and explain 
why both are jointly necessary but neither singly nor jointly sufficient for cooperation. 
 
Consensus 
Consensus is necessary for cooperation both inside and outside of formal 
international organizations. International organizations, especially those in foreign policy, 
usually have unanimity or consensus decision rules. Unanimity requires all parties to 
agree actively; consensus requires that no one actively object.45 These strong decision 
rules mean that the player who is least disadvantaged by the status quo controls the 
outcome; this actor can veto any potential agreement that would make her worse off than 
she was under the status quo. This power severely restricts the range of possible 
agreements in a given institution. The existence of this veto power, combined with the 
costliness of failed cooperation attempts, give state  an incentive to consider carefully 
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44 Chapters 4 and 5 extend Raustiala and Victor’s work about whether characteristics of institutions other 
than the identity and/or preferences of members influe ce their attractiveness for cooperation and look f r 
patterns of substitutability and complementarity across the available outcomes. 
45 Consensus is a slightly weaker decision rule, but both are still very strong compared to, e.g., the majority 




before making a proposal in an international organiz tion. In a world where multiple 
international organizations exist, the strong decision rules also create incentives for states 
to shop for an institution whose members’ preferences are distributed in such a manner 
that they will accept the proposal. 
In the absence of consensus, however, states may prefer not to approach an 
institution for cooperation. If the state wishing to act does not believe that consensus 
exists in any of the available fora, it has two outside choices available to it. First, it could 
assemble an ad hoc (extra-institutional) coalition of the willing from states whose 
preferences are similar to its own. As the section above suggested, the proposing state can 
assure consensus around its own ideal point by deliberately selecting states on the basis 
of their preferences. This choice of ad hoc activity, however, is contingent upon the 
potential group members having sufficient capacity to enact their preferences 
successfully. A group with inadequate capacity will fai , and since states prefer to avoid 
incurring the costs of failure, rational states should not move ahead with coalition 
formation if they do not expect that the ad hoc group will be able to achieve success.46  
Second, states may choose unilateral action, but this too faces a similar capacity 
constraint. All states have the capacity to issue statements and declarations; this weak 
form of action requires only a foreign ministry spokesperson or even a lone ministry 
official to read an approved text or respond to a question. Beyond this, though, national 
capacity varies greatly. If neither an institution’s membership nor a cluster of like-minded 
states is available to bolster capacity, then most states will be unable to take action. States 
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potential group’s capacity would be inadequate for the task would want to remain out of the group. I retu n 




that lack the capacity to achieve their ideal points unilaterally are limited to issuing 
statements at best or accepting the third option – doing nothing – at worst.47  
Sources of Consensus 
Four prominent factors – the structure of incentives on the issue, historical or 
situational characteristics, ideology, and issue salience – can influence the emergence of 
consensus on an issue. Each can act both as a spur and as an impediment to consensus 
and thus to cooperation. I address each in turn below. 
The first factor that can be a source of consensus i  the structure of actors’ 
incentives (i.e., the payoff structure). Some decisions are coordination problems, where 
the difficulty of consensus lies in reaching a common outcome rather than in carrying it 
out. When states solve this problem, coordination games produce self-enforcing 
equilibria: Once players achieve an agreement, such as on the language of a common 
declaration, none have incentives to deviate from it.48 
Other types of issues, however, such as deploying a peacekeeping mission or 
giving humanitarian aid, are public goods that carry with them an incentive to defect. 
Individual states believe that actions or contributions by their partners can substitute for 
their own efforts, so an incentive to free ride exists. As a result, all under-contribute and 
                                                
47 Doing nothing can also be a deliberate choice, as the figures in this chapter show. The present discus ion 
raises the possibility that doing nothing could be a default choice – one created by the absence of consensus 
and the lack of capacity – rather than one that the actor deliberately selects. I revisit this below. 
48 Compare, for example, the difference in statements saying “We condemn the recent electoral 
intimidation in Egypt and Zambia,” and “We condemn the recent electoral intimidation in Zambia and 
Egypt.” The statements are substantively the same, but for maximum effect, scholars and practitioners 
should argue, the declarations should be identically worded. Presuming that agreement exists on the desired 
degree and targets of condemnation, reaching agreement on the specific order of the states should not be 
difficult. In these (admittedly rare) cases, the payoff structure facilitates cooperation. This scenario, of 
course, presumes that states agree on the content of the declaration (i.e., that no distribution problems 
exist), and that they are only uncertain about the precise wording that the others plan to adopt. While this 
may not be an entirely accurate portrayal of the declaration drafting process, it is nonetheless a comm n 




the public good is poorly provided – if indeed it can be provided at all with the limited 
resources that the states committed. States facing a situation where they believe their 
partners will free-ride or otherwise shirk may be unwilling to agree to such a bargain.49 
Second, some historical factors can affect consensus. Countries often maintain 
foreign policy ties with former colonies, or have longstanding bilateral ties to other states 
that may be the targets of cooperative action.50 Other characteristics of similarity, such as 
sharing non-aligned status, economic interests, or ge graphic contiguity with the target 
state, may also affect states’ preferences by making them sympathetic to the target. These 
relationships and similarities may be obstacles to consensus (i.e., contribute to dissensus) 
if the organization’s members have ties to parties on both sides of the dispute. 
Ideology may also influence states’ ability to reach a consensus. Governments of 
similar ideological background may share commitments to certain international causes. 
Governments of the left may be more sympathetic to calls for global redistribution, since 
their domestic political systems value this,51 or be more attentive to labor rights, the 
environment, and human rights concerns since these is ues interest their core 
constituents. Cooperation allows them to commit more f their resources to domestic 
priorities while still achieving desired international outcomes. If these governments are 
more inward-focused, however, as post-materialist argument suggest,52 then they may be 
less inclined to cooperate overall. Governments of the right are thought to be more 
internationalist, and so they might be more inclined to cooperate. Again, though, post-
                                                
49 (Olson 1982). 
50 For example, the UK has a longstanding “special rel tionship” with the United States and maintains very 
cordial ties with its former colony of Australia. The Nordic Bloc, on the other hand, comprises three EU 
members and Norway – or alternatively, two committed NATO members and two neutrals. These ties may 
pull members in different directions depending on the substantive issue under consideration.  
51 (Noël and Thérien 1995). 




materialist arguments suggest that these parties ar concerned with national pride and 
national identity; they may be less enthusiastic about pooling sovereignty in foreign 
policy cooperation.53  
Finally, the salience of an issue may influence the c ance of consensus. Media 
coverage of foreign events can increase the extent of visibility and public concern about 
those events at home, and thus increase their salience to opinion-sensitive leaders.54 
Public attention to an issue may then provoke decision-makers to address an issue that 
they otherwise might have preferred to ignore or defer.55 Even in the absence of explicit 
public pressure on a highly publicized issue, policymakers may feel compelled to react to 
avoid public perceptions of incompetence. 
 
Capacity 
Capacity is the resource set available to a state or set of states for use in foreign 
policy that increase its chances of obtaining its (or their) desired outcome. To be willing 
to act, states must have sufficient resources to execute their desired action with a level of 
probable success that they deem acceptable. Actors annot guarantee success in foreign 
policy, even if they choose to try using force to compel the target’s behavior, so they 
must instead have a threshold probability of success that makes the expected benefit of 
using a given foreign policy instrument exceed its co t.56 Capacity involves both physical 
                                                
53 I thank Michael Koch for a helpful discussion of these ideas. 
54 All of the focal states in this study are democrati , which implies that their leaders must be at least 
minimally sensitive to domestic opinion, but see Croco (2008) for a discussion of limitations on the 
influence of popular opinion on wartime leaders. 
55 The current crisis in Sudan is an obvious example of this. 
56 Force will remove the target’s ability to choose its own policy – if it succeeds. The current US 
involvement in Iraq demonstrates that even overwhelming levels of capabilities cannot guarantee a 




components (bureaucracies, spokesmen, economic aid, military forces) and also 
intangible elements such as legitimacy and credibility. 
In the case of an individual state, capacity is relatively easy to determine; the 
state, in theory, has access to all of its own resources. It may use its entire diplomatic 
network, all of its foreign aid budget, or the full range of its military capabilities, if it so 
chooses. Not all forms of capacity will be relevant for a particular problem or issue, nor 
will states often choose to commit all of their resources to a single issue, but the existence 
of the resources creates opportunities for the owning state to use them.  
For an institution, on the other hand, capacity is a um of its own capacity and 
some fraction of its members’ capacity.57 Institutions vary in their own resources.58 Some 
institutions have aid and project budgets that are independent of member-state 
contributions. Some have developed reputations as forceful activists on particular issues, 
such as the Council of Europe on human rights issues. Other times, institutions have 
specific and unique capabilities that no other institutions have. The European Union’s 
Commission has a network of delegations that rivals any great power’s embassy network 
in both number and dispersion.59 NATO owns an extensive range of military capabilities, 
including transport and early-warning aircraft, which belong to the organization itself 
rather than to any specific member state.  
                                                
57 I address the latter in the next section. 
58 This usage of ‘own resources’ or ‘own capacity’ parallels the usage in the European Union, where it 
refers to a designated portion of tax revenue that accrues directly to the Union, without need for approval as 
a grant in the member states’ budgets. 
59 Delegations are effectively embassies, with ambassador  and other usual privileges, but which are sent
by a body other than a state. None of the other institutions considered here have delegations to other states, 
though a few have observer delegations to other intna ional organizations like the UN and also to each 




Sources of Capacity 
As the section above discussed, national capacity is the result of national 
investment in various types of resources. The amount that states choose to invest in 
capacities for external action, as well as the distribution of that amount across categories 
of resources, is a function of both overall budget size and national political priorities. 
States with neutral or pacifist traditions, for example, are much less likely to invest 
heavily in military capacity. States with national traditions of social solidarity may 
project that value internationally through their generous foreign aid budgets.60  
Institutions have two major sources of capacity, their ‘own capacities’ and 
capacity seconded from member states. The previous section discussed some sources of 
own capacity, but others exist. For example, institutions, especially larger ones, possess a 
legitimacy that lends weight to their statements. Declarations and other foreign policy 
outputs from these bodies require the agreement of a large number – and correspondingly 
large range – of states, and this broad acceptance gives the output greater legitimacy in 
the eyes of targets or recipients. This legitimacy is a form of ‘own capacity’ for an 
institution, and it is not dependent on states agreeing to loan their capacity to the group. 
Institutions also obtain capacity from seconded natio l capacities when states 
agree to provide resources in support of some collective endeavor. These may be troops 
or equipment in the case of a peacekeeping intervention, humanitarian aid in response to 
a natural disaster, funding to support a democratization initiative, or anything else. 
Institutions only have access to member-state resouces with the consent of the member-
state. Most institutions have limited resources of their own, which means that the primary 
source of institutional capacity is seconded nationl capacity. Institutional access to its 
                                                




own capacities is generally assured; institutional access to national capabilities is not. 
Uncertainty about access to other states’ resources through an institution may make other 
states hesitate to propose action beyond what they themselves can support. The choice of 
forum, in other words, is contingent on expectations of sufficient capacity, including 
political will, to implement the desired action. 
 
Necessity, Sufficiency, and Foreign Policy Behavior 
Table 2-1 below shows the possible combinations of consensus and capacity and 
summarizes the foreign policy outcomes associated with each. When neither consensus 
nor capacity exists, then no collective response is po sible. When consensus exists but 
total capacity is low or lacking, then states are restricted to lower-intensity activity such 
as issuing declarations or statements. The extent of capacity required to do this is simply 
some individual who speaks to the media on behalf of the actor; all international 
organizations and states meet this minimum capacity threshold.  
Table 2-1. Consensus-Capacity Expectation Matrix.  
 Consensus No Consensus 
Capacity 
Cooperation, including action, 
is possible. 
Ad hoc cooperation and/or unilateral 
activity are possible. 
No Capacity 
Declarations are possible, but 
not collective action. 
No collective response is possible. 
 
When capacity exists but international consensus is lacking, however, then 
national actors with sufficient capacity can respond to international events without 
needing to cooperate. Most states, however, have only a limited capacity to influence 
world affairs through unilateral action. Even the United States, arguably the world’s most 
capable state on virtually any dimension, has not been able to induce regime change in 




try admirably, they can only leverage so much political, military, or economic capability 
in support of their preferences. This capability constraint severely restricts the usefulness 
of unilateral action for them, and it causes states to reserve unilateral activity for the 
limited set of issues on which they feel they have  particular influence for historical, 
cultural, economic, or other reasons.61 
When a single national actor has insufficient capacity to respond, that actor has 
the option to form a group of like-minded states – to take advantage of a mini-consensus 
– to cooperate outside of established organizations. The pooling of resources by a 
subgroup of states whose preferences already align increases the likelihood that the states 
will make their individual capacities available for the group’s use. The (typically) small 
number of states involved means that transaction costs f r negotiating the specifics of an 
action (or less frequently a statement) are low.62 The restricted size of the group becomes 
a liability, though, when legitimacy is an issue. Ad hoc groupings' lack of association 
with recognized international institutions means that the value of a collective statement 
by these groups is only slightly more than the value of unilateral statements by all the 
members. Producing a cooperative outcome involved some negotiation and concessions, 
but since members selected themselves into the group based on their preferences, the 
additional signaling value of international coordination on a single policy is very little. 
Finally, when both consensus and capacity exist within an organization or other 
group of states, then states will have the full range of foreign policy choices at their 
                                                
61 Unilateral activity is possible in all cells, but it should be most frequent in the upper right cell. 
62 The unusually large “coalition of the willing” that the United States assembled for the 2003 Gulf Waris 
an exception here. Many of the states lent politica support without making military contributions, whic  
somewhat reduced the costs of organizing action among the subgroup that was willing to act. Negotiating 
the compensatory packages these states received in retur  for their support, however, probably negated 




disposal. Cooperation – and particularly cooperation o take some form of high-intensity 
action – is possible in this cell. Both consensus and capacity are jointly necessary for 
cooperation, but they are not singly or jointly sufficient. Even if consensus and capacity 
exist, states may decide that the appropriate form f reaction is a low-intensity 
declaration, or they may decide not to act in that institution on that issue. The latter case 
could represent either a decision not to take action at all, or it could reflect a desire to act 
instead through another venue. The substantive component of consensus – what we all 
agree that we should do – can capture any of these outcomes, and not all of them result in 
cooperation. Successful international cooperation requires finding something that 
everyone can agree on and that they have the resources to do, somewhere where everyone 
can agree to do it. 
A caveat is necessary here. The various foreign policy ptions are not mutually 
exclusive (with the exception of an explicit choice of ‘do nothing’). States may choose to 
use one or more tools simultaneously if the conditions exist – for example, unilateral 
action may occur in tandem with institutional cooperation or extra-institutional 
cooperation. States always have sufficient capacity to issue their own statements, and 
sometimes have enough capacity to take independent action, and this capacity exists even 
if consensus and capacity exist in an organization or i an ad hoc coalition.  
 
Theorizing the Choice Between Options 
The previous section established the set of foreign policy actions that states have 
and considered the necessary conditions for each to emerge. These foreign policy actions 
serves as potential strategies that states can use to achieve their preferred outcomes. For 




reductions, negotiated bilateral reciprocal concession , multilateral reduction, the use of a 
trade war to compel reductions by others, etc. As the sections above implied, these 
choices are strategic and are conditional on preference distributions in each of the 
available venues. This subsection establishes a basic expected utility framework for 
understanding the strategy choices of individual stte . It then considers when states 
might cooperate or take unilateral action and then addresses the role of uncertainty. 
Finally, it examines implications of this framework for the choice between fora. 
Understanding Preferences over Strategies 
Assume that each state i has some most preferred outcome bi for a given foreign 
policy situation. The state wishes to obtain the best possible outcome that it can, and to 
do this, it chooses between doing nothing, taking some unilateral action ai, or 
participating in some cooperative action c through some existing organization.63 For 
simplicity, assume that the choices are evaluated separately as alternatives to the status 
quo q and are then compared to one another. Each state’s choice is a function of five 
terms: the value of the status quo, the value of the unilateral action a, the value of some 
potential cooperative measure c, and the probability of achieving success with each of 
those instruments.64 The expected utilities for state i of taking some unilateral action ai 
and accepting some collective outcome c would then be: 
 
                                                
63 Each state has its own ideal point bi, but c is the same for all states who are members of the organization. 
C is a function of the distribution of bis in an organization and the organization’s decision rules; as a result, 
it may differ across organizations as memberships and/or decision rules change. The determination of c is a 
question of policy content and is beyond the scope f this dissertation. The utility of action c to state i, 
though, is a function of the absolute distance betwe n the state’s ideal point and the cooperative outcome – 
that is to say, (bii – c).  
64 Success refers to achieving the desired change in conditions or behavior in the target country or on the
target issue. The present form of the expected utility expressions assumes risk neutrality for convenience, 




EUib = uia*p(successb) – uiq(1-p(successb))   (1) 
EUic = uic*p(successc) – uiq(1-p(successc))  (2) 
Cooperation thus occurs only when EUic > EUib and EUic > EUiq. In an expected 
utility framework, three elements can decrease the inc ntives to cooperate. First, as state 
preferences diverge – as their ideal points become more widely distributed around c – 
states may prefer to act alone (i.e., take action ai) to achieve their own ideal point rather 
than accept a cooperative outcome that deviates far from their preferences. Second, as the 
two probabilities of success change, the expected values of a and c will shift. This may 
cause states to adjust their preferred strategies once some threshold is reached that makes 
EUib > EUic. Finally, uncertainty about any of the four values – a, c, or either probability 
of success – increases, state strategies may also change. I address each element in turn. 
 Why Might Unilateral Action Be More Attractive? 
Unilateral action may be more attractive to states when distribution problems are 
severe. Severe distribution problems emerge under two conditions. First, an institution's 
members may have widely distributed preferences (i.., the variance of the bis is large). 
The decision rules of most international organizations require unanimity or at least 
consensus to make a collective decision. Under conditi s of widely dispersed 
preferences, no median preference may be able to obtain the support of all members 
when compared to the status quo or other reversion outcome. Second, even if some 
compromise position did emerge with reasonably widespr ad support, individual states 
may still be substantially displeased with this positi n if it deviates too far from their own 




outside option of unilateral action to obtain their ideal points.65 This type of unilateral 
action can occur with or without the formal use of a veto in the institution.66 Either of 
these two problems – widely distributed preferences or individual states with outlying 
preferences – can hinder cooperation by prohibiting consensus and also by encouraging 
states to take unilateral measures.  
Moreover, as suggested above, unilateralism becomes more attractive for states 
with greater capacity precisely because that additional capacity increases the state’s 
probability of attaining b successfully through its unilateral action a. If stronger or more 
influential states are preference outliers, then their propensity for unilateral action may be 
compounded: They have both the motive (divergent preferences) and the opportunity 
(sufficient capacity) to take unilateral measures. 
The option of ad hoc cooperation deserves special mention here. States always 
have the option to form a ‘coalition of the willing,’ or even to form a new organization if 
existing options fail to meet their needs or desires.67 If a cluster of states exists whose 
members have similar but outlying preferences, this group may choose to pursue its own 
ideal point in another manner. Ad hoc cooperation is most likely to emerge, then, when 
the distribution problem is at a moderate severity or when the distribution of preferences 
is bimodal.68 In either case, state preferences may be dispersed, but some concentration 
exists; a cluster of states have preferences similar enough to one another to be able to 
                                                
65 This is particularly true as the capabilities of preference-outlying states increase, as I elaborate below. 
66 It is especially likely if the institution allows for consensus-based decision making and does not produce 
policies that are binding on all member states. The only institution able to produce binding mandates to all 
member states in the area of foreign policy is the United Nations Security Council. As this body is not one 
of the focal institutions of this study, I will not return to this issue. 
67 See Jupille and Snidal (2006) on the choice to create new institutions 
68 Perhaps the best-known example of this is when the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were 
reluctant to cede sovereignty to the nascent European Community and instead formed the rival European 




reach agreement among themselves. The ability to choose participants on the basis of 
their preferences is the primary attraction of ad hoc cooperation: States create a group 
where consensus already exists around a particular o tcome. By doing this, states can still 
reap (at least some of) the gains of cooperation while still obtaining an outcome closer to 
their own ideal points – provided, of course, that the coalition has sufficient capacity to 
execute the cooperation successfully. 
 Why Might Cooperation Be More Attractive? 
Cooperation, or willingness to participate in some cooperative measure c even 
where c ≠ b, is most likely to arise when either the state does not have strongly held 
preferences on an issue, or where the state lacks capacity to act independently.69 First, a 
state may have weakly held preferences over its ideal point on a particular issue. The 
utility of a state’s ideal point b is weighted by the salience the state assigns to that issue. 
For example, geographically distant events may not pr voke a strong response, nor may 
events in countries with which the state has few tis.70 Weakly held ideal points are often 
not worth defending; gains from obtaining that ideal point may not exceed the costs of 
defending it, especially if the deviation of b from c is minor. Consensus may thus be 
possible even under conditions of mild distribution problems, if those outlying ideal 
points are not so strongly held and/or are not too distant from c. 
Second, states may also choose to pursue or at least accept cooperation when they 
lack the capacity to achieve their ideal points through non-cooperative means. 
                                                
69 Two situations exist where u(c) > u(b) is possible: first, if a (the unilateral action to achieve b) is very 
costly or else has a low probability of success, or second, if cooperation itself provides a way to capture 
more gains than otherwise possible by unilateral action (e.g., trade barrier reduction). 
70 As an example, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini publically alleged that the Scandinavian states 
had very little interest in Albania’s collapse in 1997 (Bohlen 1997); few states besides South Africa were 




Luxembourg, for example, may wish to send a substantial peacekeeping mission to the 
Great Lakes region of Africa. Its army, however, numbers only 750 soldiers and it owns 
only one airplane, which will not be delivered until 2017.71 To achieve anything near its 
ideal point, Luxembourg must partner with states who have more soldiers and more 
transport capacity, but in return for their participation Luxembourg may have to accept a 
monitoring mission rather than peacekeeping and a smaller ground force than it preferred. 
This illustrates how the probability of success influences state strategy choices, as well as 
why states might choose to accept an outcome other than their ideal point. 
 The Role of Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about the values of c or a, and/or about the probability of success of 
each, can complicate states' decision-making calculations. As Chapter 1 suggested, one of 
the defining characteristics of foreign policy cooperation (as opposed to foreign 
economic policy cooperation) is the inherent uncertainty about the values of outcomes. 
Existing theory produces clear expectations about what kinds of benefits will emerge 
from international economic cooperation, and how those benefits will be distributed both 
domestically and internationally. In foreign policy, however, neither the amount nor 
distribution of eventual benefits is necessarily clear. Domestic constituencies rarely 
benefit from foreign policy, let alone foreign policy cooperation.72  
If we consider the choice to cooperate in an expected utility framework, 
uncertainty would normally enter the equations through the terms representing the 
                                                
71 Information from national ministry of defense website , accessed June 2008. 
72 Occasionally, some ethnic diasporas will organize in pursuit of particular policy goals toward their home 
country. Typically, their interest is in an end result, a particular policy goal or outcome, rather than in the 
means (i.e., strategy) used to achieve it. On ethnic diasporas in US foreign policy, see (Rubenzer 2008) or 
(Ambrosio 2002). Likewise, the military-industrial-scientific complex has a particular set of foreign policy 





probability of success for b and for c.73 Even if the utility of acting alone exceeded the 
utility of cooperating (and a correspondingly low value of p(successa)), a sufficiently 
large probability of success for the cooperative action may make its expected utility 
greater than that of acting alone. This draws our attention again to the joint importance of 
not only agreeing on what to do (i.e., achieving a consensus), but also having the capacity 
to carry out that choice, in explaining foreign policy cooperation.  
In foreign policy cooperation, though, uncertainty of a different sort also affects 
the values of c and b themselves.74 Which of these two is actually more beneficial to the 
state? This answer is not always evident when states r  making decisions, nor does 
current cooperation theory give much insight. As the value(s) of c and/or b become more 
uncertain, the difference in success rates must grow proportionally to compensate and 
continue to make cooperation an attractive option. At more intensive levels of 
cooperation, where states take collective actions that none could execute alone, this may 
occur. Larger groups may have more and/or different sources that increase the group’s 
chances of success, or they may increase the utility of c by reducing its cost to each state. 
If both a and c are some form of declaration, which is by far the most common 
form of foreign policy cooperation, then the situation becomes even murkier. 
Declarations in general have a relatively low probability of success,75 but preferences 
over the content of the declaration can be both quite divergent and also quite indivisible. 
Was an election “free and fair,” or not? Is a particular conflict “genocide,” or not? These 
                                                
73 This is true for the current risk-neutral formulation; this assumption is not, however, crucial to the 
discussion that follows.  
74 In the terms of Morrow (1994), states face an information problem where they are uncertain about the 
state of the world. 
75 This discussion presumes that the declaration’s intended audience is the target country and not some 




terms and many others have explicit (and often legal) connotations, and states may have 
firmly held preferences on these issues (i.e., have a high utility for b). As preferences 
over collective language diverge, the incentive to break from the group increases.  
But is a statement representing the (somewhat more ildly worded) opinions of a 
group of powerful states more likely to achieve the desired effect (say, a new election), 
than a unilateral declaration with a more strongly worded position? This depends heavily 
on what influence the declaring state has with the target – a former colonial metropole, or 
a major aid donor or trade partner, may be more influe tial than other kinds of states. In 
general, larger or more powerful states are more likely to achieve some form of success 
through unilateral declaration, just as they are though unilateral action, since they tend to 
wield a large range of capacities.  
And what about middle powers? Portugal still has strong ties to Angola; the 
Scandinavian states are both major donors to the dev loping world and also fierce 
champions of human rights. These kinds of historical or other ties can influence state 
preferences on particular issues, and they may wellincrease the states’ perceived 
probability of unilateral success by increasing their intangible capabilities (e.g., moral 
authority/legitimacy, credibility, etc.). States with strong ties to the target or issue may 
well choose to block cooperation, especially in a venue with fixed membership and where 
c is likely to be far from b, and take unilateral action instead.  
The Choice Between Institutions 
The expected utility framework developed above suggests that the two biggest 
influences on the choice between organizational venues are the set of states that are 




set of bis represented in an institution or group substantially contributes to determining c. 
Since bi – c is a major part of states’ utility for cooperation, states should seek the forum 
where the (expected) outcome is as close to their own ideal points as possible.  
The probability of success likewise influences the attractiveness of a venue. The 
goal of foreign policy for states is not simply to reach an agreement with partners about 
foreign policy; the goal is to influence foreign events. If the group is unable – or 
unwilling – to execute the agreement it adopts, or it lacks sufficient influence to change 
target behavior through declarations, then cooperation in that venue makes less sense. 
States interested in influencing foreign outcomes mu t be attentive to capacity. 
 
Obstacles to Studying Cooperation 
The study of cooperation as an empirical phenomenon faces two major 
methodological obstacles. These are the strategic nature of international politics and the 
resultant selection bias in observed data. I address each in turn, with particular attention 
to the importance of including negative cases in any study of cooperation. 
 







As Figures 2-1 to 2-3 and the discussion above suggested, cooperation results 
from a multi-stage process. Figure 2-4 summarizes th  earlier figures for convenience. 
Rational actors will try to predict the likely outcome of a course of action before adopting 
it. Since the outcome will depend on the anticipated b havior of others over the course of 
the cooperation process, states will choose their cou ses of action on the basis of their 
expectations about others’ actions. The decision to raise an issue for cooperation, and in 
which forum, is a function of the actor’s expectations about both the likelihood of 
consensus but also the likelihood of capacity in that forum. Strategic actors will not make 
a proposal in a forum where they expect either consensus or capacity to be lacking. As a 
result, we should (and do) observe very few cases of attempted but failed cooperation.  
Strategic behavior also produces a second complication. An outcome of ‘status 
quo’ can emerge from two different processes: either a decision at choice point 1 to do 
nothing (to outcome A), or from a failed effort to cooperate when no other action is taken 
(choice point 3 to outcome B). The existence of a choice of “do nothing” illustrates how 
the status quo is more than just the default or non-decision outcome. A valid test of when 
states choose to act in foreign policy must also then include this deliberate decision not to 
act, but obtaining an unbiased sample of non-events is a daunting task. I elaborate on 
these points in the following section. 
 
The Perils of Studying Success 
By this point, the peril of studying only successful cooperation should be clear. 




variables of preference convergence (consensus) and available resources (capacity), 
creating a pronounced bias. Studying only successful cases may be appropriate for some 
research questions, but if our interest lies in how that preference convergence arises, for 
example, then a sample consisting solely of successful cooperation presents only a 
truncated range of the variable of interest.76 This limits our ability to generalize beyond 
the set of successful cases. In addition, selection on this underlying variable that is 
correlated with success effectively introduces a form f omitted variable bias, which may 
also mask the influence of other variables.  
Scholars have attempted to address this issue by considering prominent examples 
or cases of failed or non-cooperation in their work. This does not eliminate the selection 
bias, though it can help to mitigate it slightly. Any set of widely known unsuccessful 
cases would be biased as well: Non-success would be corr lated with an omitted or 
underlying variable of saliency or prominence.77 Because norms of secrecy and 
confidentiality in many institutions prevent the majority of disagreements from becoming 
public knowledge, only cases with high political value or some similar criterion would 
enter public discourse through leaks or other forms of journalistic investigation.78 
Negative Cases in Cooperation Studies 
Including unsystematically selected negative cases is essential, then, for unbiased 
analysis. In cooperation, negative cases emerge from three separate processes. First, 
                                                
76 (Geddes 2003, esp. Ch 3). Selection of only successful cases also poses a risk, particularly in small 
samples, of leading the analyst to conclude that a particular variable is causal even though that variable was 
present in the non-cases as well. 
77 Achen and Snidal (1989) provide a well-known discussion of the pitfalls of prominent failures in the 
small-N analysis of deterrence. In foreign policy cooperation, attempted but failed cases are probably 
disproportionately clustered around a 0.5 probability of success – success was likely but not guaranteed. 
78 See M.E. Smith (2004) for an elaboration of this confidentiality norm in the context of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Similar norms of diplomatic confidentiality exist in virtually all 




states could choose to discuss a topic but then be unable to reach agreement (outcome B 
in Figure 2-4). Collapsed negotiations leave a paper trail and public records such as 
media reports and diplomatic documents. This is the obvious route to identify and select 
negative cases. In more transparent or highly visible nternational processes such as 
negotiations to end conflicts or WTO negotiating rounds, this is a valid approach. In these 
contexts the analyst can identify the entire population of cases using standard tools of 
data collection, and she can analyze the full population rather than a biased sample. 
Negative cases can also occur, though, when the issue is never raised for 
discussion (choice point 1) so that cooperation is never attempted. Two routes to this 
‘non-cooperation’ exist. First, non-cooperation could emerge because the issue is 
collectively deemed unworthy of (or inappropriate for) cooperation. The issue is not part 
of the institution’s remit, or it is insignificant or irrelevant to the members. These cases 
exit the decision sequence in Figure 2-4 at outcome A.  
The second route involves a more insidious selection mechanism. States may 
know from previous events or relationships that oner more members of an institution 
would block cooperation, and so they consciously and strategically opt not to pursue 
cooperation in that venue. This is a particularly likely series of events if failed 
cooperation carries substantial costs; the higher t potential costs of failure, the more 
risk-averse actors are likely to be. In the case of rapidly developing foreign policy crises, 
failure to cooperate on the first try may have squandered precious time and resulted in a 
substantial deterioration of the situation on the ground. The public defeat of a state’s 




policy unilaterally or outside of an institutional framework.79 In both of these situations, 
failed cooperation would increase the costs of achieving the desired policy goal as well as 
inflict political and diplomatic costs in the failure process. In this case, the most cost-
effective route may be to forego attempting cooperation if it is even marginally unlikely 
to succeed. These cases, too, exit the decision sequence in Figure 2-4 at outcome A. 
Any study of when cooperation occurs, then, must manage to capture all three of 
these types of negative cases in an unbiased manner. U fortunately, neither of the two 
paths leading to outcome A result in any kind of evidence that would allow their 
systematic capture and inclusion in any typical event sample. Importantly, this is true for 
both quantitative and qualitative work. Traditional methods of case selection in both of 
these approaches are unable to provide solutions for ystematically identifying cases of 
when cooperation could have happened but did not, or at least cannot do it without 
reference to the outcomes. How, then, can we test th  consensus-capacity argument? 
 
Solving the Cooperation Puzzle: Mixed Method Design 
The two major obstacles, strategic behavior and its resultant selection bias in 
observed events, pose serious challenges for analysis. Obtaining a systematic sample of 
negative cases is critical for quantitative analysis, since variation on the dependent 
variable is necessary to obtain any sort of meaningful answer about when and why 
cooperation will occur. Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, adds an additional 
constraint of needing to select cases that span the range of potential outcomes while still 
holding other variables constant.  
                                                
79 US efforts to obtain UN authorization for its invasion of Iraq, and the resultant legitimacy concerns thi  




My solution is to adopt a mixed-method design. I use quantitative methods to look 
for patterns in aggregate outcomes, with a random sa ple of international events and 
model specifications that account for interdependence between events and outcomes. I 
then conduct a case study of Albania’s collapse in 1997. By obtaining multiple 
observations within this case, I can hold constant some variables and study the effects of 
changes of others. I elaborate on both of these methods below. 
 
 
The Quantitative Approach 
Identifying an unbiased sample of cases for cooperation requires a solution that 
allows all cases, regardless of their values on the dependent variable, to enter the dataset. 
This includes instances of both failed and non-cooperation, instances of unilateral action 
and ad hoc cooperation. One solution is to identify the set of all international events or 
issues to which states possibly could have responded. Unfortunately, no such population 
census of issues and events exists.  
A reasonable alternative, though, is Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. Keesing’s 
is a monthly global news digest that summarizes news from hundreds of sources around 
the world, using a consistent set of editorial criteria to guide selection and placement of 
items.80 It thoroughly covers inter-state relations; it also covers domestic politics in major 
states and prominent issues in domestic politics of mall states (coups, constitutional 
revision, major protests or riots, natural disasters, lections, cabinet changes, etc.). This 
extensive and systematic coverage provides fertile ground for capturing all types of 
events of interest without introducing any deliberat  bias by region, issue, or outcome. 
                                                




In this case, I applied a double-random method to Keesing’s. I randomly selected 
a stratified sample of pages from Keesing’s and coded these to identify qualifying 
international events and issues, and then used a random number generator to select a 
single qualifying event from each page.81 The final dataset spans the period 1994-200382 
and contains 300 observations. The events in the final sample span the full range of 
geographic locations, issue areas, degrees of immediacy or urgency, and levels of 
salience. Random selection ensures that we have not inadvertently excluded cases based 
on their values of on any variable. Appendix 1 contains event selection and coding rules, 
and descriptive statistics for the final sample. 
The Benefits of Using a News Aggregation Source 
Beyond its ability to identify cases independent of heir dependent variable value, 
using a global news aggregator as a data source is useful for the study of foreign policy 
cooperation for two reasons. First, the inclusion of an event in Keesing’s means that it has 
already reached some initial salience threshold. Nation l and international news media 
considered the event ‘important enough’ to devote resources to it, and it met Keesing’s 
criteria for inclusion in a space-limited publication. The imposition of this minimum 
threshold before an event potentially enters the dataset ensures that the events in the 
dataset are sufficiently ‘important’ that they could justify an international response.  
                                                
81 Because of the nature of foreign policy cooperation in the EU, instances of foreign economic cooperation 
or issues of economic policy were not coded. Issues of foreign economic cooperation (trade agreements, 
loans and grants from international financial institutions, etc.) are addressed in the EU through the Pillar 
I/EC processes and require cooperation between the Council and the Commission. My interest here is 
primarily on Pillar II/CFSP cooperation between states only. Other sets of non-qualifying events included 
state and official visits, military aid, and military equipment sales. Additional details are in Appendix I. 
82 These dates reflect the creation of the EU’s Common F reign and Security Policy and the year 
immediately prior to the EU’s “Big Bang” enlargement to central and eastern Europe. I further discuss the 




The second reason that the use of Keesing’s is helpful is because it allows a rare 
glimpse into sub-treaty level cooperation. Studying this ‘second-order cooperation,’ or 
cooperation on issues within an established institution, has three distinct advantages over 
studying treaty-level bargaining. First, second-order cooperation differs from treaty-level 
(‘first-order’) cooperation in that the agreements a  this lower level neither persist for 
long periods of time nor, generally, form the basis of future negotiations. Sub-treaty 
cooperation is an iterated game with a lower value of the shadow of the future. Actors are 
not bargaining over the design of an institution that will then set future policies; they are 
bargaining over the substance of policy itself. Second, and as a result, studying second-
order cooperation allows us to hold the institutions fixed during the study. This isolates 
the effects of changes in the content area under contention, in institutional membership, 
or in other factors, from changes in (or debates over) the institution itself.  
The final reason to study second-order cooperation is that treaty-level cooperation 
is costly. It requires a substantial and public commit ent of resources over an extended 
period, and collapsed negotiations cause all parties involved to lose face with domestic 
and/or international audiences. This results in state  being highly selective about opening 
treaty-level negotiations; doing so requires a high level of confidence that they can reach 
an agreement on issues that are likely to be highly sa ient. Second-order cooperation 
carries less visibility and less prestige, and thus slightly lower costs for failure. Together 





Cooperation In and Across Institutions 
This dissertation contains two complementary quantit tive chapters drawing on 
the random events dataset. Chapter 3 is an in-depth study of cooperation in a single 
institution, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This chapter uses a 
relatively large dataset with nearly 300 events to capture a wide range of variation in 
substantive content, issue prominence, and other chara teristics that might influence a 
group’s propensity to cooperate. Using the insights of the consensus and capacity 
framework, this chapter begins to answer the question of when states choose to cooperate 
in international institutions at all, using the EU as a most-likely forum and foreign policy 
as a least-likely subject matter to test these arguments.  
Estimating the likelihood of cooperation within a single forum, however, without 
considering the other choices and outside options, means that we have artificially 
truncated the dependent variable by ignoring other rel vant alternatives. The choices are 
not “cooperate” and “not cooperate.” They are “cooperate,” “not cooperate,” and 
“cooperate elsewhere.” As the sections above made clear, this insight has important 
implications for both theory and empirical analysis.  
This insight forms the basis for Chapter 4’s analysis of patterns of cooperation 
across and between four institutions, and decisions not to cooperate as well. Chapter 4 
expands from studying outcomes in CFSP to include the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),83 the Council of Europe (CE), and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). These institutions vary cross a number of dimensions and 
allow us to analyze the effects of variation in institutional design across an identical set of 
issues. It explores not only patterns of cooperation in each institution, but also patterns of 
                                                




cooperation across them. When do states use these institutions in combination with one 
another, and when do institutions substitute for one another? When do states use 
unilateral activity or extra-institutional cooperation as a replacement for institutional 
cooperation, and when do these outcomes occur together? The increased data demands of 
this chapter restrict analysis to a subsample of the dataset, but the gains in complexity and 
nuance of the analysis more than outweigh the loss of observations. 
Together, these two chapters provide both a deep look at a narrow slice of the 
institutional system, and a broad overview of a wide span of the outcome space. They 
also allow us to study the effect of estimating theinfluence of various factors on 
cooperation without considering the interdependence of institutions. By comparing the 
estimated effects in both the EU-alone models and the EU-as-part-of-a-system models, 
we can identify the bias created by ignoring substitutable outcomes. Creating this explicit 
link between substantive findings and the methods used to obtain them is an important 
step in the empirical study of cooperation. 
 
 
The Qualitative Approach 
Quantitative approaches emphasize the search for general patterns, trends and 
regularities across large numbers of cases, at the cost of the details of specific cases. 
Quantitative analysis can identify correlations and other relationships between putative 
causal and outcome variables, but verifying hypothesized causal mechanisms is difficult. 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, often rely on the in-depth examination of one or a 
few cases to trace causal mechanisms. They may also expl re outlier or poorly predicted 
cases to see why the case diverges from predictions. When used in tandem, the two 




Chapter 5 extends the consensus-capacity framework fr m examining overall 
outcomes to examining the behavior of individual sttes. I use an in-depth study of the 
collapse of Albania in early 1997 to explore whether states actually expressed concern 
about the kinds of things the consensus-capacity framework would have expected. This 
particular case is understudied in the literature more generally, but it is useful for this 
project for two main reasons. First, the crisis itself is protracted. Events of interest to this 
study occurred over the six month period from January to June 1997. Second, during this 
period, at least five distinct phases of the crisis occur; these stages vary across a range of 
other variables such as issue area of the most salient crisis elements and the likely degree 
of crisis externalization.84 This multiplies the number of in-case observations a d allows 
us to test the hypotheses against more data points w th different values on variables of 
interest. At the same time, though, using multiple observations in the same case holds 
constant key variables such as geographic location, relative power and capabilities of all 
the participants, and the structure of the internatio l system. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized major strands of research on cooperation, focusing 
on the decisions to cooperate, to use an institution, and to choose between existing 
institutions. These literatures focus on one of the branches leading from their choice 
points, the positive (‘yes’) one, to the exclusion f studying what happens when states 
decide, for example, not to cooperate, or to cooperate outside of existing institutions. 
                                                
84 Issue areas differ in the extent and depth of relevant norms, in payoff structure to actors, and in their ‘fit’ 
with national roles and identities. All of these elements are of key interest in their ability to influence 




The consensus-capacity framework, and its extended view of cooperation as a 
multi-stage process, helps to fill this gap. It provides predictions of when foreign policy 
behaviors including, but not limited to, institutional cooperation will emerge. States use 
unilateral action, ad hoc cooperation, and combinatio s of response tools to address 










When Do States Cooperate? The Case of the EU's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
Chapter 2 established a framework for understanding foreign policy behavior. Its 
key insight is that cooperation emerges from institutions only when both consensus and 
capacity exist together. This chapter begins testing the consensus and capacity framework 
by examining states’ choices to cooperate through the European Union’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It emphasizes factors that might facilitate or inhibit 
consensus, including characteristics of cooperation in i stitutions more generally, and of 
the European Union (EU) in particular. This allows us to begin to answer the question of, 
“When do states cooperate through international institutions?” 
EU foreign policy is an appropriate locus for testing theories about cooperation in 
institutions for two reasons. First, the EU has a number of similarities to other 
organizations active in foreign policy cooperation during this era. Its membership 
represents the core of all other foreign policy institutions, and CFSP – like other 
international organizations – is fully intergovernmental and allows national vetoes.85 
These elements suggest that theories predicting cooperation in the EU will also have 
some success in other organizations as well. 
                                                
85 The supranational elements of the EU, specifically the Commission, the European Parliament, and the 




Second, the EU differs in key ways from the other European foreign policy 
cooperation bodies, and these differences help to make the EU a particularly appropriate 
test for arguments about cooperation. The foreign mi isters of the EU meet more 
frequently than in any other institution, and procedures exist for cooperation between 
meetings. Moreover, the EU’s jurisdiction is unlimited; it is not confined by geographic 
region or issue areas. These two characteristics give the Union the best possible chance of 
reacting to foreign policy events. A theory that can predict cooperation in the most-likely 
venue will then have justification for testing in narrower circumstances. 
This chapter first draws on the existing literature to establish hypotheses about 
cooperation, and more specifically about cooperation in formal international 
organizations. It considers characteristics of cooperation as a general phenomenon, 
characteristics of foreign policy as an issue area, and characteristics specific to the EU as 
a forum for cooperation. The second section addresses i sues of research design, 
including sampling methods and the importance of including all types of negative cases 




As Chapter 2 suggested, extant scholarship identifis conditions that facilitate 
cooperation; these conditions usually relate to achieving consensus in the group. The 
literature does not, however, go on to test its claims against an unbiased dataset. In this 
chapter, I identify variables that the consensus-capa ity framework argues would 




cannot be measured or observed directly, though, I identify and measure variables that 
theory presumes would affect the existence of either consensus or capacity.86 In the case 
of foreign policy cooperation, these variables include factors related to cooperation in 
general (regardless of issue area), and issue-specific factors related to foreign policy 
cooperation. Finally, since I test these hypotheses using the EU’s CFSP as a forum, we 
must also consider characteristics of the EU as an institution that might influence the 
choice to cooperate. 
 
Characteristics of Cooperation in General 
Previous studies of international cooperation as a general phenomenon have 
identified a number of factors that influence states’ ability to achieve cooperation. Four 
are relevant to this study: centralization, distribution problems, institutional socialization 
processes, and the number of members in an institution. I address each in turn. 
Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that states choose t pursue cooperation through 
formal international institutions at least in part because of the centralization benefits that 
these institutions provide. Centralized information provision and distribution, bargaining, 
monitoring, dispute resolution, enforcement, and other similar features increase benefits 
to states by decreasing the costs of cooperation. Multilateral bargaining facilitates issue 
linkage,87 and increasing the amount of common knowledge among participants can help 
to decrease information problems. By doing these things, institutions can help to improve 
the chances that the members will reach consensus on a particular agreement that benefits 
all of them. Since this dissertation addresses conditi s that lead to cooperation, rather 
                                                
86 C.f. (Ehrlich 2007). 




than the phases after cooperation itself, the hypothesis only addresses benefits of 
institutions that accrue before or during cooperation.88 
H1: Measures that promote centralization of bargaining, decision-making and 
information provision should increase the probability of cooperation.  
 
A second prominent factor that can impede states’ ability to reach a consensus on 
cooperation is the existence of distribution problems. Distribution problems occur when 
the actors hold different preference orderings over th  set of possible outcomes – they 
disagree on which outcome is most desirable. Chapter 2 mphasized that international 
organizations decide by unanimity or consensus. Unlike most domestic legislating or 
decision-making bodies, outliers in international organizations have the ability to veto 
any form of cooperation that would be worse for them than the status quo or other 
reversion outcome. Additionally, the cost to other states of buying off or compensating 
outliers rises sharply as the outliers become more extreme, so that strategies of issue 
linkage or side payments may no longer be viable. Together, these factors suggest that the 
probability of achieving consensus, and by extension c operation, is less likely as 
participating states’ preferences diverge. 
H2: Increases in the magnitude of the distribution problem should decrease the 
probability of cooperation. 
 
A third element that may influence states’ likelihood of cooperation is the 
existence of socialization processes within institutions. Socialization is the process by 
                                                
88 In other words, I set aside the compliance debate now. As one justification for this decision, Ginsberg 
(1989) and others argue that foreign policy cooperation is generally a coordination problem, in which no or 
few incentives to defect exist. In this case, concer s about compliance and enforcement are minimal and 
should not influence behavior substantially. In contrast, a second argument from Axelrod (1984) and 
Fearon (1998) claims that concerns about the future enforceability of particular bargains can impede 
reaching agreement at the bargaining stage, which suggests that institutional enforcement powers should 
influence the initial decision to cooperate. As neith r the EU nor the other institutions considered in 
Chapter 4 have formal enforcement powers, any bias from my exclusion of enforcement concerns should 




which states internalize the norms and roles associated with membership in a particular 
group.89 This process occurs over time as actors come to understand the expectations 
associated with their roles and react to social pressure to conform to these expectations.90 
We should expect, then, that as time passes and actors gain experience both in their roles 
and in the institution, consensus and therefore cooperation should become more likely.91 
H3: Increased time of exposure to an institution’s rules and norms should 
increase the probability of cooperation. 
 
Finally, changes in the institution, particularly increasing the number of members, 
may affect cooperation. Enlargement of an institution brings, at a minimum, increased 
transaction costs of bargaining with a larger number of states. Additionally, the new 
member(s) will alter the preference distribution of the membership, so that the median 
preference of the group is likely to change. The net result of more members, though, 
regardless of their preferences, should be a decreased chance of cooperation.92 
H4: An increase in the number of members should decrease the probability of 
cooperation. 
  
Enlargement may also have some social effects. Immediately after enlargement, 
the new members require time to adjust to their new roles and to complete their 
internalization of the organization’s norms of behavior, and the old members must adjust 
to the new dynamics of the enlarged group. As state complete these adjustments, 
however, the immediate impact of enlargement should decline and the rate of cooperation 
                                                
89 (Johnston 2003); (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). 
90 Even if rates of internalization differ across states, the hypothesis should hold so long as the rate of 
internalization is positive in all states. 
91 A parallel rationalist argument exists for socializ t on effects. States update their perceptions about, e.g., 
the distribution of member state preferences and the effects of institutions through each additional set of 
interactions. Socialization, then, is nothing more than the process by which the marginal change from each 
round of updating reaches some low and stable level.  




should stabilize at some new equilibrium level. The social effects of enlargement, then, 
should be especially pronounced immediately after enlargement but dissipate with time.93 
H4a: After a membership change, the probability of cooperation should decrease 
sharply and then move back towards its previous level after some time lag. 
 
Characteristics of Foreign Policy 
Issues of security and conflict resolution often involve crisis management and 
rapid decision-making, or what Wagner (2003) describes as “fast coordination.”94 These 
events in many ways demand a response from the international community; conflict and 
instability spread without regard for borders. Rapidly moving events on the ground leave 
small windows of opportunity where a collective policy has some chance of achieving its 
goals. Under these conditions of minimal bargaining time, even a small distribution 
problem can potentially block cooperation in organiz tions with unanimity voting rules. 
This brief bargaining window, however, perhaps masks an underlying consensus 
on the need for cooperation on these kinds of issues. The EU’s members are for the most 
part small and medium-sized states. None of them – with the potential exception of 
France and the UK – have the capacity to influence for ign conflicts and emergent 
conflicts independently, and even those two great powers have limited independent 
                                                
93 A parallel rationalist argument exists here as well, suggesting that states instead need to update their 
perceptions of member preferences and to identify new potential coalition partners in the changed 
bargaining space. Perhaps the only difference in empirical predictions between this hypothesis and the 
social effects of enlargement one above is that in  world of full rationality actors should calculate updated 
perceptions with very little time lag. As a result, we should not see an effect of enlargement for this reason 
– there should be no shock-and-dissipation effect, only the permanent effect of the increased distribution 
problem and greater numbers of members. A finding of insignificance on the coefficient testing Hypothesis 
4a would suggest support for this alternative argument. 
94 Michael E. Smith, however, explicitly contends that CFSP is “not explicitly designed …. [for] quick 
crisis management using military means.” Since the EU takes no military action on events in this sample, 
and since all events had equal opportunity for non-military responses such as declarations and the dispatch 
of assistance, this should not be an issue. In any c se, fast coordination can involve non-military responses. 




operating capacity.95 This leaves the EU’s member states with no choice but to cooperate 
if they wish to influence most global events. The combination of lack of individual 
capacity and a consensus on the importance of preventing the spread of violence should 
make crisis issues more likely to receive some typeof r sponse.96 
H5: Crisis issues are more likely to result in cooperation. 
 
That said, a variety of types of crises exist, and different kinds of crises carry 
different effects on the probability of cooperation. For the purposes of this project, crisis 
issues include incidents that threaten international security, domestic security within a 
non-EU state (e.g., large-scale rioting, hostage situations involving foreign nationals or 
armed combatant groups, civil conflict), and efforts to resolve ongoing domestic or 
international conflicts (e.g., peace talks, deployment of peacekeeping missions). Given 
differences among the EU’s member states about security policy, as I address below, we 
might expect these three groups of conflicts to have different response patterns.  
First, all groups of states in the EU agree that conflict resolution is desirable; 
indeed, this priority is enshrined in CFSP’s founding Treaty. A second consensus may 
also exist that international security crises, where war is imminent (or may have already 
occurred), deserve a response calling for peaceful r solution of the situation and/or 
condemning the use of force. These two points suggest that both conflict resolution and 
security issues are more likely to receive CFSP responses. 
A third possibility, though, is that differences betw en member states on the 
optimum institution for creating cooperative security policy would result in less 
                                                
95 Both states have only minimal long-range transport capability, in particular, and lack deployable field 
command centers.  
96 The Union itself lacked military (or civilian) crisis response units until the creation of the 1999 European 
Defense and Security Policy. The resultant “Rapid Reaction Force” was not operational until late 2001 and




cooperation on security issues than on other types of i sues. Some member states of the 
EU, as I discuss below, have a strong preference for using the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Exploring possible substitution effects between the EU and 
NATO is the focus of Chapter 4, but we must acknowledge that under the EU’s 
unanimity voting rules, these NATO-preferring states may block security policy 
cooperation there in favor of pursuing it elsewhere. 
H5a: Issues of conflict resolution are more likely to receive a response. 
H5b: Issues of international security are more likely to receive a response. 
H5c: Issues of international security are less likely to receive a response. 
 
Event salience may also play a part in provoking cooperative responses. Salience, 
or “the extent to which an issue is temporally compelling to policymakers,”97 can affect 
policymaking by helping to define the set of issues on which actors consider cooperation 
appropriate or useful. Media coverage also plays a key role here. Highly salient events on 
which no reaction is forthcoming may trigger discontent at home for governments; 
citizens become aware of salient events through their own news media and may pressure 
the government to respond. 
H6: Events that are more salient should be more likly to receive a response. 
 
Finally, geographic proximity should affect cooperation. Nearby events have the 
potential to spill over into the territories of the acting states. The risk of this kind of 
contagion should prompt cooperation from potentially ffected states to try to prevent it. 
Moreover, the EU’s move towards open internal borders (the Schengen Agreement) at 
                                                




the time could lead contagion to spread widely and rapidly.98 The possibility of contagion 
should attract more EU attention to its geographic region than elsewhere. 
H7: Events in nearby states should be more likely to receive a response. 
 
EU-Specific Characteristics 
Three features of the EU itself may influence the probability of CFSP cooperation 
on an issue: devices within the Union’s policymaking system that create an underlying 
consensus on some issues, the existence of two other Union bodies that also act in foreign 
policy, and the EU’s strong internal leadership system. I address each in turn below. 
Pre-Existing Consensus 
Two structures allow the EU to create underlying consensus on issues before 
specific events occur. First, the EU has established several priority issue areas for CFSP. 
The Treaty on European Union (Article 11, ex J.1) identifies these as the promotion of 
human rights, democratization, regional integration, international security, and conflict 
resolution. The inclusion of these issues in the treaty implies that some baseline degree of 
consensus exists about the importance of Union activity in these issue areas, which 
should increase the probability of CFSP activity. The prior section addressed activity on 
security and conflict resolution issues. As additional examples, the EU conditions a range 
of development, pre-accession, and other aid on the recipient state’s human rights 
                                                
98 At the same time, many states in the EU’s geographic neighborhood were applying to join the EU. The 
EU’s “Copenhagen criteria” placed strict elements of c nditionality on accession, including that the 
candidates respect human rights, protect cultural minorities, and conduct politics democratically. The 
enlargement process created a strong system of monitoring for all states that expressed interest in joing, 
which should also increase the EU’s attention to its own neighborhood. This element of concern about the 
region is perhaps more a characteristic of the EU as an institution rather than foreign policy as an issue 
area, but detangling the two effects is not possible here. See also (K. E. Smith 1999) on enlargement as a 




behavior and on progress towards democratization.99 I  addition, the Union frequently 
takes positions and introduces resolutions in major international human rights bodies.100 
These patterns should carry over into the EU’s behavior more generally. 
H8: Events in issue areas specified by the Treaty as priority areas should be 
more likely to receive a response. 
 
Second, the EU may have previously developed common policy on an issue that 
establishes a level of consensus about policy. In particular, the EU’s Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997, in force 1999) took steps to address problems of policy coherence 
across time and issue areas by creating a new type of olicy instrument, the Common 
Strategy. Common Strategies adopt a holistic view of the EU’s activity on a particular 
issue (e.g., environmental protection in the Mediterranean), or relations with another 
country (e.g., Russia), and are the basis for all future policy on that issue. These Common 
Strategies presumably represent the establishment of a unanimously agreed set of foreign 
policy objectives.101 If so, then after the EU adopts a Common Strategy, an  issues that 
arise under its purview should have an increased probability of cooperation, since the 
Common Strategy negotiations would have resolved some f the distribution problems.102 
H9: Events on which the Union has already established a Common Position 
should be more likely to receive a response. 
 
                                                
99 (Williams 2004). 
100Karen E. Smith (2006) also introduces data showing that the member states are still individually active in 
these fora, alongside their collectively introduced positions. This raises interesting questions about h w 
states weigh the benefits of unilateral action in this context, where they clearly also perceive some (joint 
and/or individual) gain from collective activity.  
101 (Ginsberg 2001, 48). 
102 I ignore the problem of which issues or topics receive Common Strategies for now. The extended 
negotiations on the small number of Strategies that were adopted suggest that the choice of issues was 
based on substantive relevance or political importance, rather than a ‘low-hanging-fruit’ approach. If 
Common Strategies were only adopted where consensus already existed, then negotiations would not have 
been as protracted as they were. Also, if the intended targets of such strategies were going to be issu s on 
which consensus existed, then little reason would have existed for the creation of such a policy instrument. 





CFSP, however, is not the only branch of the EU that acts in foreign and security 
policy. In particular, the European Commission and European Parliament (EP) both play 
roles in the EU’s external policy. First, the EU’s Council of Ministers has delegated 
certain tasks, particularly the allocation and administration of humanitarian aid, to the 
Commission. As a result of this delegation, Commission activity may be a possible 
substitute to or complement for Council action in the CFSP.  
Second, while the EU’s founding treaties make no reference to EP in foreign 
policy, the Parliament has carved out its own role. The Parliament’s activity mainly takes 
the form of passing a substantial number of resolutions each year to state its reaction to 
world events. It is particularly vocal about human rights abuses, with the rhetoric of its 
statements often going far beyond what the Council, as a body composed of states and 
their representatives, might otherwise be willing to say.103 This suggests a possible 
substitute or complement relationship here as well, and one might surmise this is 
particularly true in human rights issues. The Council might consciously or unconsciously 
defer to Parliament to say things that it cannot.104 
H10: Activity by other EU institutions may substitute for CFSP action and 
decrease the chance of a CFSP response. 
H10a: European Parliament activity on an event should reduce the chance of a 
CFSP response. 
H10b: European Commission activity on an event should reduce the chance of a 
CFSP response. 
 
                                                
103 For an example of the Parliament’s outspokenness on human rights matters, see their 2001 resolution on 
the sexual abuse of women, especially Catholic nuns by priests. (European Union. 4-2001, 1.2.1). 
104 Unfortunately, this dataset does not allow testing of the latter conjecture; an interaction term for EP





Finally, the leadership of the EU may also affect cooperation. Leadership in the 
EU, and most particularly in CFSP, emerges from a presidency that rotates among 
members every six months. The presidency has a substantial amount of influence over the 
agendas of Council meetings, including those that approve CFSP documents; its 
representatives also chair drafting committees and work groups. Presidency staff draft 
and circulate statements to other member states for written approval between meetings.105 
The presidency state can also use its position as the external ‘face of the Union’ to direct 
attention to issues it considers important. The slow-moving nature of the policy process 
tempers the presidency’s ability to shape the Union’s policy agenda somewhat, but the 
presidency does have some influence.106 
These institutional prerogatives of the presidency should allow a state to amplify 
the influence of its preferences during the term in which it holds the presidency.107 We 
might expect this tendency to be particularly pronounced for states whose foreign policy 
preferences are not near the middle of the group’s distribution. These states are able to 
use their vetoes to block unacceptable policy, just like all other states, but they also have 
the ability to prevent undesirable items from reaching the agenda, to create texts in line 
with their own preferences that may not be acceptable to the rest of the group, and to 
convene working groups on issues of importance to them. If states are as attentive to their 
own interests during their term in the presidency as they are at other times, these abilities 
should generally result in less cooperation as the outlier presidencies make use of their 
                                                
105 (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 172). 
106 (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006, 166-67). 





temporary powers. Even though norms in the EU encourage the state holding the 
presidency to act impartially and in the Union’s interests rather than its own, setting aside 
some deeply ingrained preferences may create major domestic costs for outlier 
presidencies and so encourage them to violate the norm.108 
H11: Events during the presidency of a state that is a preference outlier should 
be less likely to receive a response.  
 
In European foreign policy, the primary dimension on which states can be outliers 
is security policy. Two distinct European security identities exist: formally neutral states 
and states with an “Atlanticist” orientation in their security policy.109 Formal neutrality is 
a fairly extreme position in that its formality makes it a more rigid form of non-
alignment, which is more extreme than a policy that allows for flexible or short-term 
alignments. When security issues arise, a neutral state holding the presidency may prefer 
to step aside and defer to another security-oriented institution or ad hoc grouping in 
which it does not participate, rather than to try to lead cooperation itself.  
On the other hand, Wivel (2005) argues that the peaceful resolution of disputes is 
often a critical component of security policy identity for small and neutral states. We 
might expect, then, that neutral states would become more involved in conflict resolution, 
particularly by offering mediation or other “carrots” to support conflict resolution 
                                                
108 Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006:176) argue that the presidency’s strong “brokerage” role in CFSP 
demands impartiality to be successful. My argument suggests that outlier presidencies are less impartial 
than more centrist states (and thus less effective at achieving cooperation) as a result of domestic or other 
pressure on them to protect their relatively extreme preferences.  
109 Chapter 4 provides a more extensive discussion of these identities. All states who are not Atlanticis or 




processes. Neutral presidencies should preside over more foreign policy cooperation in 
conflict resolution issues than other types of presidencies.110  
Similarly, we may expect that states with an Atlanticis  foreign policy orientation 
– those with a strong and persistent preference to use NATO as the primary institution for 
security issues – would be more likely to defer to NATO or some other institution to act, 
and thus would be less likely to use the EU for these issues during their presidencies.111  
H11a: Security events during the presidency of an Atlanticist state should be less 
likely to receive a response than other types of events. 
H11b: Security events during the presidency of a neutral state should be less 
likely to receive a response than other types of events. 
H11c: Conflict resolution events during the presidency of a neutral state should 
be more likely to receive a response than other types of events. 
 
Research Design 
In the preceding subsections I established a set of hypotheses about when 
cooperation should occur in CFSP. This section addresses the methodological obstacles 
to studying the question of when cooperation happens, particularly the importance of 
studying unsuccessful cases and the challenge of obtaining a sample of events chosen 
without reference to their outcomes.  
The quantitative study of EU foreign policy activity patterns dates back to 
Ginsberg (1989), who examined whether a range of foreign policy actions from 1958 to 
1985 were prompted by pressures associated with interdependence, externalization of 
internal policies, or a “self-styled” logic related to then-EC’s conception of its place in 
                                                
110 A neutral presidency might also make a particularly ctive effort to exert leadership during its tenure to 
demonstrate that its neutrality was not going to impede the development of CFSP. Several observers 
believe that this occurred during the initial presidencies of Austria, Sweden, and Finland. These stats had 
repeatedly declared during the accession process that they would participate fully in the CFSP, including in 
its security components. (Ferriera-Pereira 2004). 
111 Conflict resolution is not a salient component of Atlanticist security identities, so no hypothesis exists 




the world. In explaining the causes of the EU’s actions, however, Ginsberg’s research 
design reveals a critical gap: an inability to know about what causes an action to occur in 
the first place. The study of only successfully concluded instances of cooperation, and the 
relative frequency of causes associated with successes, tells us nothing about what 
prompts action – only about the characteristics of uccessful action.112 The proportion of 
successful cases that result from externalization-based pressures, for example, tells us 
little about the incidence of externalization pressure  in world events more broadly. 
Without knowing this, we cannot understand whether externalization pressures are more 
likely to produce cooperation than are other potential causes. Ginsberg reports (number 
of successful cases under one particular logic) / (number of successful cases under all 
logics). Making the claim about which of Ginsberg’s logics is most likely to result in 
cooperation requires knowing something about the quantity (number of successful cases 
under this logic) / (total number of cases where state  could have cooperated under this 
logic even if they did not). This limits Ginsberg’s conclusions to stating that “the logic of 
x is the most common reason for cooperation” rather t an making claims about causality.  
Ginsberg’s choice to study only successful outcomes wa  a reasonable first cut at 
the study of EC/EU foreign policy activity, given the paucity of existing data and 
computing resources at the time. Unfortunately, though, it introduces an issue of selection 
bias into the analysis. When success (cooperation) c uld result from any of several 
causes, we can only distinguish between the causal patterns by studying cases where 
                                                
112 A similar statement would describe the current compliance literature – we know when states will 
comply with the agreements they have made, but we still have little sense of when they would have made 
an agreement in the first place, let alone why they signed the agreement that they did. As Chapter 2 argues, 
the sample of successfully completed agreements is in it elf a biased sample; the agreements that states did 




these causes are both present and absent in different combinations, and where variation 
in outcomes exists.113 Negative cases are thus essential to unbiased causal analysis.114  
The practice of looking for (and looking at) the ‘dogs that did not bark’ is 
common in large-n empirical political science. Scholars of international conflict, for 
example, have often assumed that states have the option to go to war with one another 
every year. This assumption allows them to approximate the population of all possible 
cases of war – both negative and positive – by studying all dyad-years in the international 
system.115 But how do we identify cases where foreign policy cooperation potentially 
could have happened, but did not?  
Rather than a dyad-year strategy or another approach th t attempts to approximate 
the population of cases, I have instead created a random sample of international events 
that represent the plausible targets of foreign policy cooperation by states and/or one or 
more European foreign policy institutions. To build a dataset that represents the full 
universe of cases, I first took a random sample of pages from Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archive, a monthly global news digest, and used a random nu ber generator to select 
which qualifying international event from each entered the final sample. The resulting 
double-random sample of 300 events is broadly repres ntative of the types and 
                                                
113 By not including negative cases, Ginsberg is effectiv ly trying to explain a constant – cooperation – with 
a variable (type of “logic”). If externalization causes cooperation, and interdependence causes cooperati n, 
then what causes non-cooperation? 
114 Geddes (2003) and Achen and Snidal (1989) make powerful cases for careful case selection. Studying 
only the ‘success’ cases involves an implicit assumption on the analyst’s part that the relationship between 
outcome and independent variables is the same across the independent variable’s full range of values, and
this can be dangerous – and sometimes misleading – f the variable that causes ‘success’ correlates with
another underlying variable. 
115 Lewis and Lewis (1980) establish a typology of negative cases and argue for their inclusion in data 




distribution of issues that states confront in foreign policy.116 It contains events in a wide 
range of issue areas and at varying levels of prominence and urgency. 
The dataset spans the period 1994 to 2003, representing the first full year of CFSP 
operation to the last full year before the EU’s enlargement from 15 to 25 members. The 
exclusion of the earliest post-Cold War years has both practical and theoretical 
justifications. First, in practical terms, the CFSP did not exist until November 1993. Prior 
to this, European foreign policy cooperation occurred under the rubric of “European 
Political Cooperation.” This system was explicitly not institutionalized; it existed outside 
the treaty frameworks with the exception of the (rather small) Council Secretariat being 
charged to support EPC as well as Council activity n EC matters.  
Second, theoretically speaking, the earliest post-Cold War years were a time of 
great change when state interests were uncertain.117 Events in this period are not likely to 
reflect the same kinds of dynamics as during periods f (increasing) preference stability. 
This uncertainty and fluctuation in preferences in the early post-Cold War period would 
confound the causal patterns that the consensus-capacity framework tries to explore by 
increasing the difficulty for states of estimating the preferences of their partners. 
Theoretical and practical reasons also prevent the ext nsion of the dataset beyond 
2003. First, the accession of 10 states to a body that previously contained only 15 
represents an enormous shock to the system. Decision-making dynamics changed 
substantially as the new member states joined or created coalitions on various issues.118 
The foreign policy backgrounds of these new states r  incredibly different from older 
                                                
116 The sample excludes foreign economic policy issues. The Appendix contains further details and 
justifications about the sample selection process and coding rules. 
117 (Ginsberg 2001, 16). 




member states, to the point where we might expect substantially different theoretical 
models of preference formation and policy behavior fr m them. These factors likely 
make pooling pre- and post-2004 events inappropriate. Moreover, in practical terms, few 
of these new member states have widely accessible documentation of their foreign policy 
during the earlier part of the study period. This would result in substantial amounts of 
non-random missing data, which would undermine the s udy’s analysis. 
The sample used here consists of 300 observations of randomly selected 
international events. The EU’s norm of not addressing events that involve its member 
states or that occur on members’ territory (i.e., the norm of domaines réservés) means 
that the eighteen observations occurring inside the EU drop from the sample.119 This 
leaves 282 observations for analysis in this chapter. Figure 3-1 displays the distribution of 
these remaining events by region of origin.120 
Figure 3-1.  Distribution of Events by Region. 
 
                                                
119 The dropped intra-EU observations return to the analysis in Chapter 4. 
120 The category of “International” is Keesing’s classification for events, issues, or developments that are 
global in scope. Examples of this (not all of which are in the sample) include the entry into force of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the crisis in the aviation industry after 9/11, the opening of a new UN 
General Assembly session, an FAO report on the extent of world hunger, etc. They have no target or region 




Understanding Patterns in EU Foreign Policy Cooperation 
The following subsections test the hypotheses developed above on the effect of 
variables related to cooperation in institutions, foreign policy as a broad issue area, and 
EU-specific characteristics. In all models that follow, the unit of observation is an event 
from the random event dataset described above. Likewise, the dependent variable in all 
models is whether the EU made any type of formal response: issuing a statement or 
declaration, or conclusions; passing a Common Position; or undertaking a Joint Action.121 
Table 3-1 shows the distribution of EU cooperation over time on events in the sample. 
Table 3-1. CFSP Activity by Year. 
 No Activity Activity Total 
% Successful 
Cooperation 
1994 20 7 27 29.3% 
1995 22 5 27 18.5% 
1996 20 6 26 23.1% 
1997 15 12 27 44.4% 
1998 20 8 28 28.6% 
1999 22 7 29 24.1% 
2000 16 8 24 33.3% 
2001 21 10 31 32.3% 
2002 21 9 30 30.0% 
2003 23 10 33 30.3% 
Total 200 82 282 29.1% 
 
The decision to code declarations and conclusions as foreign policy activity 
deserves some discussion, especially in light of debates in the CFSP literature on whether 
these rhetorical moves actually represent cooperation beyond what the states themselves 
would have done individually.122 First, both rationalist and constructivist arguments 
suggest that public statements serve a function in foreign policy. For constructivists, such 
                                                
121 For our purposes, differentiating between these subgroups is not necessary. Statements, declarations and 
conclusions pool as low-cost rhetorical behaviors, and Joint Actions and Common Positions pool as higher-
intensity behaviors that require resource commitmens.  
122 See, e.g., Davidson (1997/98); Hoffmann (2000). In effect, these authors argue that CFSP serves more 




statements can contribute to creating or shaping the global discourse about a particular 
issue; they can also be part of a process of ‘naming and shaming,’ in which states and 
international organizations try to use social pressure to change the target state’s behavior. 
For rationalists, public statements can generate audience costs and serve as costly signals. 
Not all statements will have this effect – many arep obably cheap talk – but where the 
statement makes a threat or promise, the audience costs of the statement may help the 
actors commit to that path of action and signal their credibility to the target.123 Neither of 
these functions requires that states commit themselve  to anything beyond what they 
would otherwise have done. 
As additional justification for treating declarations and statements as forms of 
cooperation in this project, consider the following two arguments. If declarations are 
cheap or costless, then states or international orgnizations should issue them on more – 
or even all – events. But at the same time, if joint declarations are simply what states 
would do anyway and are thus unlikely to have any additional effect (i.e., have a low 
probability of achieving success when used alone), then why do states use them at all? 
The existence of 80 instances of declarations or statements in the dataset poses a puzzle, 
especially since 70 of those instances occur where no form of higher-order (resource-
committing) cooperation occurs. In these arguments, the content of the declarations is 
beside the point; their mere existence is the puzzle.124 
                                                
123 See Morrow (1994) on cheap talk and Fearon (1997) on costly signals. The possibility exists as well that 
the actor’s intended audience for the statement is others beside the target state: other states, domestic 
publics, other international organizations, etc. 
124 The other two instances of EU activity in the datase  are ones with higher-order but no lower-order 
cooperation: a Common Position on the opening of voter registration in what was widely expected to be a 
fraudulent election in Nigeria, and a Joint Action related to the postponement of municipal elections in 




Declarations and statements are actions that require consensus among the 
participants but only a minimal level of capacity. Unfortunately, these events comprise 
the majority of cooperation successes in the dataset. Testing hypotheses related to 
institutional capacity is not possible in this dataset, since it includes only twelve instances 
of higher-order cooperation involving the commitment of resources (i.e., Joint Actions 
and Common Positions). This is insufficient variation to obtain reliable estimates in 
ordered models. Similarly, the institution’s membership, structures and/or resources do 
not change substantially during the period of study (1994-2003), so testing capacity 
arguments is not possible in this context either. As a result, I defer discussion of capacity 
variation to Chapter 4. 
 
Cooperation in Institutions 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 consider characteristics of co peration in institutions that 
should affect the probability of observing it: distribution problems, socialization, the 
number of members, the effects of membership change, and the centralizing role of 
institutions. Variables to capture these concepts were coded especially for this study. 
I measure the severity of the distribution problem using the Comparative 
Manifesto Project’s Left-Right orientation scale. The Government Orientation scale 
weights the preferences of the parties in government by their share of the government’s 
parliamentary majority, then sums the weighted party scores. The emphasis here is on the 
dispersion of preferences, rather than their precise location, so I take the standard 




coding accommodates changes in government during the year and is reasonably reflective 
of the Council’s composition at each meeting.  
Left-right preferences are a crude proxy for foreign policy preferences, since we 
might expect that ideologically similar governments would share at least some common 
preferences in foreign policy.125I use the left-right ideological positions rather than the 
positions on European integration measure because coding of the latter conflates all 
dimensions of European integration into a single indicator (“all positive references to 
European integration” – “all negative references to European integration”). The left-right 
variable includes positive and negative codings on thirteen different elements.126   
Socialization is a process with few overtly observable characteristics. By 
definition it is a process of internalization of norms and roles or identities, meaning that 
the key elements of the process occur inside the minds of participants. What we can 
observe, however, is the occurrence of events or behaviors that scholars theorize 
contribute to socialization. Chief among those is repeated exposure to or participation in 
the desired behaviors, and/or extended periods of practicing a given role.127 To capture 
this, I use the time in months between the event and the creation of the CFSP. The data 
sample used here, 1994-2003, begins just after the creation of CFSP in November 1993, 
and so this captures almost the entire extent of state exposure to and activity under 
                                                
125 Whether governments of the left or right are more inclined to international cooperation is an open 
empirical question beyond the scope of this chapter; th  use of the standard deviation of mean preferences 
renders the point irrelevant. Chapter 4 addresses justifications for and objects to the use of manifesto data 
in more detail. 
126 (Marks, et al. 2007). Coding all European issues in a single variable conflates issues of economic 
integration (often favored by the right but opposed by the left) with issues of social integration (often 
favored by the left and opposed by the right) and political integration (where party orientation predicts 
irregularly). As a result, the European Integration variable is very noisy, and so I opt not to use it here. See 
also (Aspinwall 2007). 




CFSP’s rules and structures.128 Since CFSP functions through a series of (typically) 
monthly meetings on a range of professional levels, the use of a month-based indicator 
measures exposure to these rules and expected behaviors in a fairly direct manner. 
As an indicator of the number of members, I use a dummy variable coded 1 for all 
events that occur after the EU’s “Northern Enlargement” on January 1, 1995. This is 
functionally equivalent to a variable that indicates the number of members and changes 
from 12 to 15 on that date, but the dichotomous variable facilitates interpretation.  
To capture the social effects of enlargement – that the alteration in membership is 
a shock to the established social system in the group – I use three indicators with 
differing rates of decay. Table 3-2 displays these rat s of decay. This allows me to vary 
the shape of the decay function (linear in Enlargement 2 and Enlargement 3; nonlinear in 
Enlargement 4), the rate of decay (slopes of -0.25 in Enlargement 2 and -0.33 in 
Enlargement 3), and also the time required for the eff ct to dissipate (24 months for 
Enlargement 2; 18 for Enlargement 3 and Enlargement 4). The six-month intervals each 
correspond to a term of the presidency in the EU.129 The varying shapes of the decay 
functions are all monotonically negative, but they differ in the distribution of that 
dissipation over time. 
Table 3-2. Values of Dissipating-Enlargement-Shock Variables. 
Term (Presidency State) Enlargement 2 Enlargement 3 Enlargement 4 
Jan-Jun 1995 (France) 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Jul-Dec 1995 (Spain) 0.75 0.66 0.5 
Jan-Jun 1996 (Italy) 0.5 0.33 0.25 
Jul-Dec 1996 (Ireland) 0.25 0 0 
Jan-Jun 1997 (Netherlands) 0 0 0 
                                                
128 The creation of CFSP codified EPC but added formal institutions and new policy tools, including tools 
for action as well as declarations.  
129 I discuss the presidency and its role in greater detail below. For purposes here, the presidency is the 
common time unit for understanding EU activity. Because each presidency enters with a policy agenda, 
each six-month period is effectively a distinct policy cycle, even though completion of some initiatives may 




Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that institutional features that led to increased 
centralization should improve the chances of cooperation. In 1999, the EU’s Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into effect, bringing with it several enhancements to the CFSP that 
increased centralization. The Treaty of Amsterdam created a “High Representative” for 
the CFSP, who is a proto-Foreign Minister; this individual serves as the EU’s mediator in 
a variety of global crisis situations and also works to increase the public visibility of 
CFSP.130 The Treaty also created the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which 
assembles senior foreign service officers of the member countries to generate common 
strategic analyses and policy papers. It aims to improve the chances of consensus by 
creating a unified understanding of ‘the problem’ at or before its emergence, rather than 
waiting for states to develop their own positions ad working backward to a consensus. 
I test these hypotheses using a probit model, with standard errors corrected for 
clustering on major groups of events (i.e., Middle East peace process, Bosnia, etc.).131 As 
the results in Table 3-3 show, none of the hypotheses about characteristics of cooperation 
in general receives even mild support in the data. No specification produces a significant 
coefficient, even under the more generous one-tailed tests presented in the table. 
Hypotheses from both the rationalist and constructivist ‘conventional wisdom about 
cooperation are equally unsupported by this model. Possible reasons for this include the 
somewhat simplistic measurement of most variables and the admittedly partial model 
specification. 
                                                
130 The presidency serves as the public face of CFSP, but with the presidency rotating between states every 
six months, the EU’s leaders felt that a permanent face would help personalize and personify CFSP to the 
ordinary citizen. 
131 Probit specifications are appropriate because the dep ndent variable is binary (cooperate or not); 
clustered standard errors allow for possible non-independence of events in clusters. 72 cases of success 
appear across the 288 observations. Rare events logit maximizes its usefulness with a ratio of 1 success to 2 
failures; the current specification is approximately 1:3. Thus, the rare events procedure is unlikely to 







Table 3-3. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Cooperation in General. 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
 Coeff 
Robust 
SE p Coeff 
Robust 
SE p Coeff 
Robust 
SE p Coeff 
Robust 
SE p 
Preference Dispersion -0.050 0.058 0.195 -0.050 0.056 0.186 -0.045 0.056 0.212 -0.038 0.077 0.310 
Socialization (Time) 0.006 0.006 0.162 0.006 0.007 0.203 0.004 0.007 0.264 0.005 0.006 0.225 
Centralization -0.430 0.429 0.158 -0.431 0.448 0.168 -0.399 0.458 0.192 -0.392 0.454 0.194 
Enlargement -0.034 0.417 0.468 -0.041 0.315 0.449 0.052 0.322 0.436 0.014 0.509 0.489 
Enlargement 2 -- -- -- 0.011 0.524 0.492 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Enlargement 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.152 0.507 0.382 -- -- -- 
Enlargement 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.161 0.427 0.354 
Constant 0.095 0.942 0.460 0.100 0.901 0.456 0.028 0.903 0.488 -0.080 1.24 0.475 
Log pseudolikelihood -169.30 -169.300 -169.21 -169.22 
Pseudo-R2 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
N 282 282 282 282 





Characteristics of Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy as an issue area includes many fast-moving events with broad 
ramifications for the international system. This is particularly true for wars and conflicts, 
which cause avoidable death and suffering and which may spread to neighboring states. 
The variable All Crisis Issues captures all issues with security ramifications, including 
issues classified as both domestic and international pe ce and security, and issues of 
domestic and international conflict resolution. 
A second factor that may affect foreign policy cooperation is the event’s level of 
salience. Highly salient events – those obtaining much media coverage and that other 
members of the foreign policy community (including the media) perceive as important – 
should also be more likely to receive a response. To capture salience, I use the word 
count of the article in Keesing’s Contemporary Archive from which the event was 
selected. These word counts are logged to reduce the influence of outliers; in addition, all 
entries over four pages long have an arbitrarily high word count of 1000. Figure 3-2 
displays the distribution of (logged) salience in the sample. 
















Finally, geographic proximity may affect foreign policy cooperation behavior 
since many forms of crisis and conflict spread easily over national borders. In the case of 
the EU, the variable Greater European Region captures all events in non-EU Europe 
(including Turkey) and the former Soviet Union.132 
Table 3-4. Probit Models (Minimal) of EU Activity and Foreign Policy Characteristics. 
 Model A Model B 
 Coeff Robust SE P Coeff Robust SE p 
All Crisis Issues 0.396 0.137 0.002 0.321 0.141 0.012 
Greater European Region 0.123 0.140 0.191 0.077 0.134 0.284 
Salience (logged) -- -- -- 0.491 0.112 0.000 
Constant -0.767 0.167 0.000 -3.203 0.650 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -166.75 -157.66 
Pseudo-R2 0.019 0.073 
N 282 282 
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests. 
 
Table 3-4 provides a preliminary test of hypotheses related to characteristics of 
foreign policy as an issue area. Model A is a limited model, examining only Hypotheses 
5 and 7. All Crisis Issues has a positive and significant relationship with CFSP responses. 
In this limited specification, geographic location is not related to EU cooperation. 
Overall, the model performs poorly. 
Model B expands the set of explanatory factors slightly by adding Salience to test 
Hypothesis 6. Salience is highly significant, with a large and positive effect. With all else 
held at its median value, moving Salience from one standard deviation below its mean to 
one standard deviation above increases the probability of cooperation by 21.76%. All 
Crisis Issues retains its positive and significant relationship in this specification, but 
Salience alone accounts for some 5.2% of the model’s explanatory power.  
                                                
132 A longstanding norm prohibits the EU from using its foreign policy mechanism to address or respond to 
events in the EU itself; these observations are excluded from the dataset, and so coding them as part of the 





The models in Table 3-5 disaggregate All Crisis Issues into its component parts 
and examine them separately to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b nd 5c. Model A examines the 
combination of All Security Issues (both domestic and international) and All Conflict 
Resolution Issues. First, disaggregation improves the model’s fit by an additional 2%. 
This represents a substantial increase over the extr mely low level of variation explained 
by Table 3-4’s models, though the overall variance explained remains low. Second, the 
model suggests that the EU is significantly more lik ly to respond to Conflict Resolution 
Issues, but no relationship appears to exist between All Security Issues and CFSP activity. 
This suggests that two different causal processes are at work in these sub-issues. 
Model B continues the disaggregation process by considering only International 
Security Issues, which are the primary focus of the hypotheses, and Conflict Resolution 
Issues. The results, however, parallel the findings in Model A; Conflict Resolution Issues 
and Salience remain significant, and Greater European Region and International Security 
Issues are not. Model C, which reintroduces Domestic Security Issues as a separate 
variable, produces comparable results. Neither S curity Issue variable approaches 










Table 3-5. Probit Model of EU Activity and Characteristics of Foreign Policy. 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Coeff Robust SE P Coeff Robust SE p Coeff Robust SE p 
All Security Issues 0.158 0.156 0.155 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
All International. Security Issues -- -- -- 0.059 0.129 0.323 0.063 0.132 0.317 
All Domestic Security Issues -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.124 0.166 0.227 
All Conflict Resolution Issues 0.603 0.177 0.001 0.583 0.178 0.001 0.602 0.177 0.001 
Greater European Region 0.057 0.116 0.317 0.056 0.115 0.313 0.055 0.116 0.317 
Salience (logged) 0.487 0.114 0.000 0.496 0.114 0.000 0.489 0.114 0.000 
Constant -3.201 0.653 0.000 -3.206 0.667 0.000 -3.207 0.653 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.00 -155.30 -155.10 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.087 0.088 
N 282 282 282 







To summarize, the models in this section produce strong support for Hypothesis 6 
on the role of event salience in predicting CFSP responses. Salience alone accounts for a 
substantial portion of the model’s explanatory power. Hypothesis 7 on geographic 
proximity, however, receives no support here. Neither pooled indicators of all crisis 
issues, nor disaggregated variables reflecting interna ional and domestic security issues, 
have significant relationships with CFSP activity. Hypotheses 5b and 5c thus both lack 
support. Hypotheses 5a, however, gains considerable support; conflict resolution issues 
are a significant predictor in all models in which they appear. Moreover, disaggregating 
the crisis issues in this manner explains less variation than the pooled model, which is 
unexpected since conflict resolution and security issues appear to behave very differently.  
 
EU-Specific Characteristics 
Specific characteristics of the EU as a venue should also influence cooperation. 
First, the Treaty on European Union, which created CFSP, specifies five priority areas as 
“objectives”133: international security, conflict resolution, democratization, human rights, 
and regional integration. Because these are part of the Treaty, and the Treaty required the 
unanimous consent of the member states, we should expect that a greater underlying 
consensus exists on these issues and that we should see more cooperation on them.134 The 
following models reflect two codings of the issue ar as. Model A in each table shows the 
treaty issues pooled into a single variable (All Treaty Issues); Model B disaggregates the 
issue areas into separate variables. 
                                                
133 (European Union 1991, Art 11, ex J.1). 
134 Each event may code as up to two issue areas. For example, violence erupted at the opening of the 
Haitian Legislature in 1994. As this was both an insta ce of substantial domestic unrest, it codes as a





Second, and for similar reasons, we might also expect issues on which the EU has 
established a Common Strategy to be more likely to receive responses from the Union. 
As I discussed above, the negotiations to produce the Common Strategies should have 
helped to resolve many of the underlying distribution problems on that issue and to 
establish a basis for future policy. Because a Commn Strategy is both fairly recent and 
also fairly detailed, we would expect its effect to be stronger than that of treaty issues; it 
would both reflect current member state governments’ preferences and also have 
addressed distribution problems on more specific issue . To capture this, I create a 
dichotomous variable where events on which the Union had established a Common 
Strategy have a value of 1.  
Third, CFSP is not the only component of EU external activity. Two other EU 
bodies, the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), make statements, 
and the Commission also acts in international affairs. As the discussion above suggested, 
the behavior of these two bodies may either substitute for or complement CFSP activity. 
The dichotomous variables Commission and EP capture action by these bodies.135 
Finally, Hypothesis 11 proposed that the preferences of the state holding the EU’s 
rotating presidency should influence the Union’s propensity for cooperation. The powers 
of the presidency may allow the state holding it toexpress its preferences more fully 
during its term in office than it might otherwise. Preference Outlier captures whether the 
presidency state has a constitutional or other legally-binding commitment to neutrality or 
nonalignment in its security policy (Ireland, Finlad, Sweden, or Austria), or a 
historically Atlanticist security policy orientation (the UK, Germany, Spain, and 
                                                
135 I do not test Hypothesis 11 (the general substitute/complement hypothesis) directly with a variable that 
captures action by either body. The different powers and resources granted to the two bodies would make 




Denmark). These states have distinct preferences that are far from the median preference, 
and we might reasonably expect them to behave differently. Therefore, Preference 
Outlier codes both of these types of presidencies as 1 and all others as 0.136 
Table 3-6. Probit Models of Cooperation as a Function of EU-Specific Variables. 
  Model A Model B 
  Coeff 
Robust 
SE p Coeff 
Robust 
SE p 
All Treaty Issues 0.475 0.121 0.000 -- -- -- 
All Security Issues -- -- -- 0.213 0.219 0.165 
All Conflict Resolution Issues -- -- -- 0.756 0.194 0.000 
All Human Rights Issues -- -- -- 0.080 0.225 0.362 
All Democratization Issues -- -- -- 0.396 0.158 0.006 
Regional Integration -- -- -- 0.228 0.197 0.123 
Common Strategy 0.845 0.350 0.008 0.931 0.356 0.005 
European Parliament 0.958 0.280 0.001 0.984 0.281 0.000 
Commission 0.132 0.324 0.342 0.053 0.352 0.441 
Pref. Outlier Presidency -0.100 0.142 0.241 -0.143 0.142 0.159 
Constant -1.046 0.168 0.000 -0.986 0.196 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.64 -151.79 
Pseudo-R2 0.085 0.107 
N 282 282 
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests. 
 
Table 3-6 shows two probit models of EU cooperation. Model A pools all the 
Treaty-specified issues into a single variable; Model B disaggregates them. In Model A, 
strong and significant effects appear for both All Treaty Issues and Common Strategies. 
Being a treaty issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by 13.33% over the 
baseline of 15.00%; having a Common Strategy results in an increase of 27.61% 
percent.137 Given the rather low baseline, these increases are ubstantively significant as 
well – nearly doubling for treaty issues and nearly trebling for issues with a Common 
Strategy. The European Parliament’s behavior is also a significant predictor of 
                                                
136 Later models disaggregate this variable into Neutrals and Atlanticists. 
137 All other variables held at their medians (0); calculations performed in Stata 8.0 using CLARIFY 
((King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000); (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2001)). Baseline represents all variables 




cooperation (p < 0.000), though its sign is positive. This strongly suggests that a CFSP 
response and EP behavior are complements rather than substitutes.138  
Model B’s picture is more nuanced, showing the separate effects of the 
component issue areas in the Treaty. The bulk of the Treaty’s influence appears to come 
from two issues, Conflict Resolution (p < 0.000) and Democratization (p < 0.006).139 
Regional Integration marginally misses conventional levels of statistical significance in a 
one-tailed test (p < 0.123), even with a control for Commission activity on that event. 
Security and Human Rights issues, however, are insignificant (p < 0.155 and 0.362, 
respectively).140 European Parliament activity continues to have a strong and significant 
positive relationship, though as before, the coding procedures prohibit any causal 
conclusions from this finding. The influence of Preference Outlier presidencies, 
however, becomes substantially more certain, though it too still fails to reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance (p < 0.159, one-tailed test). 
Table 3-7 extends the analysis by disaggregating the preference outliers into 
neutral and Atlanticist states. Model A, with the pooled treaty issues, suggests that the 
two types of outliers do indeed behave differently. Atlanticist Presidencies appear less 
likely to cooperate, though the coefficient just misses conventional levels of statistical 
significance (p < 0.107, one-tailed test). Neutral Presidencies have an unexpected 
positive sign though they are nowhere near statistical significance. 
                                                
138 The coding of the data does not, however, allow us to determine whether EP behavior leads to CFSP 
action, or vice versa. Coding procedures captured whether the EP or Council made any reactions to the 
event/issue within a standard time frame of two months before the event to one month after. It did not 
capture the specific dates of the reactions. In any case, these dates would be influenced by preset meting 
schedules to an extent where the enactment dates themselves are fairly meaningless unless they are 
separated by some significant span.  
139 That the EU is more likely to act on conflict resolution issues is no surprise to EU scholars and 
practitioners. Hill (2004155) notes, “The EU is good at the theory of conflict resolution, if nothing else.” 
140 The lack of significance on Security is perhaps not surprising given the range of security policy 




Table 3-7. Probit Models Disaggregating Preference Outliers. 
  Model A Model B 
  Coeff Robust SE P Coeff Robust SE p 
All Treaty Issues 0.498 0.125 0.000 -- -- -- 
All Security Issues -- -- -- 0.239 0.218 0.136 
All Conflict Resolution 
Issues -- -- -- 0.771 0.196 0.000 
All Human Rights Issues -- -- -- 0.104 0.228 0.325 
All Democratization 
Issues -- -- -- 0.413 0.158 0.005 
Regional Integration -- -- -- 0.285 0.213 0.091 
Common Strategy 0.827 0.347 0.009 0.914 0.347 0.004 
European Parliament 0.959 0.282 0.001 0.984 0.285 0.001 
Commission 0.150 0.330 0.325 0.066 0.353 0.426 
Atlanticist Presidency -0.192 0.155 0.108 -0.228 0.157 0.074 
Neutral Presidency 0.048 0.184 0.397 -0.006 0.176 0.486 
Constant -1.069 0.171 0.000 -1.010 0.201 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -155.15 -151.40 
Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.110 
N 282 282 
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-tailed tests. 
 
Model B disaggregates both the outliers and the treaty issues. Security and 
Human Rights issues remain insignificant, and Regional Integration moves from 
marginal to significant (p < 0.09, one-tailed test). Common Strategies and EP behavior 
remain significant while Commission activity continues to be insignificant. Turning to 
the preference outlier presidencies, Model B presents clear evidence that the two types of 
outliers do indeed behave differently. Atlanticist Presidencies are now significantly less 
likely to preside over cooperation than states with the median (noncommittal) security 
policy preference (p < 0.074), as theory predicts. Holding all other variables constant at 
their medians (0 in this case), moving from a noncommittal presidency to an Atlanticist 
one decreases the probability of cooperation by 4.92%  Neutral Presidencies remains 
highly insignificant; this suggests that these states behave in a very similar way to states 




Table 3-8 presents tests of interaction hypotheses 11a, 11b, and 11c. These 
hypotheses relate presidency security identity to issue area and allow for a more refined 
test of the argument that the reactions of the two outlier security identities, Atlanticist and 
neutral, are different from both other (non-committal) states and also from each other. 
The models in Table 3-8 include variables interacting both neutral and Atlanticist 
presidencies with security issues and, for neutral presidencies, with conflict resolution 
issues.141 Both security identities contain clear predictions about their expected behavior 
on security issues – Atlanticists should prefer action hrough NATO and neutrals should 
prefer no action. Only the neutral identity contains expectations, though, about behavior 
on conflict resolution issues. Support of activity in this field is a significant part of the 
neutral identity, at least as practiced by the state  in this sample, and so we should expect 
a positive effect of the interaction.142 
Table 3-8 shows the by-now standard pattern of significa ce across Common 
Strategies, EP activity, and Commission behavior. Among the issue areas, Human Rights 
and Regional Integration remain clearly insignificant and Democratization remains 




                                                
141 The tacit interaction of Neutral Presidencies and Atlanticist Presidencies drops as the categories are 
mutually exclusive. 
142 Switzerland, whose neutrality is perhaps most easily understood, does not typically act on this 
component of the ‘neutral’ identity. This is perhaps because its confederal system of government produces 
only a weak prime minister who may lack the international credibility to be an effective global presenc . 
While none of the other neutral states here – Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland – are particularly 
powerful or strong states, each of their prime ministers has engaged in international mediation at some 




Table 3-8. Interaction Effects in EU Cooperation. 
  Coeff Robust SE p 
All Security Issues 0.332 0.264 0.105 
All Conflict Resolution Issues 0.469 0.273 0.043 
All Human Rights Issues 0.074 0.241 0.380 
All Democratization Issues 0.397 0.161 0.007 
Regional Integration Issues 0.203 0.236 0.195 
Common Strategy 1.000 0.355 0.003 
European Parliament 1.033 0.260 0.000 
Commission 0.133 0.363 0.357 
Atlanticist Presidency -0.080 0.140 0.284 
Neutral Presidency -0.338 0.240 0.080 
Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res. 1.431 0.524 0.003 
Neutral Pres. * Security 0.070 0.450 0.439 
Atlanticist Pres.* Security -0.428 0.346 0.108 
Constant -0.996 0.207 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -147.14 
Pseudo-R2 0.135 
N 282 
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-
values represent one-tailed tests. 
 
From there, however, the results begin to diverge fom earlier models. 
Considering first the components of the interaction erms, Security is borderline 
significant (p < 0.105) in the presence of the interaction terms, suggesting that states with 
no distinct security identity (the noncommittal states, who comprise the excluded 
category for this variable) are more willing to use th  EU for security matters than the 
outliers are. The positive and significant coefficient on Conflict Resolution suggests that 
the marginal effect of conflict resolution issues among non-committal and Atlanticist 
states is positive. Atlanticist Presidencies are negatively related to cooperation (though 
the coefficient is insignificant); Neutral Presidencies are now significant and negatively 
related to cooperation. Both of these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 11.  
The interactions, though, tell another story. Interacting Neutral Presidencies and 




the interaction of Neutral Presidencies and Conflict Resolution issues. As Table 3-9 
shows, a non-conflict resolution issue with a noncommittal presidency has a 16.42% 
chance of receiving a CFSP reaction (Cell A); this is a baseline probability of cooperation 
for most events. As we vary the two elements of interest, for example to a non-committal 
presidency with a conflict resolution issue (Cell B), we observe a ne r doubling of the 
probability of cooperation, to 30.33%. Altering, instead, to a conflict resolution issue and 
a neutral presidency (Cell C) produces a decrease of 6.49%, thanks to the negative 
coefficient on Neutral Presidencies. Finally, when we observe both a neutral presidency 
and a conflict resolution issue (Cell D), the probability of a CFSP reaction jumps by an 
astounding 53.77%, to a total 70.19% probability of c operation. 
These strong results for Neutral Presidencies fail to emerge for other outlier 
presidencies. In contrast to the models in Table 3-7, Atlanticist Presidencies are no longer 
significantly related to cooperation. Their interaction with security issues produces a 
negative coefficient, though, and is marginally significant (p < 0.108, one-tailed test). 
The cumulative effect of a security issue with an Atlanticist presidency is to reduce the 
baseline in Cell A of Table 3-9 by 3.21%, to a total f 13.21% chance of response. 
Table 3-9. The Effects of Neutral Presidencies and Conflict Resolution Issues. 
Conflict Resolution Issue  

















Notes: Top entry is total probability, bottom entry is change from baseline value (Cell 
A). Predicted probabilities generated using CLARIFY and coefficient estimates from 
Table 8, with the exception of clustered standard er ors. Cell entries may not sum 





Taken together, the models in this section suggest that presidency effects do exist, 
with neutral and Atlanticist presidencies both less likely to preside over foreign policy 
cooperation. The exception to this negative trend is conflict resolution issues, where 
neutral presidencies demonstrate a marked willingness to engage in foreign policy 
cooperation. The finding of presidency effects in CFSP cooperation contradicts repeated 
evidence in the EU studies literature – and indeed, the Council’s own Presidency 
Handbook – on the norm of presidency neutrality.143 During a period when the state holds 
the presidency, it is expected to set aside its natio l interests and work in the interests of 
the Union. The bulk of the evidence for this propositi n comes from “Pillar I” 
(EC/economic) issues, however, and the findings here may be evidence of a different 
dynamic operating in CFSP (Pillar II).144 
 
A Consolidated Model 
The models above segregated variables into conceptually related groups. What 
does a consolidated model tell us? The model specification in Table 3-10 includes all of 
the variables used in previous models. The inclusion of the security interaction terms 
precludes the disaggregation of security issues into their domestic and international 
components (as in Table 3-5); instead, we must poolthem into All Security Issues.  
The results differ strikingly from the segregated models. The baseline probability 
of cooperation now is 10.97%, which is notably lower than in most prior models.145 None 
                                                
143 (European Union. General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. 2001). 
144 Schalk et al. (2007) and Dür and Mateo (2004) address presidency norms and treaty-level bargaining. 
Edwards (2006) provides evidence from elite interviws that national interests regularly influence CFSP.  
145 In all predicted probability reports in this section, Salience, Socialization and Preference Dispersion are 
at their means. All other variables are held at their medians, which is 1 for Enlargement and Amsterdam 




of the variables reflecting ideas about ‘cooperation in general’ were significant in the 
earlier specifications; here, Socialization (time in months) has a significantly positive 
effect. Moving Socialization from its median (64 months, reflected in the baseline value) 
to its 75th percentile (93 months) increases the probability of co peration by 5.65%. As 
discussed above, the process driving the change in b havior may be more of a rationalist 
perception updating one rather than a socialization one, but the model here is unable to 
distinguish. At a minimum, this model clearly suggests that some form of learning – 
either an individual form or a social form – occurs over time, so that the group finds 
reaching consensus easier as time passes.  
The variables capturing characteristics of foreign policy as a broader issue area 
produce largely the same results as in the earlier models. Salience continues to have a 
strong and positive relationship to cooperation, as do Conflict Resolution Issues; moving 
Salience from its mean (reflected in the baseline) to one standard deviation above its 
mean increases the probability of cooperation by 7.73%. Geographic location continues 
to be insignificant. Given the context of the EU and its immediate interests in its 
neighbors, both as sources of potential instability and as candidates for EU membership, 
this insignificance is somewhat surprising.146 This model is unable to test arguments 
about all crisis issues, or about domestic and interna ional security issues, but it does 




                                                
146 The EU may convey its interest in events in these states through channels other than the CFSP, such as 




Table 3-10. Consolidated Probit Model of EU Activity. 
  Coeff Robust SE p 
Preference Dispersion -0.050 0.108 0.323 
Socialization (time) 0.011 0.007 0.048 
Centralization -0.598 0.503 0.117 
Enlargement -0.116 0.554 0.417 
Enlargement 4 -0.319 0.497 0.261 
All Security Issues 0.346 0.234 0.070 
All Conflict Res. Issues 0.511 0.269 0.029 
Greater European Region 0.048 0.141 0.367 
Salience (logged) 0.472 0.140 0.001 
All Human Rights Issues 0.118 0.207 0.285 
All Democratization Issues 0.435 0.180 0.008 
Regional Integration 0.301 0.144 0.019 
Common Strategy 0.815 0.360 0.012 
European Parliament 1.120 0.254 0.000 
Commission 0.117 0.397 0.385 
Atlanticist Presidency -0.084 0.177 0.317 
Neutral Presidency -0.363 0.174 0.019 
Neutral Pres. * Conflict Res. Issues 1.450 0.463 0.001 
Neutral Pres. * Security Issues 0.168 0.450 0.355 
Atlanticist Pres.* Security Issues -0.394 0.372 0.145 
Constant -2.951 1.402 0.018 
Log pseudolikelihood -136.48 
Pseudo-R2 0.197 
N 282 
Notes: Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on issue group. p-values represent one-
tailed tests. 
 
Security Issues and Conflict Resolution Issues comprise two of the five issue areas 
that the EU’s founding Treaty specifies as its CFSP priorities. Of the rest, Human Rights 
Issues continue to have no statistically significant relationship to cooperation. Given the 
amount of literature on the EU’s activity in this issue area, both through CFSP and other 
tools, this finding is somewhat surprising.147 The coefficients on Democratization and 
Regional Integration are both significant and positive. This is true for Regional 
Integration even in the presence of a control for Commission activity, where much of the 
                                                




practical support for regional integration elsewhere merges.148 EP activity and the 
existence of a Common Strategy continue to have their usual strong and positive effects. 
Issues or events on which the EP has acted are 31.56% more likely to receive a CFSP 
response than those with no EP attention.149 In this consolidated model, both the short-
term/recently-generated consensus of a Common Strategy nd the long-term/underlying 
consensus of Treaty inclusion appear to increase the chances of a CFSP response. 
The variables reflecting presidency security policy orientation also continue to 
have similar effects as above. Atlanticist Presidencies are no more or less likely than 
noncommittal ones to preside over cooperation. On the o her hand, Neutral Presidencies 
are significantly less likely to preside over cooperation – the probability of observing a 
CFSP response decreases by 4.71%, or nearly half of its baseline value. As preference 
outliers, these states appear to use their agenda power to take advantage of the lack of 
consensus and obtain outcomes nearer their own ideal points. On conflict resolution 
issues, however, the neutrals continue to be very active. A neutral presidency facing a 
conflict resolution issue increases the probability of a CFSP response by an enormous 
48.92%, even in the presence of all the variables proposed by other hypotheses.150  
F-tests of Neutral Presidency, Neutral * Security Issue, and Neutral * Conflict 
Resolution Issue show that the three terms are jointly significant (p < 0.015). This 
indicates that in general, neutral presidencies do behave differently on all forms of 
security and conflict resolution issues. Atlanticist states, however, show no such pattern. 
Joint tests of Atlanticist Presidency and Atlanticist Presidency * Security Issue, and of 
                                                
148 The effect of Commission activity itself continues to be insignificant, though. 
149 Again, coding procedures prohibit conclusions about ca sality. 
150 This predicted probability holds Salience at its mean. Since most crisis issues have Salience levels above 




Atlanticist Presidency and Security Issue, both fail to reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance (p < 0.257 and p < 0.230, respectively, two-tailed tests). These 




This chapter has explored factors that drive states to cooperate in foreign policy in 
a formal international organization, and in particular it studies those factors influencing 
when states choose to cooperate within the EU’s Comm n Foreign and Security Policy 
framework. The answer to “when do states cooperate through international institutions?” 
involves a number of elements related to institutional and issue area characteristics. 
Several variables clearly affect states’ ability to reach consensus on a common 
response. In particular, salience has a substantial effect. Highly salient or prominent 
events have a much greater chance of obtaining a CFSP response. This effect is 
consistent across all models. Events that can tap apre-existing consensus, whether from a 
Common Strategy or from the EU’s Treaty basis, alsohave a significantly higher chance 
of cooperation. Human rights is the only issue area specified in the Treaty that never 
attains statistical significance; this is perhaps because the current measurement conflates 
both positive human rights developments and negative ones.151 
                                                
151 Running Table 3-10’s consolidated model with separate indicators for positive and negative human 
rights developments does not substantially improve the model’s fit (model not shown). Positive Human 
Rights Issues is just barely significant (p < 0.100, one-tailed test) and positively signed, but Negative 
Human Rights Issues is nowhere near significant (p < 450, one-tailed test). Most EU human rights 





Distribution problems themselves, as measured by the left-right preference 
dispersion of member governments, fail to predict cooperation in any model 
specification. Other indicators related to distribut on problems, however, perform 
somewhat better. An indicator of whether an Atlanticis  state holds the presidency is 
negatively related to cooperation, though in some models it fails to reach statistical 
significance even in the more generous one-tailed tests. Atlanticist states holding the 
EU’s presidency are somewhat less prone to cooperation, but the finding is not robust. 
Indicators of neutral state presidencies perform more c nsistently, producing 
negative and significant effects in all models. The eff ct is reversed, however, on conflict 
resolution issues. In these cases, neutral presidencies are operating on issues that are 
consistent with their self-perceived security identity, and the interaction term produces a 
statistically significant and substantively quite large positive effect. 
The EU, however, is not the only institution for European foreign policy 
cooperation. Several others exist, and their existence may influence decisions to conduct 
cooperation through the EU. The use of an institution is a choice, as is the decision on 
which institution to use. We are also unable to test variables related to capacity in the 
context of a single organization, since the EU varies only slightly in both membership 
and “own capabilities” over time.152 Chapter 4 examines these effects by considering 
variables about both capacity and consensus across four European foreign policy venues. 
 
 
                                                
152 “Own capabilities” are capabilities of the instituon itself rather than of its member-states. Examples 
include NATO’s ownership of several AWACS planes and its own situation center. The EU later acquires a 
satellite center (inherited on the dismantling of the Western European Union), but it continues to lack any 











The International Politics of Forum Choice: 
Foreign Policy Behavior In and Out of Institutions 
 
The previous chapter explored the determinants of cooperation through an 
institution, and in particular through the European U ion’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). As Chapter 1 suggested, however, the choice to cooperate is not 
the only foreign policy option states have. A number of other outcomes are possible: the 
status quo (do nothing), unilateral action, cooperation outside institutions, or cooperation 
through a different institution. Compounding the problem, these options (other than ‘do 
nothing’) are not mutually exclusive.  
How, then, do states decide which option – or options – they will select? This 
chapter explores the international politics of policy choice by studying characteristics of 
institutions, issues, and states. In particular, it examines how these characteristics 
influence which kinds of foreign policy outcomes emerge – status quo, unilateral action, 
institutional cooperation, and extra-institutional cooperation – using a subset of Chapter 
3’s random events dataset. As in Chapter 3, the focus here continues to be at the level of 
international outcomes, rather than the level of actions or preferences of individual 
states.153 In addition to studying patterns of event outcomes in everal institutions, I also 
examine these international outcomes in the context of non-exclusivity: which institutions 
or outcomes occur in which combinations for which issues? 
                                                




This chapter first establishes claims from the literature on cooperation, and 
foreign policy cooperation in particular, that help to explain the range of outcomes we 
observe in foreign policy. It emphasizes the role of characteristics of institutions, such as 
their membership, and characteristics of states, such as security policy preferences, that 
may influence perceptions about consensus and capacity. The first section also suggests 
hypotheses to this effect. The second section follows the general line of existing literature 
on cooperation and tests only hypotheses that address when states should choose to 
cooperate through institutions. This narrow focus speaks clearly to our current 
understandings of cooperation. It also, however, establi hes baseline expectations for 
comparison with models that treat the full range of foreign policy outcomes jointly. 
The third section examines patterns of substitutabili y and complementarity in 
foreign policy outcomes. When does unilateral activity occur alone, and when does it 
occur alongside other forms of behavior? Which institutions are complements and which 
substitutes? This section contends that existing arguments about ‘forum shopping’ fail to 
predict international outcomes well because they trat outcomes as mutually exclusive 
and they neglect both non-cooperative and extra-institutional options. The consensus-
capacity framework treats foreign policy as a series of decisions and relates all of these 
options to one another. The empirical models in this section thus treat the full set of 
foreign policy options as interconnected rather than mutually exclusive.  
The final section compares the third section’s multiple-outcome analysis with the 
institutional-cooperation-only models of the second section. This comparison provides a 




cooperation. It ends by assessing the contributions f this chapter’s analysis to the 
consensus-capacity framework.  
 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior 
In this section, I hypothesize that the consensus and c pacity framework leads us 
to focus on three sets of variables to explain international cooperation: characteristics of 
the institutions, characteristics of states that are considering cooperation, and interactions 
of the two. These characteristics influence whether cooperation is attractive for states in 
any given situation. I address each set of variables in turn. 
 
Institutions and Cooperation 
Organizations and groupings differ in four ways that influence their attractiveness 
as cooperation fora: the number and preferences of their members, the existence of tools 
and resources, the enforceability of agreements, and fi ally, the organization's 
jurisdiction. Number and preferences of members and jurisdiction affect the 
organization’s ability to reach consensus on an agreement; concerns about enforceability 
and the organization’s resource pool influence the organization’s capacity to execute the 
agreement successfully. I illustrate the importance of these factors by first comparing the 
advantages and disadvantages of large and small institutions in terms of membership, 
resources, and enforceability. I then address why jurisdiction is important.  
Enforceability and the Number and Preferences of Memb r States 
The number and preferences of members both influence an organization's 




consensus. Large organizations, like the United Nations or the OSCE, have problems on 
this front. As the number of states increases, the number of preference points also 
generally increases, which potentially hinders the organization’s ability to agree on a 
single course of action.154 Since international organizations generally operate under either 
consensus or unanimity decision rules, reaching an agreement will become more difficult 
as the number of members increases. The presence of even one extreme preference 
outlier can be fatal to cooperation if the institution’s decision rules allow that actor to 
exercise a veto. Large organizations implicitly acknowledge this problem in their 
institutional design and in their activity by trading unanimity decision rules for consensus 
ones, allowing abstention, and producing non-binding agreements.155  
Larger groups also have difficulty providing public goods, of which foreign 
policy is a classic example.156 Under typical conditions states have strong incentiv s to 
free-ride on others’ contributions, and monitoring and enforcement instruments are weak. 
Lack of enforcement is a vicious cycle. If actors believe that other actors will not 
contribute, and that the public good is not likely to be successfully provided as a result, 
then they themselves have no incentive to contribute, and then the public good is even 
less likely to be provided or to succeed. Consequently, international public goods such as 
international security or environmental protection are often underprovided. 
Compared to smaller groups, large organizations engage in high-intensity actions 
much less often. Instead, they frequently use low-level resolution-making, such as 
                                                
154 The UN’s decision-making institutions reflect this dynamic If the 192-member UN required unanimity 
or consensus among all of its members to adopt any kind of text, action would be slow indeed. Instead, the 
most rapidly moving and sensitive issues go to a subset of the membership, the Security Council.  
155 These two characteristics, the veto and the abstention, are in large part why the predictions of the 
median voter theorem do not hold in international organizations.  




‘Hallmark diplomacy’157 (the issuing of congratulatory, sympathetic, or condemning 
statements or resolutions) or other weak courses of action. This kind of activity carries 
very low costs, and participants normally have very little incentive to defect. Even if 
states did have incentives to do so, the effect on participating states’ expected utility from 
the declaration is small. The probability of a declaration alone achieving the desired 
outcome is very small, and the utility from the kinds of watered-down language that 
compromise among large groups usually produces, means th t the effect of most kinds of 
defection would be minimal.158 Because of their large and diverse membership, and their 
non-majoritarian decision rules, these organizations must settle for a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ response. Put another way, larger institutions usually sacrifice depth of 
cooperation and instead privilege breadth of membership.159 
Smaller organizations do not often share these problems. Typically, smaller 
institutions are “clubs,” formed of states that have like interests on issues under the 
organization's jurisdiction.160 The deliberate selection of members on the basis of their 
preferences enhances the group's ability to reach consensus. The smaller number of 
preference points that must be accommodated in any decision also contributes by limiting 
the quantity of potentially divergent preference points where concessions might be 
required. Smaller organizations may also have more success at enforcing agreements. 
Monitoring costs are proportionately less, and both reputation effects and a credible 
threat of punishment in a future round are more likly within a smaller group that 
                                                
157 Sarah Croco coined this term for the practice. 
158 I conceptualize defecting from a declaration or statement as issuing a statement or taking an action that 
differ from the common policy agreed in the collective statement. 
159 Gilligan (2004)presents an alternative perspective on the number of members and the outcomes of 
cooperation; in particular he argues that the ‘broader-deeper’ tradeoff does not formally exist.. 




interacts repeatedly.161 Informal agreements and agreements at less than the treaty level 
can be buttressed by the threat of peer sanctioning for deviation, even if the agreement 
itself contains no official sanctioning procedure.162 Though none of the institutions 
considered here have the ability to pass legally binding foreign policy agreements, 
agreements that are socially or politically enforceabl  should have a higher probability of 
success – after all, if states do not do as they agreed, the action cannot possibly succeed. 
One of the potential drawbacks of a small organization, however, is the pool of 
resources that group of states possesses. Coordinate  foreign policy action - as opposed 
to joint declarations or statements - requires the pooling of resources. Depending on their 
membership, smaller institutions are more likely to have access to shallower pools of 
resources.163 All other things equal, organizations with deeper resource pools should have 
the capacity to support more cooperation and should therefore be more attractive as fora. 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 about organization size, member preferences, and resources 
follow from the discussion above. 
H1: An increase in the number of member states should decrease the rate of 
cooperation. 
H2: As an organization’s resource pool grows, the rate of cooperation should 
increase.  
H3: Increased dispersion of member preferences should decrease the rate of 
cooperation. 
 
                                                
161 E.g. (Axelrod 1984). 
162 Germany extended diplomatic recognition to Croatia earlier than an EU agreement had specified, and 
faced a substantial amount of peer displeasure as a result. (Ginsberg 2001, 7) 
163 The Benelux countries may wish to deploy peacekeepers somewhere, but according to their Defense 
Ministries’ web sites, between them they have eight helicopters currently in service and two planes which 
will not be delivered until 2017 and 2018. On the other hand, a three-member grouping of France, 
Germany, and the UK would have a much larger pool of resources, including aircraft carriers and long-
range transport aircraft. As the consensus and capacity framework suggests, though, such a great-power 
grouping is unlikely to form for anything but the hig est-intensity types of cooperation; the participating 





 The final factor that may affect the probability of cooperation is the range of 
issues over which it has competence. Jurisdictione may derive from formal international 
law (the organization's charter), or it may emerge informally from a perceived sense of 
the legitimacy of the organization's action on that issue. An example of jurisdiction 
emerging from perceived legitimacy among the membership occurs in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was originally authorized to operate defensively on 
the territory of member states in case of a direct attack. After the demise of the Soviet 
Union, however, and the abrupt abolition of a need for this type of action, NATO's 
members confronted the decision whether to go “out of area or out of business.” They 
chose to reconceptualize the institution as a broader regional security organization and 
began to act in peacekeeping and conflict resolution functions outside of NATO’s 
original region of jurisdiction. 
As the NATO case illustrates, cooperation is typically not limited to only issues in 
the institution’s jurisdiction. States can and do ch ose to act on issues not formally in the 
institution’s jurisdiction.164 Cooperation should be more likely in institutions that 
formally or informally claim jurisdiction over a particular issue or region. Because formal 
jurisdiction provides an explicit legal basis for activity, it should have a larger effect than 
informal jurisdiction. Hypotheses 4 and 4a summarize this section’s conjectures. 
H4: Issues within an institution’s jurisdiction should be more likely to receive 
cooperation than issues on which it has no jurisdiction.  
H4a: The effect of formal jurisdiction on the rate of cooperation should be 
stronger than the effect of informal jurisdiction. 
 
                                                
164 Few international organizations have explicit prohibitions on their areas of activity; the most prominent 
one of which I am aware excludes the EU’s economic decision-making structures from acting on any issue 




Characteristics of States and Cooperation 
Apart from the characteristics of the institutions, two key sets of member state 
characteristics can also influence the organization’s propensity for cooperation. The first 
set affects cooperation through institutional leadership structures, which allow the state 
holding the leadership position an opportunity to expr ss its preferences more fully than 
it might otherwise. These state preferences are a function of historical and situational ties 
to other states that may be the targets of potential responses. The second set of factors 
affects cooperation through the set of ‘outside options,’ or non-cooperation response 
choices, available to states. When member states have viable outside options, then 
cooperation at a point other than the state’s ideal point becomes much less attractive. I 
address each of these sets of factors in turn. 
State Preferences and the Role of Leadership Structures 
First, a range of situational or historical factors can affect state preferences, either 
by influencing the location of the state’s ideal point, or by causing it to hold its 
preferences more strongly than one might otherwise expect. Among the situational 
factors, geographic proximity is central. States have incentives to be more attentive to 
their neighbors since instability spreads easily. Both refugees and rebels often cross 
borders, creating both domestic and international ch llenges for the neighboring state. 
Other concerns such as contagious diseases (SARS, avian flu, etc.), illicit narcotics, and 
some forms of economic disruption also flow easily over borders. 
Among historical factors, colonial relationships are quite important. France, the 
UK, and Portugal all have associations of their forme  colonies, and these associations 




members with flagrant human rights violations on several occasions and has sent 
investigative missions in other cases. These post-colonial ties can also shape trade, as the 
so-called “Banana War” between the US and EU attests.165 France and the UK continue 
to maintain military bases in a number of their forme  colonies, which makes them both 
more attentive to issues there and also better able to execute a higher-intensity response. 
Therefore, all else equal, European states should be more attentive to affairs in their 
former colonies than in states with which none of them have historical ties. 
A state’s traditional orientation in foreign and security policy is also a major 
determinant of its preferences. Over the course of the post-war period, a number of 
European states have developed longstanding patterns of preferences in security and 
defense policy; indeed, several states have enshrined their preferences in their national 
constitutions.166 Four distinct profiles exist here, ranging from Atlanticist to European, 
neutral, and post-Communist. These profiles or “identiti s” shape state preferences both 
over policy content and also over which forum (if any) is appropriate for cooperation on 
security and conflict issues.167 As a result, we would expect that when a state holding an 
institution’s leadership position has a relatively xtreme preference security policy (i.e., 
the state is a preference outlier), the institution is less likely to cooperate. The state 
holding the agenda power probably does not have preferences that are similar to the 
majority’s. This should be particularly true for issues with security and defense 
implications, but it should hold more generally. 
                                                
165 The “Banana War” explicitly questioned the legality under WTO rules of the EU’s preferential pricing 
schemes for banana-producing former colonies of EU members, versus its less preferential schemes for 
“dollar-denominated” bananas from areas formerly under US influence. (Alter and Meunier 2006). 
166 Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria have legally entrenched neutrality provisions, though the form and
precise content of those statements vary. 
167 Atlanticists, for example, prefer the use of NATO over any other available institution. No identity 
contains a general preference for cooperation; indeed, a key difference between them is which institution is 




One caveat applies to expectations about the influece of state characteristics on 
cooperative outcomes in institutions. Because the abs nce of cooperation can result from 
various factors, we are generally unable to determine, using qualitative or quantitative 
means, which particular state “caused” the failure of cooperation. Indeed, as Chapter 2 
established, the absence of cooperation can emerge from a failed attempt at cooperation, 
from a decision not to pursue cooperation after a discussion, or from self-censoring 
caused by knowing that one’s partners in an institution will never agree to such a 
proposal. As a result, our only opportunity to examine where the preferences of a specific 
state matter is through organizations that contain some type of rotating internal leadership 
structure. When a state holds the chair of an organization, institutional rules such as 
agenda powers or control over draft text allow that st e to express its own preferences 
more fully than it might at other times. Hypotheses 5 and 6 summarize expectations about 
historical and situational characteristics of states, l adership, and cooperation. 
In institutions with leadership structures, and ceteris paribus, 
H5: Leadership by a state with strong historical or situational ties to the target 
state will increase the probability of cooperation. 
H6: Leadership by a preference-outlying state will decrease the probability of 
cooperation. This should be especially true if the outlier also has high capacity. 
 
Outside Options and Foreign Policy Cooperation 
The second state characteristic that influences choices to cooperate is whether the 
states in question have sufficient capacity to act independently. Outside options always 
exist in foreign policy cooperation. Indeed, unilater l state action is the default expected 
action – this ability is a key component of the Westphalian definition of statehood.168 
States also retain the opportunity to engage in ad hoc cooperation outside of existing 
                                                




institutions or to form new institutions.169 The persistent availability of these choices – 
even when/where institutional options for cooperation exist – can decrease the 
attractiveness of cooperation, at least for states that have sufficient capacity to achieve 
their ideal points through unilateral or ad hoc behaviors. As the attractiveness and 
feasibility of these outside choices grows, states will increasingly have incentives to hold 
out for their ideal points in cooperative behavior.  
Conversely, as the capacity and consensus framework suggests, capacity 
limitations may prevent states from taking some action strategies that they might 
otherwise prefer. All states have sufficient diplomatic capacity to issue declarations and 
statements, though national predilections for doing so vary.170 In many cases, though, 
higher-order responses such as military intervention, the granting or withholding of aid, 
or even the expulsion of diplomats may not be possible. Weak or smaller states lack the 
budgets, militaries, or diplomatic leverage to execut  them.171 As states’ national 
capabilities decrease, their propensity for non-cooperative responses should also decrease 
as these outside response tools become unavailable to them. The hypotheses below 
summarize this section’s arguments. 
H7: States with greater capacity are more likely to engage in unilateral action.172  
H8: States with greater capacity are more likely to participate in ad hoc (extra-
institutional) cooperation.173 
                                                
169 (Jupille and Snidal 2006). 
170 The cause is not entirely clear; at a minimum national political culture (or the institutional culture of the 
government) exerts influence. 
171 Most pairs of weaker states lack reciprocal embassies. For example, Finland accredits 104 ambassadors, 
meaning that some ninety states lack representation there and thus cannot have their diplomats expelled.  
172 As an additional implication, this should be particularly true for actions as opposed to statements, but all 
forms of activity should be more likely and they should not be conditional on collective activity. Data 
limitations, however, prevent the testing of this implication in this dissertation.. 




Testing Hypotheses About Foreign Policy Choice 
This section tests the hypotheses presented above about foreign policy behavior 
choices. This chapter’s data are a subset of the random international events dataset 
introduced in Chapter 3. In particular, I analyze th  sixty most salient events in the 
dataset. Using only events that received a substantial amount of coverage in the 
international press maximizes the probability that these events will be of sufficient 
interest to states that we obtain some form of meaningful variation in reactions.174 
Reactions include official statements, informal statements from authorized figures 
(spokesmen, secretaries general, etc.), formally adopte  actions, and informal missions 
and delegations. In addition to the data on EU foreign policy behavior presented in 
Chapter 3, I also test these hypotheses on the behavior of three other European foreign 
policy institutions: NATO, the Council of Europe (CE), and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly the Conference/CSCE). 
As Table 4-1 shows, responses varied widely for the sixty events represented 
here. Panel A shows that as Realists would expect, unilateral action remains the most 
common way for states to conduct foreign policy. That said, the EU responded to nearly 
half the total sample of events, and to a majority of events to which its foreign policy 
mechanism was eligible to respond (28 of 54, 51.9%) The EU’s 28 instances of 
cooperation are more than three times greater than t e next most frequent responder, 
NATO. Overall, institutions responded 56 times to the 60 events in this sample. Even 
when we restrict the set of events to the greater European region (Table 4-1, Panel B), 
where NATO and the other institutions are on more secure jurisdictional footing, the EU 
                                                
174 Early efforts to collect data on EU responses indicated a high probability that a random sample of events 
would produce a sample with few or no successful cases of cooperation in some of the institutions. The 




responds to half of the events, whereas the CE responds to about 62% and NATO and the 
OSCE only respond to 25%. Unilateral behavior is always more frequent than EU 
responses, both within the region and elsewhere.  
The patterns in Table 4-1 are not a function of all the institutions responding to 
the same events. Table 4-2 shows the distribution of responses, separated by total 
responses (unilateral, ad hoc, and from each institution), and institutional actions only. 
Table 4-1. Behavior Across Outcomes. 
A. All Events, All Regions  B. Events in Greater European Regiona 
Institution Activity No Activity Total  Institution Activity No Activity Total 
EU 28 27 55b  EU 6 5 11b 
NATO 8 52 60  NATO 5 11 16 
OSCE 4 56 60  OSCE 4 12 16 
CE 6 54 60  CE 5 11 16 
Other Instc 10 50 60  Other Instc 2 14 16 
Subtotal 56 239   Subtotal 22 53  
Unilateral 39 21 60  Unilateral 12 4 16 
Ad-hoc 7 53 60  Ad-hoc 3 13 16 
Total 
Activity 102 313   
Total 
Activity 37 70  
Notes: One observation is a qualifying international event from a random sample; entries indicate 
whether that reaction occurred on that issue. a “Greater European Region” includes EU Europe, non-
EU Europe, and the former Soviet Union. b EU norms prohibit addressing events inside the EU itself 
through its foreign policy mechanisms. c “Other institutions” includes reactions by other bodies in 
which European states form a notable body of members: the OECD, the UN, and the G-7/8.  
 
Table 4-2. Total Amounts of Cooperation Per Event. 
A. All Forms of Response  B. Institutional Responses Only 
Total responses Freq. Pct.  Total responses Freq. Pct. 
0 14 23.3  0 28 46.7 
1 14 23.3  1 23 38.3 
2 21 35.0  2 4 6.7 
3 5 8.3  3 3 5.0 
4 3 5.0  4 2 3.3 
5 1 1.7     
6 1 1.7     
7 1 1.7     
Note: Maximum of 7 in Panel A represents possible respones of unilateral action, ad hoc 
cooperation, four European institutions (EU, NATO, SCE, CE), and non-European institutions. 
Maximum of 4 in Panel B represents only the four Euopean institutions. 
 
The modal event receives two responses (Panel A); twenty-one cases are in this 




EU and unilateral. Only one event, Russian efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and 
peacekeeping arrangement in Kosovo, received all seven forms of responses.175 Panel B 
shows that the modal event – and very nearly the median event – did not receive a 
response from any institution. Among institutions, response from a single institution is by 
far the most common form of response. Only nine events received a response from more 
than one institution. Two events – creation of Albania’s national reconciliation 
government and Russia’s efforts to end the Kosovo crisis–received reactions from all four 
institutions; these two events alone represent half t e observed total of OSCE activity. 
 
Characteristics of Institutions 
This section tests the influence of four sets of institutional characteristics on 
cooperation: members and resources, dispersion of member preferences, and jurisdiction. 
Members and Resources 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that institutions with more members should produce less 
cooperation; Hypothesis 2 suggested that institutions with greater capabilities should 
produce more cooperation. Unfortunately, capabilities and number of members variables 
are endogenous, both theoretically and by construction. As the number of members 
increases, by definition the amount of potentially vailable capabilities must increase as 
well. As a result, these independent variables cannot appear in the same equation.  
I use two indicators of capabilities - logged GDP from the World Development 
Indicators and the Correlates of War Composite Capabilities Index – in separate 
                                                
175 The return of Kosovar Serbs to their homes after th  peace settlement received responses from all but 
the OSCE; the creation of a government of national reconciliation in Albania in early 1997 received no 




models.176 The models include activity by the EU, NATO, Council of Europe, and 
Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, over the period 1994-
2003.177 Since the unit of analysis is the institution-year (with a maximum n of 40), these 
values are summed for all members of an institution and lagged one year to reflect the 
minimum capabilities available to the group at the start of the year.178  
Table 4-3. Poisson Models of Cooperation by Year, Measured as Count. 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Coeff SE p Coeff SE p Coeff SE p 
No. of Members -0.050 0.015 0.001 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
COW Capabilities, 
lagged 
-- -- -- -7.361 1.69 0.000 
-- -- -- 
Log GDP, lagged  -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 Constant 1.469 0.662 0.014 1.834 0.459 0.000 1.684 0.659 0.006 
Log  
Pseudolikelihood -55.097 -45.010 -55.049 
Wald χ2 (p-value)  10.65 (0.001) 18.99 (0.000) 13.75 (0.00) 
N 40 36 40 
Poisson goodness 
of fit χ2 (p-value) 51.09 (0.076) 29.39 (0.241) 51.00 (0.077) 
Notes: Poisson models of number of instances of cooperation observed per year in EU, NATO, OSCE, 
and CE; standard errors clustered by institution to adjust for other unobservable institution-specific 
characteristics. 
 
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 below examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 using two different 
measures of the dependent variable, cooperation output. The Poisson event count models 
in Table 4-3 consider the number of instances of cooperation per year in a given 
institution, over the set of events in the sample. The OLS regression models in Table 4-4 
                                                
176 (Bennett and Stam, 2000); (Singer, 1987); (World Bank, 2006). Efforts to obtain measures of diplomatic 
capacity such as number of representations abroad and/or number of diplomats were unsuccessful. 
177 See Chapter 2 for justification of this time period and set of institutions. Because the COW data end in 
2001, models with the lagged composite capabilities ndicator drop each institution’s 2003 observation. 
178 Using an organization’s budget allocation as an indicator of capacity would be problematic for at least 
two reasons. First, most of the organizations in this study have minimal budgets for their day to day 
operations (and sometimes for continuing programs. Individual programs and efforts that occur during a 
year are funded by either special GDP-based levies on all states (e.g., the EU, some NATO activity), or by 
the participating states (e.g., OSCE, some NATO activity). Using their annual budgets would miss the 
component of seconded national capacity that the national contributions represent. Second, using the 
organization’s end-of-budget-year total expenditures would be inappropriate not least because of a strong 
element of endogeneity. Total annual spending would then include contributions to fund the events and 




correct for the unequal number of cooperation opportunities per year in the sample by 
using as the dependent variable the percentage of events receiving a response out of the 
total number of events in the sample for that year. All Poisson and OLS models present 
robust standard errors clustered on the institution o capture unmodeled features that 
would plausibly influence cooperation rates (frequency and timing of meetings, etc.). 
Table 4-4. OLS Models of Cooperation per Year, Measured as Percent. 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Coeff. SE P Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
No. of Members -0.009 0.006 0.104 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
COW Capabilities, 
lagged -- -- -- -1.405 0.669 0.064 -- -- -- 
Log GDP, lagged  -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0005 0.000 0.000 
 Constant 0.499 0.263 0.077 0.586 0.234 0.044 0.5417 0.090 0.73 
R2 0.292 0.368 0.294 
N 40 36 40 
Notes: OLS regression models of OSCE, CE, EU and NATO cooperation behavior; responses to eligible 
events measured as annual percentage. 
 
Poisson models of cooperation counts present a negativ  nd significant 
coefficient for the number of members in an institution: Larger institutions produce less 
cooperation. Both measures of capacity also exhibit ighly significant effects, but their 
signs contradict the theory’s predictions. To some extent, as I discussed above, this may 
be a result of construction: With an additive indicator, capabilities must increase as the 
number of members increase. This mathematical element is compounded further, though, 
by the nature of membership variation across these institutions. The European states with 
the most capabilities – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and perhaps Italy and 
Spain – are members of all four institutions. Variation in capabilities, then, comes from 




base.179 The combination of minimal variation across institutions caused by the core 
membership and the additive structure of the indicator create a situation where the 
number of members and their pooled capabilities co-vary and are likely capturing the 
same concepts rather than different ones. 
The regression results in Table 4-4 paint a similar picture, with the dependent 
variable in these models being the percentage of events in the sample to which an 
institution responded in a given year. In a one-tailed test, the number of members in an 
institution falls just below conventional levels of statistical significance (p < 0.104). Its 
substantive significance is less clear; each additional member decreases the percentage of 
events receiving a response by just less than 1%. The GDP and military capabilities 
variables, on the other hand, are both statistically nd substantively significant in 
bivariate models, but they are again incorrectly signed. The most likely reason for this 
continues to be the additive nature of the capabilities measures.180  
Preference Dispersion 
Hypothesis 3 argues that as the dispersion of preferenc s increases, cooperation 
should be less likely. Dispersion of preferences here is one aspect of measuring the 
severity of distribution problems.181 Preferences may differ and still be fairly closely 
clustered in space; under these circumstances, cooperation is typically possible. As 
                                                
179 Russia is the only state with significant capabilities that is not a member of all four institutions. It is a 
member of the C/OSCE for the whole period and joins the Council of Europe in 1996. These two 
institutions have the largest number of members by a substantial amount (the EU has 15, NATO has 19, the 
CE has 45 and the OSCE 49), and so the indicator conflates Russia’s capabilities with the substantial 
number of additional members. 
180 Given the structure of membership in the four institutions – that Russia (and its capabilities) belongs to 
both large institutions – how this might be rectified is unclear. 





preferences diverge, however, actors’ utility for the more distant points drops 
substantially, and finding an agreement that is acceptable to all becomes more difficult.  
Attempting to collect reliable data on how fifty-odd states would have preferred to 
respond to sixty different events would be an overwhelming and time-inefficient task. 
Even if we could obtain multiple interview sources for each state on each event, verifying 
their accuracy and placing the preferences relative to one another would be difficult.182 In 
general, we cannot measure preferences directly; we can only use post-revelation 
evidence (actions, statements) to estimate pre-revelation ‘true’ preferences.  
Because capturing information on specific (and often un-revealed) preferences for 
this many governments and events is infeasible, I rely here on a general estimate of 
government preferences as revealed through the government’s election campaign 
promises. Such measures are appropriate for two reasons. First, the preferences are 
revealed prior to the initiation of the event itself, meaning that to the greatest extent 
possible these capture underlying preferences which are then applied to the event of 
interest when it occurs.183 Second, ideological proximity may indicate a sense of shared 
goals and similar set of foreign policy objectives. Even though no theoretical consensus 
exists about whether parties of the left or right should be more interested in international 
cooperation, a focus on dispersion of preferences rathe  than their absolute location 
makes this criticism is less relevant.184 As this second component suggests, measures of 
                                                
182 (Dorussen, Lenz and Blavoukos 2005). European Union Politics (6,3) is a special issue devoted entirely 
to evaluating the use of expert interviews. See also (Thomson, Stokman and Koenig 2006) for an example 
of the use of expert interviews to generate large-N datasets. 
183 On manifestos separating preferences from behavior, see (Marks, et al. 2007). Few events in the dataset 
occur in a manner where the event’s occurrence (or xpectation of it) precedes elections so that the event 
might affect parties’ platforms. These are essentially limited to the two 2003 Iraq observations and the wo 
1997 Albanian observations, and observations related to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.  




government preferences via party manifesto coding are not without weaknesses.185 For 
the purposes of this dissertation, however, most major critiques do not apply. 
The use of manifesto data, and in particular the Comparative Manifesto Project 
data,186 creates an unfortunate restriction on testing hypotheses about international 
cooperation. Manifesto data are only available for highly developed countries and a 
subset of Central and Eastern European countries. The only European foreign policy 
organization for which all member countries have Manifesto data is the European Union. 
As a result, we cannot compare the effects of preference dispersion across institutions 
with different numbers or compositions of members; we can only study it in the context 
of the European Union. 
Table 4-5. Probit Models of EU Cooperation and Preference Dispersion. 
 Coeff. SE p 
Preference dispersion -0.078 0.104 0.220 
Salience (logged) 1.906 0.631 0.002 
Gr European region 0.896 0.461 0.417 
Constant -10.197 4.104 0.007 
LR χ2 (p-value) 0.1671 
Log likelihood -31.745 
N 55 
 
Table 4-5 shows the results of a probit model examining the probability of any 
EU reaction as a function of preference dispersion, the event’s salience, and its 
geographic location. Preference dispersion is measur d as the standard deviation of EU 
                                                
185 The Manifesto Project’s left-right government measure codes the election manifesto of each political 
party to establish a percentage of manifesto statements that are left-oriented and a percentage right-
oriented. These are subtracted to obtain a single indicator of party placement. The ideology of a 
government, then, is a sum of the component parties weighted by each party’s share of the parliamentary 
majority. A number of scholars have raised objections to this approach, arguing that the measure captures 
salience of issues rather than ideology (i.e., that missing elements are nonrandom); that the items 
composing the left and right indicators themselves are incomplete and inaccurate (Aspinwall 2007); or that
the proper weighting should be seats in the cabinet rather than the legislature. All of these are valid 
criticisms of the Manifesto ideology measure; Volkens (2007) provides an extensive discussion of all of 
these critiques. My use of the standard deviation – a measure of relative position rather than absolute 
position – mitigates their effect somewhat.  




member government preferences on the Manifesto Project’s left-right scale, calculated 
monthly. Salience, or “the extent to which an issue is temporally compelling to 
policymakers,”187 parallels its usage in Chapter 3; it is the logged word count of the 
original Keesing’s article. Finally, geographic region is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the event occurs in the greater European region (non-EU Europe and the former 
Soviet Union). The model shows, as expected, that salience has a strong and positive 
effect on cooperation; events which receive more coverage in Keesing’s are notably more 
likely to receive a response from the EU. Surprisingly, events in the EU’s geographic 
region are not more likely to receive a response, though this may be because most of the 
European events in the sample are also highly salient.188 Dispersion of preferences, on the 
other hand, is not significant in a one-tailed test (p < 0.182). In the presence of this 
restricted set of controls, and on this study’s limited sample, the spread of ideological 
positions among EU member states does not appear to influence cooperation behavior.  
The EU is an unusual institution for several reasons, not least of which are the 
breadth and depth of its foreign policy cooperation and the fairly homogenous set of 
states that compose it. These two elements restrict our ability to generalize from the EU 
to the other institutions examined here. NATO’s cooperation is very deep but very 
limited in scope, the OSCE has member states that vary in their commitment to 
democratic principles, and the Council of Europe has a diverse membership with a weak 
                                                
187 (Busby 2007, 252). 
188 The European events in the truncated 60-observation sample used in this chapter are related to Albania, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Gibraltar, and Northern Ireland. A longstanding norm prevents the EU from acting on 
issues inside or between its member states through the foreign policy mechanism, however, and as a result 
the Gibraltar and Northern Ireland observations are dropped from the sample for EU models only. The 
remaining events on Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo are all of very high salience. All models for institutions 




institutional structure. Hopefully, future developments in data collection will allow 
testing of these hypotheses on a broader set of states and institutions.. 
Jurisdiction 
Hypotheses 4 and 4a spoke to the role of an institution’s jurisdiction in its 
attractiveness for cooperation. Peculiarities of the European foreign policy system, 
however, complicate testing somewhat. The Treaty on European Union, which created 
the CFSP, explicitly gives the EU jurisdiction to respond to any event of any type, in any 
region.189 The EU thus lacks variation on this variable.  
NATO lacks variation as well, but for a different reason. NATO’s formal 
jurisdiction is direct attacks on the territory of its member states. The only event of this 
type occurred during the sample period of 1994-2003, the attacks of 11 September 2001 
on the United States, were not selected for the dataset; formal jurisdiction is therefore 0 
for all cases in the sample. Moreover, during this period NATO constructed its own 
informal jurisdiction by extending its mandate to crisis management on its borders. This 
includes its activity in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts. The dataset contains only 
events related to these two conflicts, and two events related to the Albanian crisis of 
1997, as events in NATO’s informal jurisdiction. NATO’s informal jurisdiction 
correlates nicely with its activity simply because th  activity captured here is precisely 
the activity NATO used to define its informal jurisd ction. Finally, in the current sample 
of events the OSCE acts only on events in its jurisdiction, meaning that it too lacks 
                                                
189 The Treaty does specify a set of priority issues. Chapter 3 tests whether these issues receive different 
treatment than others and finds that some, but not all, of the Treaty-specified issues have statistically 




variation on this independent variable. The resulting perfect prediction means that 
multivariate analysis is not possible. 
To summarize, the EU always acts in its formal jurisdiction because its formal 
jurisdiction is universal. NATO only acts in its informal jurisdiction because it has been 
successful as a deterrent and has not faced armed attack from outside its borders. The 
OSCE has not acted outside of its formal jurisdiction. The only institution for which 
adequate variation exists to study the effect of jurisdiction conditional on other factors is 
in the Council of Europe. Of the 60 events in the sample, six receive some reaction from 
the CE; three of those are in the institution’s formal jurisdiction. 
Model A of Table 4-6 shows a probit model of CE activity on formal jurisdiction. 
As expected, formal jurisdiction has a strong and significant positive effect on 
cooperation. A similarly salient event inside the CE’s jurisdiction is 37.9% more likely to 
receive a response than one outside.190 
Table 4-6. Probit Model of CE Cooperation. 
 Model A Model B 
 Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
Log salience 1.563 0.683 0.011 2.130 0.960 0.015 
Formal jurisdiction 1.672 0.619 0.004 2.554 0.934 0.003 
Informal jurisdiction  -- -- -- 1.919 0.938 0.021 
 Constant -11.303 4.342 0.005 -15.627 6.409 0.008 
Pseudo R2  0.319 0.462 
Log likelihood -13.280 -10.488 
N 60 60 
 
Hypothesis 4a suggested that having formal jurisdiction should produce a larger 
effect on the probability of cooperation than informal jurisdiction. Model B of Table 4-6 
adds a variable for events that occur within the institution’s self-defined informal 
                                                
190 Predicted probabilities generated with CLARIFY ( (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000); (Tomz, 




jurisdiction. The effect of informal jurisdiction is also strongly significant and positive, 
with an event in the CE’s informal jurisdiction 20.6% more likely to obtain a response 
than one outside of it. As Hypothesis 4a predicts, the effect of formal jurisdiction appears 
larger than that of informal jurisdiction, but t-tes s of the two coefficients cannot rule out 
equality (p < 0.394).  
These models represent only a partial test of the hypot eses about jurisdiction. 
While testing this argument against other institutions would be ideal, none of the other 
organizations in this study are suitable for large-n analysis, as I discussed above. Instead, 
Table 4-7 below shows the distribution of activity for NATO under its informal 
jurisdiction (Panel A), and the OSCE under its informal and formal jurisdictions (Panels 
B and C, respectively). As we can see, both NATO and the OSCE are more likely to act 
when they have jurisdiction. Chi-squared tests suggest that the distributions are unlikely 
to occur by chance; in the case of NATO at least thi  is largely by construction since 
NATO was defining its informal jurisdiction by its actions on the events studied here. 
Table 4-7. NATO and OSCE Cooperation by Jurisdiction. 
a. NATO   
Response  Informal 
Jurisdiction No Yes Total 
No 50 2 52 
Yes 2 6 8 
Total 52 8 60 
Pearson χ2(1) = 30.3772  Pr = 0.000 
         




Jurisdiction No Yes Total  
Formal 
Jurisdiction No Yes Total 
No 47 0 47  No 52 0 52 
Yes 9 4 13  Yes 4 4 8 
Total 56 4 60  Total 56 4 60 





Characteristics of States and Leadership 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 speak to the role of leadership within an institution in 
encouraging or hindering cooperation. This section primarily tests Hypothesis 6, which 
examines the effect of having preference-outlier state  in the leadership position.191  
Three of the four institutions in this study have internal leadership structures that 
rotate among member states. NATO lacks such a structure; its day to day leadership and 
public face are provided by the Secretary-General. Of the three remaining, the EU’s 
presidency is most powerful. The state holding the presidency has the ability to set the 
agenda, to draft all texts and preside at all working group and other meetings, and to 
speak to the press as the ‘face of the Union’ betwen meetings. The OSCE and CE, in 
contrast, have much weaker presidencies192; both presidencies usually require 
authorization from the group to make statements to he press, and have little control over 
the text drafting process or meeting agendas. 
 Institutional positions such as leadership matter b cause these roles potentially 
allow for the amplification of any extreme preferenc s the leader may have. The 
presidency’s agenda and drafting powers allow the state holding it to express its 
preferences more fully than it can when it does noth ld the presidency.193 Data 
limitations restrict the current analysis to the EU and CE.194 The notable differences 
                                                
191 Events in the subsample of data used here have insufficient variation on historical ties to allow tesing of 
Hypothesis 5. Of the 60 events, about one-third of the target countries have at least nominal ties to the 
United Kingdom. One has ties to France, and depending on the extent of historical ties allowed, one has ties 
to Portugal and up to two have ties to Spain.  
192 I use the term ‘presidencies’ generically to convey the sense of leadership. In the CE, the foreign 
minister of the country holding the leadership positi n is officially the “Chair of the Council of Minsters”; 
the OSCE’s title for the same position is the “Chairman-in-Office.” 
193 Spain, for example, chose to prioritize relations with Latin America during its 1995 presidency of the 
European Union.  
194 While the OSCE does have a presidency of sorts, no comprehensive list of its presidencies exists on its 




between the two organizations and the roles of their pr sidencies mean that pooling the 
observations for a single analysis is inappropriate. The EU’s president (and the High 
Representative for foreign policy) may make informal st tements on the Union’s behalf 
without additional authorization; the CE’s cannot, and its meetings are much less 
frequent than the EU’s. Because of this, I analyze each institution separately. 
For the purposes of this project, national security identities are a key set of 
preferences to study. Most European states have stable security policy profiles or 
identities, adhering to one of four durable patterns of behavior and expressed preferences 
in security policy. These identities largely align o  a single dimension, the role of 
military power in security policy, and I summarize them as neutral, post-Communist, 
Atlanticist, and Europeanist. Formally neutral states see the role of military power as 
minimal and are generally unwilling to use it (here, n utral states include Switzerland, 
Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria. Atlanticist states have a strong and sustained 
preference that favors NATO as their primary forum for security policy coordination, and 
they see the United States as an appropriate and often necessary actor in European 
security. Atlanticist states include the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Denmark, 
as in Chapter 3, and also Iceland. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary join this 
group after their accession to NATO in March 1999.195 A general consensus exists in the 
literature that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many central and Eastern 
European states turned to NATO, and particularly to the United States, as guarantors of 
                                                                                                                                      
international organizations which rotate in alphabetical order, the OSCE’s rotation order is irregular. This 
means that reconstructing the list on the basis of the ew available data points is not possible. 
195 Staff at the Atlantic Council of the United States identified these states, along with Turkey and Canad , 
as having Atlanticist policy orientations (using the definition provided above) through the early part of he 
1990s. Canada is not an European state and so is exclud d from this study. Turkey does not hold the chair 




their security. As a result, these states fall betwe n the non-committal states and the 
Atlanticist ones on the security orientation dimensio .196  
The remaining category of states are the non-committal. These states have not 
consistently espoused a pattern of behavior consistent with a single security identity; their 
policy profiles have been unstable and frequently changed with each new cabinet. Here, 
consistency of preferences over time is key. As constructivists argue, state identities 
change slowly. To qualify as either Atlanticist, Europeanist, or neutral requires a 
sustained pattern and national consensus about the appropriate form of security policy for 
the state. Various Italian governments, for example, have alternately leaned towards 
NATO or towards the budding EU security policy struc ure, but this very malleability of 
national policy signals that the state does not self-id ntify its overall security policy 
stance as part of a national policy tradition. 
Table 4-8. Council of Europe Cooperation by Presidency Security Identity. 
Response by CE CE Presidency 
Security Identity No Yes 
 
Total 
Neutral 7 2 9 
Noncommittal 20 1 21 
Post-Communist 17 0 17 
Atlanticist 10 3 13 
Total 54 6 60 
 
Table 4-8 shows CE cooperation behavior on the subsample of 60 events studied 
in this chapter. Two striking observations emerge from this table. First, the CE produced 
a very small number of instances of cooperation – a total of 6 – even on 60 of the most 
prominent global events of the period 1994-2003. Second, five of the six instances of 
                                                
196 The fifth security identity, Europeanist, is generally comfortable with the use of force, but prefers the 
exclusion of the United States and other non-European states from European security affairs. Because the 
only state with a consistently Europeanist policy orientation is France, including a category for this identity 




cooperation came under the leadership of states who are preference outliers. This 
bivariate analysis clearly discredits Hypothesis 6. 
Table 4-9. Probit Model of CE Preference Outliers and Cooperation. 
 Coeff. SE P 
Preference outlier presidency 1.167 0.719 0.052 
Gr European region 1.937 0.8422 0.011 
Salience (logged) 2.276 1.058 0.016 
Constant -16.982 7.075 0.008 
Pseudo R2 0.5151 
Log likelihood -9.457 
N 60 
 
 Table 4-9 shows a probit model of CE cooperation on salience, geographic 
location, and presidency security identity. For simpl city, I pool both kinds of preference 
outliers – states with constitutional neutrality and those with Atlanticist leanings - since 
the prediction is the same for both.197 These results confirm the intuition suggested by 
Table 4-8: Hypothesis 6 lacks support. All three independent variables are highly 
significant, with preference outliers notably more likely to preside over cooperation. 
Two explanations for the unexpected sign on preference outliers exist. One 
possibility relates to the very small number of insta ces of cooperation in the sample. 
Even a casual glance through the CE’s archives show that its level of output is 
substantially higher than the observations here would lead us to believe. The events in 
this model are a subsample of a set of randomly chosen world events, however, and 
European affairs form only a small part of the sample. The six instances of cooperation 
here were under the leadership of six different state , five of whom – Finland, Ireland, 
Hungary, Iceland and Germany – are preference outliers.198 The combination of a 
                                                
197 Models entering the two groups (neutral and Atlanticist) separately produce substantively similar results.  
198 Finland and Ireland are constitutionally neutral; Germany, Iceland, and Hungary (after its 1999 




relatively small sample with a very small number of successes could mean that the results 
are simply a statistical fluke. 
A second possibility acknowledges that the outcome coding here reflects only the 
existence of a response and not its content or form. The CE’s responses include four 
actions – higher-order cooperation – and four statements,199 but what did the statements 
say? Perhaps the preference outliers are using their powers during their presidencies to 
produce minimal outcomes that suit their preferences as a way to preempt efforts from 
the floor that may be less to their liking. This result suggests that the presidency’s 
drafting power, or perhaps the agenda power more gen rally, may be driving the result. 
Explaining this relationship is grounds for future research. 
Table 4-10. Cooperation by EU Presidency Security Identity.  
Response by EU CFSP EU Presidency 
Security Identity No Yes 
 
Total 
Neutral 3 6 9 
Noncommittal 17 15 39 
Atlanticist 7 7 14 
Total 27 28 55 
 
Tables 4-10 and 4-11 show a similar pattern with the European Union.200 As in 
Table 4-8 above, Table 4-10 shows that the non-committal states (those without distinct 
security identities) lead cooperation at the lowest rate, despite having the largest number 
of opportunities. Table 4-11 presents multivariate findings. As expected, salience is 
positive and highly significant; geographic region is insignificant, as we might also 
expect from a body that explicitly claims universal jurisdiction. Preference outlier status 
remains positive, but it is no longer statistically significant under a one-tailed test.  
                                                
199 Two of the observations received both a statement and an action. The dependent variable here codes 
only that one of these happened. 
200 The number of cases for the EU is smaller than the number for the CE, NATO and OSCE because 





Table 4-11. Probit Models of EU Preference Outliers and Cooperation. 
 Coeff. SE p 
Gr European region 0.079 0.458 0.432 
Salience (logged) 1.894 0.623 0.001 
Preference outlier 
presidency 0.159 0.371 0.334 
 Constant -11.414 3.706 0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.1621 




Complementarity and Substitutability in Foreign Policy 
Like many issue areas in international affairs, cooperation on foreign policy 
occurs in a dense institutional environment. A range of appropriate fora exists for 
addressing any given issue or concern. These institutional options sit alongside the ever-
existing options of unilateral activity and extra-institutional cooperation. The existence of 
multiple possible response options gives states – particularly those with outlying 
preferences – incentives to choose strategically between the institutions or to involve 
multiple institutions in complex ways to obtain outcomes closer to their ideal points. The 
overall foreign policy outcome of a situation is a function of the various separate 
responses. Strategically-minded states can manipulate these separate responses to tap 
synergies between the responses and thus amplify the total effect of responding. 
Responses from different institutions or states may be complements in this 
fashion, but they can also be substitutes. If France is already conducting an evacuation 
from Congo-Brazzaville, then perhaps arranging for your handful of citizens to exit with 
the French makes more sense than conducting your own evacuation or trying to get an 
international organization to coordinate it. A NATO peacekeeping mission obviates the 




declaration from an institution may reduce the incentiv s for the member states to issue 
their own unilateral statements. 
As a result of these complementary and substitutable relationships, foreign policy 
behavior cannot be studied as a series of independent decisions that result in single 
outcomes. The existing literature on foreign policy behavior fails to capture this insight. 
Davis’s (2006) study of trade dispute settlement is a case in point. She evaluates what 
conditions lead the United States to pursue a dispute through the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) or through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
These two fora are clearly substitutes for one another, but Davis overlooks the decision to 
pursue the case at this level in the first place. Some other disputes were submitted to 
arbitration or settled informally. These are also substitutable responses, and the choice to 
pursue settlement in a formal institution is itself the product of a selection process 
between these substitutes. As a result, the observed pool of dispute cases in either or both 
of these bodies is biased. Likewise, Jupille and Snidal (2006) allow states to choose 
between using existing institutions, modifying existing institutions, and developing new 
institutions. They neglect, however, the options of d ing nothing, acting alone, or 
cooperating without using an institution, and they fail to consider the possibility that 
states may pursue more than one of these options.201  
Because foreign responses are neither mutually exclusive (with the exception of 
‘do nothing’) nor independent of one another, the us of a multinomial probit model or 
similar large-n estimation strategy is inappropriate. Multinomial probit accommodates 
                                                
201 Perhaps the best example of this is the Kosovo crisis of 1999, where NATO, the EU, the UN, and the 
OSCE attempted to mediate simultaneously. The US, UK, France, and Russia created an informal ‘Contact 
Group’ to continue and coordinate their high-level unilateral efforts, all while they continued to participate 




mutually exclusive but unordered outcomes. It falters in this particular case because of 
the non-exclusive outcomes. Even if each exclusive cat gory referred to a combination of 
outcomes, rather than to a single outcome, the model still fails on two accounts. First, the 
number of categories still exceeds the model’s manageable maximum of approximately 
five outcomes. Approximately 17 different combinations of outcomes appear in the data, 
and most of those appear only a very limited number of times. Second, such a model 
almost certainly fails to satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption 
that multinomial probit requires. The institutions themselves are both potential 
complements as well as potential substitutes. As a result, the probability of choosing the 
option “unilateral + EU” is not independent of the probability of choosing “unilateral + 
EU + CE.” This violates the model’s assumption that the probabilities of observing the 
possible outcomes be independent of one another. 
Instead, simultaneous estimation of a set of models allows for the occurrence of 
multiple outcomes on any given event, and it also all ws for the non-independence of 
observations across models.202 Each model represents a different possible outcome, and 
the simultaneous estimation adjusts standard errors for the non-independence of the 
observations. Model A in Table 4-12 below estimates the influence of all available 
variables on each outcome,203 and it adjusts for non-independence in this manner. I  this 
model, the variable “Non-European institutions” refers to action by a body outside the 
sample group here: the United Nations, the Associati n of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the Group of 7/8 (G-7/8), etc. This controls, at least partially, for action by 
groups other than the bodies of interest.  
                                                
202 (Greene 2003).  





Table 4-12. Simultaneous Estimation of Probit Models, by Outcome. 
  Model A Model B 
 Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
Unilateral Action  
Salience (logged) 0.164 0.572 0.387 0.165 0.572 0.387 
Greater European region 0.211 0.401 0.300 0.211 0.401 0.300 
Any European institution 0.937 0.398 0.009 0.937 0.398 0.009 
Any non-European institution -0.159 0.607 0.397 -0.159 0.607 0.397 
Constant -1.140 3.376 0.368 -1.140 3.376 0.368 
Log likelihood -34.452 -34.452 
LR χ2 (p-value) 8.79 (0.067) 8.79 (0.067) 
Ad Hoc Cooperation 
Salience (logged) -0.137 0.546 0.401 -0.137 0.546 0.401 
European region 0.418 0.435 0.169 0.418 0.435 0.169 
Any institution -0.009 0.556 0.494 -0.009 0.556 0.494 
Any non-European institution 1.292 0.540 0.009 1.292 0.540 0.009 
Constant -0.737 3.060 0.405 -0.737 3.060 0.405 
Log likelihood -18.577 -18.577 
LR χ2 (p-value) 6.07 (0.194) 6.07 (0.194) 
EU Cooperation 
Salience (logged) 1.740 0.495 0.000 1.625 0.539 0.002 
European region 0.112 0.416 0.394 -0.246 0.465 0.299 
EU Neutral presidency 0.313 0.517 0.273 0.307 0.509 0.273 
EU Atlanticist presidency -0.222 0.450 0.311 -0.238 0.459 0.302 
Any non-European institution 0.758 0.679 0.132 0.726 0.661 0.136 
Institutions other than EU -- -- -- 0.700 0.614 0.127 
Constant -10.525 2.966 0.000 -9.859 3.215 0.001 
Log likelihood (p-value) -30.752 -30.240 
LR χ2 (-value) 14.72 (0.012) 15.75 (0.015) 
NATO Cooperation 
Salience (logged) 1.372 0.673 0.021 0.972 0.638 0.064 
European region 1.176 0.521 0.012 1.116 0.495 0.012 
Any non-European institution 0.484 0.530 0.181 0.315 0.501 0.265 
Institutions other than NATO -- -- -- 0.633 0.601 0.146 
Constant -10.061 4.247 0.009 -7.944 3.860 0.020 
Log likelihood (p-value) -17.531 -17.020 
LR χ2 (-value) 12.06 (0.007) 13.08 (0.011) 
OSCE Cooperation 
Salience (logged) -0.445 0.444 0.158 -0.445 0.444 0.158 
Any non-European institution 0.612 0.710 0.195 0.612 0.710 0.195 
Constant 1.070 2.580 0.339 1.070 2.580 0.339 
Log likelihood (p-value) -14.254 -14.254 
LR χ2 (-value) 0.88 (0.643) 0.88 (0.643) 
 






Table 4-12, Continued. 
CE Cooperation 
Salience (logged) 2.171 1.022 0.017 1.942 1.024 0.029 
European region -2.002 0.809 0.007 -1.355 0.806 0.047 
CE informal jurisdiction 3.545 0.590 0.000 3.209 0.818 0.000 
CE neutral presidency 0.828 0.728 0.128 0.702 0.770 0.181 
CE Atlanticist presidency 1.137 0.561 0.022 1.197 0.619 0.027 
Any non-European institution 0.927 0.582 0.056 0.658 0.553 0.117 
Institutions other than CE -- -- -- 0.981 0.713 0.085 
Constant -16.369 6.453 0.006 -15.719 6.510 0.008 
Log likelihood (p-value) -8.461 -8.135 
LR χ2 (-value) 22.09 (0.003) 22.74 (0.004) 
 
The simultaneously estimated probit models in Table 4-12 suggest that the 
mechanisms driving unilateral and ad hoc responses differ from one another and from the 
other forms of institutional cooperation studied here. The action of non-European 
institutions (the UN, etc.) substantially increases the probability of ad hoc cooperation by 
European states. Unilateral action, on the other hand, is related to the activity of 
European institutions; the positive association suggests that unilateral action serves as a 
complement to cooperative action for European state.204 These results hold in both 
Models A and B, since the ‘institutions other than’ variable does not enter for these 
dependent variables. Salience and region are insignifica t in both models; this generally 
conforms to expectations, especially in the unilateral model, where the dependent 
variable captures action by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or Italy.  
For the institutions, salience is regularly significant and in the expected direction. 
In the OSCE model, jurisdiction and region variables are not included as a result of 
perfect prediction, so perhaps the OSCE results emerge at least in part from omitted 
variable bias. Intriguingly, only salience is significant in the EU model. The 
                                                
204 The interpretation of the positive coefficient on non-European institutional activity for ad hoc 
cooperation is unclear from the present codings. Without knowing which organization(s) and states 
responded, we cannot determine whether the positive relationship indicates action by states uninvolved 




insignificance of region is perhaps expected, since th  institution claims global 
jurisdiction. Additionally, all of the European institutions except for the Council of 
Europe appear indifferent to (or at least unaffected by) the action of non-European 
institutions; the cause of this effect is not clear.   
Model A allows for weak interdependence among the outcomes, with a tie 
through the error term but no direct effect of one on the other. This is statistically 
defensible, but it almost certainly underestimates the effect of the substitutability and/or 
complementarity among the outcomes. Even a casual reading of cases shows that states 
perceive a heavy degree of complementarity between institutions, with the EU, for 
example, often funding initiatives of the CE and OSCE. Ignoring dependency of this 
nature, where one institution’s behavior explicitly influences the behavior of another, 
would lead to omitted variable bias.205 Model B (Table 4-12 above) allows for a much 
stronger degree of interdependence by explicitly including in each institution’s equation 
an independent variable indicating whether any of the other institutions in the study had 
acted on the event.  
These variables are not unproblematic. In particular, since the outcome in each 
institution influences all other institutions, introducing these “Institutions Other Than” 
(IOT) variables creates a distinct case of endogeneity. The outcome in one institution 
affects the probability of cooperation in the second, third, etc., institutions, but in turn we 
want to use the outcomes in institutions 2, 3, and 4 to predict cooperation in the first. 
Endogeneity of this nature leads to the endogenous explanatory variables being correlated 
with the error terms. The typical solution to the endogeneity problem is to use an 
instrumental variables framework, in this case with appropriate instruments for the 
                                                




behavior of the other institutions, so that the instruments are not correlated with the error 
terms. If only a single variable were endogenous, thi  would likely be a viable strategy. 
Unfortunately, this case would require instruments for several jointly endogenous 
variables. Finding an instrument that is exogenous t  all four institutions but still predicts 
the activity of one is a daunting prospect – finding four such instruments is likely 
impossible. 
Instead, I mitigate this problem somewhat by coding the IOT variables as whether 
any of the remaining institutions acted, rather than including separate variables for 
whether each acted. To take the case of IOTEU, for example, three sets of independent 
variables – those explaining whether the CE, OSCE, and NATO reacted – are involved in 
determining whether the value of IOTEU is 1. The EU’s own outcome is in each of those 
sets, but the number of other variables cushions the effect of the EU. Moreover, since 
only one of those components needs to be a success (produce coop ration) for IOTEU to 
equal 1, the total effect of the EU’s implicit entry on the right hand side of its own model 
is smaller than if each of the institutions were a separate variable.206 
Model B presents the results of a second simultaneous estimation that now 
includes the (endogenous) IOT variables.207 Even though the IOT variables fail to attain 
statistical significance in their own right, several notable differences emerge between this 
model and Model A. For the EU, the sign on geographic region has reversed, though the 
coefficient itself remains insignificant; salience remains the sole significant predictor. For 
NATO, salience loses some significance; the same happens for action by other non-
European institutions in the model of CE behavior. In the Council of Europe as well, the 
                                                
206 Models which included the responses of each of the ‘other than’ institutions separately collapsed as a 
result of collinearity and perfect prediction. 




effect of non-European institutions becomes insignificant in the presence of the IOT 
control. The model for the OSCE remains unchanged and continues to perform poorly. 
The models in Table 4-12 describe relationships betwe n the predictive variables 
and institutional output. While the IOT variables and the seemingly unrelated probit 
framework allow the coefficients to reflect interdependent relationships between the 
outcomes, Table 4-12 does not allow us to make direct conclusions about complementary 
and substitutable relationships between the available outcomes. Table 4-13, on the other 
hand, allows us to draw these conclusions. It shows correlations between the residuals 
generated by Models A and B from Table 4-12 in panels A and B, respectively. These 
correlations capture unmodeled relationships between th  different outcomes; by 
comparing these directly across the models, we can obtain estimates of the relationships 
between the outcomes. Positive correlations in this case reflect a complementary 
relationship between outcomes; the use of one makes the occurrence of the other more 
likely. Likewise, negative correlations reflect subtitutable relationships, where the 
occurrence of one outcome makes another less likely. 
Table 4-13. Residual Correlations from Seemingly Unrelated Estimations 
A. Model A Unilat. Ad Hoc EU NATO OSCE CE 
Unilateral 1.0000      
Ad Hoc 0.2727 1.0000     
EU -0.0838 -0.0384 1.0000    
NATO 0.1848 0.0661 0.0356 1.0000   
OSCE 0.1086 0.0164 0.1123 0.4184 1.0000  
CE 
 
0.0241 0.0883 0.0232 0.4434 0.4585 1.0000 
B. Model B Unilat. Ad Hoc EU NATO OSCE CE 
Unilateral 1.0000      
Ad Hoc 0.2727 1.0000     
EU -0.0976 -0.0373 1.0000    
NATO 0.1958 0.0714 -0.1522 1.0000   
OSCE 0.1086 0.0164 0.0377 0.3500 1.0000  
CE -0.0127 0.0642 -0.0589 0.3962 0.3841 1.0000 





Model A does not contain the ‘institutions other than’ variables. The unexplained 
portions of the observations are thus somewhat larger than in the Model B because the 
variance captured by the IOT variables remains in the residuals in Model A. As a result, 
most of the correlations are larger in absolute terms in Model A. Substantively, Model A 
suggests two important things. First, unilateral action complements ad hoc activity, 
though the relationship is only moderately strong. Also, a slightly weaker relationship 
exists between unilateral behavior and NATO action; this deserves further investigation. 
Second, a strong complementarity relationship exists be ween NATO, the OSCE, and the 
CE (r > 0.4), but none of these bodies has a strong relationship to the EU. This is perhaps 
a function of the institutions’ substantive jurisdictions; the three institutions’ jurisdictions 
overlap substantially, and the EU’s jurisdiction contains a number of issues that are not 
part of these three bodies’ remits. This finding is perhaps more intriguing in light of the 
extensive formal ties and coordination structures btween the EU and the OSCE and CE, 
which we might have expected to produce strong positive correlations between them. The 
EU’s residuals correlate to the OSCE’s at r = 0.11, suggesting a mild complementarity, 
but this value is not particularly large relative to the values for the OSCE and CE. 
Model B, on the other hand, contains the IOT variables in the institutions’ models. 
The models for unilateral and ad hoc behavior have not changed, so the moderately 
complementary relationship of Model A persists here as well. The moderate relationship 
between unilateral and NATO activity has strengthened as well, though it still falls short 
of the relationship between unilateral and ad hoc behavior. The OSCE, CE, and NATO 
continue to be strongly related, though to a lesser deg ee now that the behavior of the 




difference between the two models appears here in the relationship of the EU and NATO. 
These two institutions go from having a positive but s bstantively insignificant relation 
ship in Model A (r = 0.0356, panel A) to having a moderately strong substitute 
relationship in Model B (r = -0.1522, panel B). When the models allow for more explicit 
interdependency between the outcomes, we see a substitution relationship emerge. This is 
perhaps suggestive of the ‘division of labor’ that the organizations sought to reach at 
various points during this period. While the member states never reached a formal 
agreement on a division of labor between the two bodies, some informal jurisdiction 
splitting did occur, at least on a case-by-case basis. This relationship deserves further 
investigation, perhaps through detailed policymaker interviews, to elucidate how the two 
bodies interact and whether this relationship has changed over time. 
 
A Precautionary Note About Statistical Power in Small Samples 
This chapter has explored relationships between forms of foreign policy behavior 
using a series of increasingly complex econometric tools on a relatively small sample of 
60 cases. The limited variation contained in these cases has severely restricted the set of 
possible analyses and has most likely affected the findings. The OSCE is a case in point. 
Across the 60 events, it responds to only 4; the CE likewise responds to only 6 of 60. The 
resultant constraints on the dataset – particularly the limited set of contexts in which 
‘success’ occurs – almost certainly weaken the model’s ability to find statistically 
significant relationships. These constraints are only magnified as the complexity of the 
model being estimated increases. Thus, some of the weak findings, particularly in the 




weakness of the theory as they are a function of the weakness of the data. Further work 
will expand the dataset and re-test the hypotheses on more diverse data. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined patterns of outcomes in foreign policy behavior, 
focusing on the role of variables related to capacity and consensus in determining which 
outcomes emerge in international events.  
Indicators of consensus, or an institution’s likely ability to achieve it, include the 
distribution of member preferences, the number of members, the institution’s formal and 
informal jurisdictions, security policy orientations of institutional leadership, and the 
event’s overall salience. Salience is a fairly stable predictor of cooperation, with 
increased salience leading to increased probabilities of cooperation. The number of 
members has a strong and negative effect on an institution’s ability to achieve 
cooperation, as measured by the institution’s annual cooperation output. Models 
examining distribution problems, measured as dispersion of government preferences, 
consistently have the correct sign though they fail to attain statistical significance; data 
limitations restrict this finding, however, to models of the EU only.  
Indicators of capacity are fewer and less informative for two reasons. First, the 
institutional capacity needed to act in this study is the ability to pass a declaration. No 
variation exists on this variable: All of the institu ons and individual states considered 
here have that capacity. Second, the two primary measur s of capacity used here are blunt 
and, partly as a result of their construction, not particularly informative. Capabilities, 




Index, produce significant effects on an institution’s annual amount of cooperative 
output. Because both are constructed as additive measur s of member state capabilities, 
though, these measures by definition have to increase s the number of members 
increases. The negative coefficient most likely results from the positive correlation 
between number of members and the capabilities measur s. 
The analysis in this chapter leaves open a number of questions, however. The role 
of capacity is still unclear, particularly in explaining unilateral behavior and extra-
institutional cooperation. When states have decided to use an institution, how do the 
kinds of general capacities examined here relate to institution-specific capacities such as 
particular aid programs or access to particular equipment or expertise? Do states 
deliberately try to maneuver around potentially obstructionist states by choosing fora that 
exclude, marginalize, or disenfranchise the preference outliers? Why do states choose to 
use multiple forms of response - and in particular several institutions - simultaneously 
when this imposes higher coordination costs without producing a clear benefit? 
In-depth examination of a single case can help to shed light on these questions. 
Chapter 5 returns to the case of Albania’s collapse in arly 1997, when the states of 
Europe enacted one of their most complex and drawn-out responses ever. This case 
affords a range of outcomes – from unilateral statements and actions by some but not all 
actors, to statements and independent actions by some but not all institutions, and finally 
to a coordinated action. It also includes a range of potential motivating factors – 
geographic proximity, cultural differences, security aspects, and human rights and 
economic concerns. The combination of these factors makes it a rigorous and challenging 













“To be frank, we do not know what to do.” 
 
- Swedish Foreign Minister Lena  
Helm-Wallen, March 15, 1997208 
 
 
The previous chapter explored patterns of outcomes across events and 
international institutions using quantitative techniques. At the outcome level, we observe 
no association between unilateral activity and institutional actions. This suggests that 
states treat most forms of foreign policy cooperation as complementary to, rather than a 
substitute for, their own foreign policy activity. The focus on outcomes, however, masks 
important variation in how individual states treat cooperation.  
This chapter expands the test of the consensus-capacity framework beyond the 
level of outcomes by providing preliminary tests of hypotheses about the behavior of 
individual states in pursuit of the outcomes studied in Chapters 3 and 4. Do states 
explicitly strategize about venue choice with concer s about consensus and capacity in 
mind? Under what conditions are states willing to act outside institutions, either 
unilaterally or collectively?  
The collapse of Albania in early 1997 provides an excellent opportunity to test 
hypotheses at the level of individual states. When extensive Ponzi (pyramid investment) 
                                                




schemes collapsed, ties between the pyramids and the ruling party turned economic chaos 
into political breakdown. The government refused to act, either to suppress the pyramids 
or to protect its already-impoverished citizens from the scams. Citizens in the hardest-hit 
areas took up arms and eventually marched on the capital. The country hovered on the 
brink of civil war for several weeks until a belated European diplomatic mission 
successfully negotiated a solution. Over a month laer, a peacekeeping force finally 
deployed to facilitate weapons collection and new elections. 
This complicated scenario engendered an even more complex set of responses 
from other European states. Over the course of the crisis, we see issues of humanitarian 
relief, democratization, economics, domestic (interal) security, and international 
security. The final foreign policy outcome of the crisis involved a range of both 
institutional and unilateral actions. Unilateral activity ranged from declarations to 
military deployment; institutional responses included a number of declarations of concern 
and support along with a UN-authorized, OSCE-organized, Italian-led ad hoc military 
intervention.  
Examining an extended, multifaceted crisis with a nu nced and highly-contested 
outcome is advantageous because it provides an opportunity to extract multiple 
observations from this single “case.” By identifying discrete events or phases within the 
crisis and studying the responses of multiple state, I xpand the number of observations 
within the case to reduce overdetermination while holding other factors about the crisis 
constant across all phases. While the evidence here is preliminary and drawn from 




concern about capacity and contesting the definition of the issue to obtain action in their 
preferred venue. 
From an empirical standpoint, the Albanian case is a good focus for testing these 
hypotheses for several reasons. First, it is sufficiently after the substantial preference 
upheaval and institutional redesign that accompanied th  end of the Cold War. By 1997, 
states’ preferences had begun to stabilize, and they had begun to acclimate to the new 
dynamics in the various institutions. Second, the Albanian crisis contains several non-
conflict-oriented elements. The economic element, for example, triggers different sets of 
interests and concerns among other states while also expanding the set of institutions that 
states would consider as part of their response.209 Finally, the crisis was unexpected; it 
was not something for which states had had pre-established policy or pre-drafted 
response plans.210 The lack of prepared policy or anticipated responses forced states to 
enact the entire policy planning process in public in a short period of time. This allows 
observers to obtain a fuller picture of the crisis than might otherwise be possible.211 
This chapter first discusses consensus and capacity s state-level concerns and 
hypothesizes about how they would affect individual st tes’ behavior. The second section 
presents a brief background to the crisis and a summary of events during the crisis itself. 
The third section presents evidence about state behavior on two key issues in the crisis 
and analyzes this data in relation to the hypotheses. The final section concludes by 
assessing the usefulness of the consensus-capacity fr mework at the state level. 
                                                
209 NATO, for example, is much less of an appropriate nstitution for the crisis in its early economic phase. 
210 Kosovo, in contrast, was something that policymakers had begun to expect even as early as 1997; 
several sources speak of concerns that civil war in Albania would give ethnic Albanians in Kosovo reason  
to take up arms against the Serbs. 
211 The Bosnian crisis of 1993-95 is less appropriate on each of these counts. The OSCE did not even exist 
in its current form during this period, and the EU’s CFSP was in the process of being completed. Russia’s 
likely response was very uncertain, and the relevance of the crisis to some great powers was also less c ar. 




Consensus and Capacity as State-Level Concerns 
Two main sets of hypotheses exist about how consensu  and capacity should 
matter in individual states’ decision-making processes. They address the distinction of 
preferences over outcomes versus preferences over strategies: Who should be willing to 
act outside institutions, and who should prefer which of the venues for cooperation.  
The distinction between preferences over outcomes and preferences over 
strategies is important here. States have preferencs over the set of possible outcomes in 
any situation. Outcomes are final conditions or end-states such as the cessation of 
hostilities, a fresh election, a clear military victory for one side, an end to the refugee 
flows, etc.212 Because the events under consideration are fast-moving and constitute 
second-order cooperation, however, I assume that these preferences are generally 
exogenous and fixed in the short run.213 
The first subsection below presents hypotheses about which states should prefer 
extra-institutional strategies of ad hoc cooperation or unilateral action, and under what 
circumstances. The second subsection discusses hypotheses for how states choose 
between the institutional venues available to them when they decide to pursue 
cooperation in an existing group. 
 
                                                
212 Identifying the sources of state preferences is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
213 States could, however, perceive cooperation as an end in itself, as an outcome over which they hold a 
preference. Several lines of thought, including one  the ‘coordination reflex’ in studies of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, suggest that such a preference exists. These authors believe national 
preferences are malleable through interaction and socialization, but they acknowledge that such change is 
likely to be slow, measured in decades rather than e handful of months the Albanian crisis persisted. Even 
for states who have a preference for cooperation itself, their observed strategy/outcome preference should 
not change over the course of the two or three months of this crisis. These states, however, should be very 
unlikely to propose unilateral action, and they should be unlikely to propose any action outside of an 
institution. See (M. E. Smith 2004) and (Glarbo 1999) for prominent examples of this cooperation-as-a-




Acting Outside Institutions 
Two forms of activity occur outside of institutions: ad hoc cooperation and 
unilateral activity. The consensus-capacity framework suggested that extra-institutional 
cooperation should occur when a cluster of states with like preferences exists, but a 
general consensus in existing institutions does not. A cluster’s similar preferences allow 
the members to reach a consensus among themselves on a policy response. That cluster 
of states, however, must have sufficient capacity to undertake the desired action with an 
acceptable probability of success. Because the partici nts in an ad hoc action must 
generate all of their own required capacity from among themselves (no institutional 
capacity is available), adding many low-capacity states increases transaction costs 
without substantially increasing the available resources. 
H1a: Participants in ad hoc cooperation will belong to a preference cluster.  
H1b: States with moderate to high capacity are most likely to participate in ad 
hoc cooperation. 
 
Ad hoc cooperation thus requires consensus on a smaller scale and some degree 
of capacity pooling. On the other hand, consensus of any variety is not a necessary 
condition for unilateral activity. Unilateralism can rise under conditions of consensus or 
dissensus, though the theory suggests it is more likely under the latter. Actors choosing to 
take unilateral action generally are not satisfied with either the non-cooperative status quo 
or the new potential cooperative outcome. The latter group are easy to identify as 
preference outliers within a given group or organiztion.214 The former group, those 
unhappy with non-cooperation, may be more difficult to spot, however; their stated 
preferences could be anywhere on the policy dimension that is not the status quo. The 
                                                




identifying feature for this group is the differenc between their (stated) ideal outcomes 
and the status quo. 
The necessary condition for unilateral action is capacity, but a caveat applies. 
Because all states have the minimum capacity needed to produce declarations or 
statements, we must distinguish here between unilateral statements (low-intensity 
behaviors) and unilateral actions (high-intensity behaviors). Hypotheses 2a and 2b reflect 
this logic: 
H2a: Preference outliers with moderate to high capacity should be willing to act 
unilaterally. High and low intensity behaviors are possible. At moderate levels of 
capacity policymakers should evidence some concern about capacity constraints. 
H2b: Preference outliers with low capacity may be willing to act unilaterally but 
will only be able to take low-cost actions. Policymakers will be concerned with 
capacity constraints.215 
 
Direct evidence of concern about capacity constraints could take the form of 
policymaker statements about inability to do particular tasks, lack of resources, or 
possibly requests for help from states who do have particular forms of capacity.  
 
Venue Preferences  
The second set of hypotheses addresses how states choo e between existing fora. 
Even when states do decide to cooperate, and do decide to cooperate through an 
institution, they still face the decision of which institution to use. In the case of European 
states and the Albanian crisis, options included the United Nations, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union 
(WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and for some 
aspects of the crisis, the Council of Europe (CE). 
                                                




The membership, capacity, substantive jurisdictions, a d decision-making rules of 
these institutions vary dramatically. The combination of these elements will alter the 
likely type of cooperation that the institution can produce. Differing preference 
distributions and decision rules will shape outcomes; outcomes will interact with capacity 
to produce an estimated net benefit of cooperation that states can compare to the status 
quo and to their own ideal points.216 Thus, these institutional differences should allow 
states to discriminate between them. 
H3: Preference outliers should express preferences for institutions or venues 
where they are pivotal voters, as determined by that venue’s voting rule. 
H4: States should base their venue preferences on their estimation of the likely 
cooperative outcome and the estimated deviation of this from their ideal 
points.217 
 
In previous chapters, a state’s security identity served as a crude proxy for 
preference outlier status since it was available cross-nationally and had a definition that 
was invariant to the issue under consideration. In the case of the Albanian crisis, 
however, more nuanced measures are possible. In particul , we can identify single 
policy dimensions at several points in the crisis and order states by their policy 
preferences on that dimension. By studying several stages that invoke different policy 
issues, we can vary the set of states that are outliers o see if this affects their stated 
preferences or behavior. This also allows the substantive content of policy to re-enter the 
picture; data constraints led previous chapters to ign re this in favor of simply noting 
whether any cooperation occurred. 
 
                                                
216 This paragraph summarizes the conclusions of the exp cted utility framework in Chapter 2.  




Background to the Albanian Crisis and Brief Chronology 
This section provides a brief overview of the crisis in Albania to set the stage for 
discussions of state preferences during the crisis. I begin by discussing prevailing 
economic and political conditions in Albania in the p riod leading up to the crisis itself. I 
then discuss the transformation of the situation from an economic crisis to a political 
disaster and the efforts by other states and institutions to resolve the crisis. The final 
subsection addresses the implementation of the agreement, the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces, and the election itself.218 
Figure 5-1. Map of Albania. 
 




Even prior to the collapse of Communism in late 1990, Albania was one of the 
poorest countries in Europe. Its longtime dictator Enver Hoxha adopted autarkic 
                                                
218 This account is based heavily on Pettifer and Vickers (2007), Vaughan-Whitehead (1999), and 
Perlmutter (1998). As most of the basic details are common knowledge, I cite only specific facts not 




economic policies through much of the 1980s, prohibiting not just trade with the outside 
world but virtually all other contact with it as well. After Hoxha’s death in 1985 and the 
fall of his handpicked successor Ramiz Alia in 1991, Albanians entered the transition to a 
market economy even more ignorant of its workings than other former Communist states.  
The combination of desperate economic conditions and ig orance about market 
economics made Albanians very susceptible to a range of fraudulent investment 
schemes.219 Ponzi (pyramid) schemes swept through most Eastern Bloc countries at some 
point in the early 1990s, but in Albania they found particularly fertile ground.220 By late 
1996, some twenty pyramid schemes operated in the country, taking in $3-4 million a 
day,221 and some had existed for half a dozen years.222 Experts later estimated that the 
total investment in the schemes exceeded $2 billion – which is no mean feat in a country 
with a GDP around that amount223 – and that some half or more of the population 
received a regular income from the schemes.224 Despite warnings from the International 
Monetary Fund, the pyramids continued to operate openly through late 1996. 
Meanwhile, on the political front, hard-fought national parliamentary elections in 
May 1996 drained both parties’ treasuries. Both parties turned to various pyramid 
schemes to raise additional funds. The ruling Democratic Party (DP) was quite overt 
                                                
219 (Jarvis 2000, 46). 
220 Pyramid schemes pay exorbitant rates of “interest” on investments; the ‘pyramid’ structure emerges 
because early investors must recruit additional participants. Pyramid funds may invest in some productive 
activity, but crucially, though, the bulk of their “ nterest” payments come from the principal payments of 
later depositors. As a result, these schemes are mathe tically unsustainable. Once the pyramid exhausts 
the supply of gullible investors, it loses the stream of income by which it paid interest to earlier entrants. 
Only early entrants can possibly profit from these schemes – if the scheme survives long enough to repay 
their investment. Later participants will lose their investment entirely; their principal was not invested but 
was instead used to pay interest to early entrants. 
221 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 194). 
222 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 4). 
223 (Economy's losses caused by schemes estimated at 2bn dollars - Koha Jone 1997); (Vaughan-Whitehead 
1999, 192); see also (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 5). 
224 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 204); Jarvis (2000, 46) cites IMF statistics suggesting that two-thirds of the




about their ties. Posters everywhere proclaimed “With the DP, Everyone Wins” and 
showed a photograph of the DP’s local candidate surrounded by the names of major 
pyramid companies.225 Despite equally heavy (and equally suspect) spending by the 
Socialists, the election was a landslide; the DP won 122 of the 140 parliamentary seats 
and handily re-elected the DP prime minister. External observers confirmed widespread 
electoral fraud, and the Socialists boycotted the new Parliament.226  
October’s local elections were an even bigger fiasco. The Democratic Party, upset 
by the fraud pronouncements in May’s election, refus d to accredit a group of OSCE 
observers for the local elections. The West saw this as a clear signal that the DP, under 
Prime Minster Aleksander Meksi and President Sali Berisha, intended to win this election 
by fraud as well. They were probably right; the DP won 86.9% of the country’s 
mayorships and communal councils.227 The shunning of observers, however, and overt 
fraud made continued support of Berisha’s regime more difficult for Western states.228  
 
Collapse and Crisis 
The first pyramid to collapse was a smaller Tirana-based scheme run by an 
illiterate Gypsy named Sudja, who had made her fund’s financial decisions by consulting 
her crystal ball. Sudja’s bank closed in December 1996; Sudja herself was arrested in 
mid-January for fraud. More seriously, two of the larger funds (Xhaferri and Populli) 
stopped paying interest in mid-January.229 When the government arrested leaders of these 
                                                
225 See, e.g., (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 197); this particular element of the campaign is widely noted in 
accounts of the crisis.  
226 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 206). 
227 (Biberaj 1998, 313). 
228 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 6-7). 




schemes for fraud, citizens believed that the governm nt had done it to steal their 
money,230 and the demonstrations outside the kiosks and in Tirana began to include 
slogans of “down with dictatorship” as well as “we ant our money.”231 In a desperate 
attempt to prevent further collapses, the government froze the two schemes’ deposits 
(some $255 mln), began rationing bank withdrawals, nd created commissions to 
reimburse those funds’ investors and to investigate the remaining pyramids.232 
The government’s attempts to stem the economic collapse and placate citizens 
failed. January 22 saw thousands of demonstrators “fighting a pitched battle” with police 
in the streets of Tirana, demanding that their investm nts be repaid.233 Five thousand 
citizens rampaged in Lushnja on the 24th, burning the city hall and destroying most 
government offices in their dissatisfaction with government policy. When the foreign 
minister visited Lushnja the next day, to try to placate the citizens, he was beaten and 
stoned by a mob.234 By the 26th, fourteen cities were reporting rioting and violenc .235 On 
January 27, an estimated 35,000 citizens clashed with riot police in Tirana’s central 
Skanderbeg Square, calling for the government’s resignation.236 The same day, in the 
face of DP supporters marching in Tirana and protests in DP-loyal cities, the DP-
dominated Parliament buckled and granted Berisha emergency powers.237 
                                                
230 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 11). The Albanian authorities closed Xhaferri largely at the insistence of 
Western governments, who had evidence that the nasce t Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had deposited 
substantial amounts of funds there. Xhaferri’s depositors, however, were heavily concentrated in the 
southern city of Lushnja, where support for Berisha’  Democratic Party was weakest. This had important 
consequences later.  
231 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 10). 
232 (Standish 1997). 
233 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 10). 
234 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 210). 
235 (Robertson 1997). 
236 (Dhimgjoka 1997). 




The rosy picture of Albania as the showcase economy f Eastern Europe238 fell 
apart rapidly after that. Almost all of the major funds had fallen by February 5, and the 
largest of all dangled by a thread. Around two-thirds of the population had money 
invested in the pyramid schemes.239 A large number had sold their land or farm animals 
to invest additional money in the pyramids, and many had encouraged their relatives 
working abroad to send back larger remittances for this purpose too. The Southern part of 
the country was home to a number of the longest-lived and widely-subscribed schemes; 
citizens and the local economy were particularly devastated by the collapses. 
Government Incompetence and the Escalation of Violence 
The sheer extent of the crisis was compounded by the government’s refusal to 
take responsibility for allowing the pyramids to persist and to capture gullible investors. 
On January 30, the largest scheme placed a letter in the Financial Times denying that it 
was a pyramid, apparently at the urging of the governm nt. One pair of observers 
describes this as “a complete divorce from reality in the Albanian fiscal world,” and the 
currency plummeted as citizens tried to trade leks (the local currency) for dollars.240 
Berisha did not admit any responsibility or mistakes on his part until February 15, and 
even then he insisted that most responsibility rests with the citizens and that the 
government would not compensate them for their losses.241 
In the face of this government refusal to address the problem of the pyramids or 
the devastation they caused, violence escalated and continued to spread through February 
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and into March. Berisha sacked Meksi’s government o March 2242; but the DP-
dominated parliament re-elected Berisha to another fiv -year term on March 3.243 This 
prompted the now-unified opposition to call for more protests, and even DP supporters 
were beginning to question why the government had remained blind to the schemes for 
several years. In the South, anti-Berisha forces were highly displeased with the re-
election, and they seized small arms and light weapons from army weapons depots on 
March 3.244  
By mid-March, the insurgency had taken on a political slant that had very little 
connection to the original pyramid scheme crisis. The economic crisis may have provided 
the initial impetus, but the primary emphasis now was on removing the DP government.  
‘Salvation committees’ in the south, largely using Communist-era political actors and 
political and military structures as a basis, began taking cities and re-establishing order; 
rebels controlled fourteen southern cities by March 14.245  
As the boundary of rebel-controlled territory crept closer to Tirana, insurgent 
groups in the north also armed themselves and pushed south. The north was traditionally 
a bastion of DP strength, and Berisha himself came from there; the south was a Socialist 
stronghold. But because regional lines in Albania coin ided with party lines and with 
ethnic lines, and because a large number of looted weapons were now easily available, 
                                                
242 (State of Emergency Called as Albania on the Brink 1997). 
243 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 212). In a belated show of disapproval, ambassadors from EU member 
states declined to attend the swearing-in ceremony. (Fox 1997). 
244 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 20). 
245 (US employees, citizens ordered to leave Albania 1997). The Partisan popular army tradition was a key 
element of Albania’s World War II experience; it relied on all citizens having a basic knowledge of defense 
and community-based defense practices. This continued in the formal “civilian military education process” 
of the Hoxha era, where among other things all citizens were drilled in how to improvise defensive 
strategies against potential invasion and were given basic training in the use of small arms. See (Pettifer 




outside powers became very concerned about the risk of civil war.246 At a minimum, the 
looted weapons could easily find their way across the border into neighboring Kosovo 
and destabilize the situation there further. 
Threats to the Outside 
Beyond the risk of exacerbating tensions in Kosovo – a prospect which Germany 
desperately wanted to avoid247 – the Albanian crisis created at least two other treats for 
the international community. These were the need to protect and evacuate their own 
citizens from the strife-torn country, and the large numbers of refugees fleeing the 
economic and/or political consequences of the crisis. 
By March 11, Western states had begun to evacuate their nationals from Tirana. 
By this point, though, the chaos in Albania was so far along that the evacuation process 
was a mess. Civilian flights from Tirana airport had ceased a week earlier, forcing 
embassies to make alternate plans.248 Well over a dozen naval vessels from seven 
countries gathered in the Adriatic, patrolling the waters and serving as landing pads for 
helicopter evacuations.249 American helicopters came under fire near the Tirana irport, 
                                                
246 (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 27-28). Ethnic Ghegs are concentrated in the northern part of the country 
and typically vote for the DP (or other parties of the right), and the southern Tosks support the Socialist 
Party and its Communist predecessor, the People’s Party of Albania. In hindsight, Greco disagrees with the 
immediacy of the civil war threat (2001, sec. 2), though contemporary commentators appear to believe it 
quite plausible. (e.g., Irish Independent, March 1997, various issues). He also cites disagreement (2001, 
sec. 3) on the risk of the crisis spilling over to K sovo and Macedonia. 
247 (Barber 1997). 
248 In one widely reported incident, a British evacuation convoy’s vehicles had a pile-up accident as they 
neared the port at Durres; the missionaries and aid workers were stranded overnight on the beach with 
armed gangs firing shots into the air all around them.  
249 (Greece moves to evacuate nationals from Albanian capital - ER Radio 1997); (U.S. Marines in Tirana 
to provide security for evacuation 1997); (Miller 1997); (European countries speed up evacuation work in 
Albania 1997); (Greek Navy conducts evacuation mission in Albania 1997). Sight of the ships often led 
citizens in areas of mixed political affiliation tohink that the ships were an international force int rvening 
on behalf of the DP government, as the government had requested, and as a result the ships’ appearance 
often triggered more looting and violence. Ironically, this destruction was usually led by DP supporters 
who thought that if the situation could be made to look worse such an intervention would in fact occur. See 




and the evacuation was suspended until the airport area was more secure. A German 
helicopter was also the target of hostile fire, provoking the soldiers aboard to fire shots on 
foreign soil for the first time since World War II.250 
Meanwhile, as conflict in the south became more severe, Albanians began to flee 
in larger numbers. The south had suffered more thane north from the collapse of the 
pyramids, at least in part because more southerners worked abroad and had invested their 
earnings in the schemes. It was also much less supportive of the DP than the north, it was 
home to the largest bases of the Albanian Mafia, and it was closest to Italy. Anyone who 
could afford to do so paid the Mafia or other enterprising boat-owners to cross the narrow 
Strait of Otranto to Italy.251  
The situation in Italy rapidly became dire. On March 9 news sources reported that 
the flow of illegal immigrants “has not exceeded by much the scores that normally try to 
make it to Italy on average weeks.”252 By March 15, though, the Italian navy and coast 
guard had intercepted some three thousand refugees,253 and another thousand arrived by 
the evening of the 16th.254 Altogether, over 11,000 refugees arrived in southern Italy over 
the course of less than a week,255 utterly overwhelming Puglian social service providers 
and prompting the Italian government to declare a state of emergency on March 19.256 
                                                
250 Comments in the press speak of the UK effort as being the center of evacuation efforts for all EU 
citizens. Meanwhile, a US Department of State spokesman describes the whole evacuation as “a 
coordinated NATO military action.” (Burns 1997). See also (North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North 
Atlantic Council. 1997). 
251 By March 20, the going rate was between I£100-400 (Johnston 1997). 
252 (Italy sends back 38 Albanians to homeland 1997). 
253 (Thomas 1997). 
254 (Ulbrich 1997). The refugees included the crews of three Albanian naval ships (along with many of their 
family members), the crews of at least three army helicopters, and a MiG plane whose two pilots landed on 
a NATO airstrip in Italy and asked for political asylum. Berisha’s two adult children also fled to Italy on 
one of the last commercial ferry departures. See (Walker, Amnesty bid … 1997, 11); (Pettifer and Vickers 
2007, 37); (Italy fears refugee influx as two of Berisha's children arrive in Bari 1997). 
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Efforts at Settlement 
Amid this context of escalating violence and rising emigration, Europe belatedly 
tried to intervene. Both the Italian and Greek prime inisters telephoned Berisha on 
March 5, urging him to compromise with the oppositin’s demands. A mediation 
delegation from the Council of Europe arrived in Tirana on March 6, but its meetings 
produced little.257 A second delegation, headed by the President of the EU’s Council of 
Ministers, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, arrived in Tirana on the 7th for a 
fact-finding mission.258 Yet a third delegation, this time from the OSCE and headed by 
former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitsky, arrived on the 8th, after a delay caused by 
Berisha’s threat to refuse to receive the delegation.259 On March 10, an Italian warship in 
the Adriatic hosted talks with the rebels, trying to consolidate the government’s amnesty 
offer and plan for a Government of National Reconciliation,260 while Italian Foreign 
Minister Lamberto Dini met with Berisha in Tirana to dangle aid as a carrot.261  
Berisha finally consented to appointing a Socialist prime minister and named 
Bashkim Fino to the post on March 9th, but this hadlittle effect on the violence. As the 
situation continued to deteriorate and fighting reached the outskirts of Tirana, European 
organizations played a game of ‘hot potato’ with the idea of an intervention. NATO 
Secretary-General Javier Solana bluntly stated, “In Albania at the moment, politics has to 
be done; diplomacy has to be done. It is not for a military operation by NATO or 
                                                
257 (EU delegation arrives in Albania 1997); (Council of Europe delegation arrives 1997). 
258 See (EU delegation arrives in Albania 1997), and the extensive statement issued that night. (European 
Union. Presidency. 1997). Berisha categorically refus d all outside intervention in the early stages of the 
crisis, hoping to delay it until he had strengthened his position by regaining control of key southern cities 
and ports. (Walker, Fighting grows as Albania clamp tightens 1997). 
259 (OSCE envoy in talks with Albanian opposition 1997). 
260 (Italy mediates in Albanian crisis 1997). 




anybody else.”262 NATO’s ambassadors discussed and formally rejected th  idea on 
March 11, calling only for the appointment of Government of National Reconciliation as 
soon as possible.263 The European Parliament passed a resolution urging an international 
military response on the 12th, and the Western European Union began to plan for such 
action. The OSCE debated sending a small policing mission to buy weapons back from 
the population and dispatched yet another representative to Berisha to discuss the idea.264 
On March 13, OSCE mediator Vranisky returned to Tirana for a second round of 
talks.265 That evening, Berisha and Prime Minister Fino formally asked the Netherlands, 
which held the EU presidency, to intervene militarily.266 By the next morning, the 
OSCE’s chair (held by Denmark) publicly described intervention as “probable,”267 
though he did not specify which institution would head it. Amid calls from French 
President Jacques Chirac for the EU to respond (and equal opposition to the idea from 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl),268 the WEU met at French insistence to discuss the 
situation and recommended that planning continue.269 
The OSCE meeting on the 15th, however, nearly derailed the emerging plans by 
passing a resolution “insisting that it was not theappropriate forum to decide on a 
potential troop deployment.”270 Amid public statements from the United States and 
                                                
262 (Pettifer 1997). 
263 (NATO voices concern over Albanian crisis 1997). A government of national reconciliation, sometimes 
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264 (France tells its people in Albania to get out 1997); (Pettifer and Vickers 2007, 44). 
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Germany favoring Berisha’s removal,271 the EU’s foreign ministers gathered at 
Apeldoorn. The Albanian situation dominated the agenda of the scheduled meeting, but 
the results disappointed most observers. The EU’s member states could only agree to 
send a high-level advisory mission to study the situat on.272 While they had cautiously 
accepted the possibility that any humanitarian or civilian assistance mission would 
require a small protection force, they insisted that any such intervention would first 
require approval from the UN Security Council.273 
Somehow – none of the sources are very sure how – and after ten more days of 
additional confusion and shuttle diplomacy, the OSCE finally voted to organize an 
intervention on March 27. That afternoon, the Italian and Albanian Ambassadors to the 
UN jointly requested a meeting of the Security Council to obtain a formal authorization 
for the mission.274 In a meeting hastily convened before the Easter recess, the Security 
Council approved a three-month mandate for the Multinational Protection Force (MPF), 
which Italy would lead and organize within an OSCE framework.275 The mission was 
charged with protecting and providing humanitarian aid and helping to organize new 
parliamentary elections in June.  
 
The Aftermath 
By April 8-9, the Italian parliament approved dispatching troops to Albania until 
one month after the elections; the Turkish and Romanian parliaments followed within the 
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next several days.276 Troops began to arrive in Albania on April 15.277 Over the course of 
the next month, more than 6300 troops from over 11 countries deployed as part of 
‘Operation Alba.’ Table 5-1 shows known force contributions. 













Total:  11 states 6556 – 7215) 
Source: (Greco 2001) ; * initial 
deployments from (Pettifer and Vickers, 
The Albanian Question: Reshaping the 
Balkans 2007, 68);. # projected 
contributions from (Graham 1997). No 
estimates of Belgian or Portuguese 
contributions exist. 
 
OSCE-organized national parliamentary elections occurred under the supervision 
of MNF troops and outside observers on June 29. While neither the setting nor the 
conduct of elections were perfect, the Alba troops did at least ensure a reasonably 
peaceful environment for the conduct of an election. As expected, citizens removed the 
DP from office and replaced it with a solid Socialist majority. In mid-June, Italy 
organized a multilateral donor conference, including representatives of both interested 
states and international organizations, for the rebuilding of Albania.  
                                                
276 (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999, 214). Greco (2001) suggests, however, that Italian approval occurred only 
“only after a harsh political debate that almost brought [Prodi’s government] down.”  
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occurred in April. The March timeline seems unrealistic as on March 15 the OSCE declared itself an 
inappropriate venue for troop deployment decisions a d the EU ministers had not yet met at Apeldoorn t 




Evaluating Hypotheses About State Behavior 
This section presents evidence about two episodes in the Albanian crisis: the 
outflow of refugees in early March, and European intervention efforts in early and mid-
March. While much of the evidence is anecdotal and from secondary sources, it 
nevertheless allows us to provide at least a preliminary test of the hypotheses. The final 
subsection evaluates the evidence against the hypoteses. 
 
Intervention 
At the onset of the crisis, the Europeans (and for that matter the Americans as 
well) exhibited an all-around aversion to interventio  in the region, with one 
commentator describing it as a kind of “Balkan fatigue”278 following so close on the 
conclusion of the Bosnian conflict. As one source noted, “No one is at all keen on wading 
into such a confused situation,” not even the state that favored an intervention.279 In 
some part conditions on the ground influenced this reluctance. As Italy argued, 
intervening while Berisha still held power would bethe equivalent of “pick[ing] sides 
inside Albania,” and this view “was widely shared inside the EU.”280  
Developments in the European Union at the time suggest that the EU’s CFSP 
would have been the logical center for any reaction, and numerous evaluations of the 
press and public agree with this as well. Despite several attempts, though, the EU was 
unable to agree on a response. The primary focus of this section, then, is to explore why 
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279 (EU and NATO rule out Albania intervention 1997). As Pettifer and Vickers note, “there was very little 
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surprising, as the rebellion was turning into an armed uprising of the people against a repressive 
government along lines that had not been seen in Europe since the nineteenth century” (2007: 33). 




major European states preferred not to use the European Union for this task, and how 
they then established preferences for other strategies to achieve their preferred outcomes. 
Venue Preference 
The consensus-capacity framework predicts that state preferences over potential 
venues should be related to their position in the preference distribution in each venue, and 
to the venue’s potential ability to succeed with the proposed or desired action. In the case 
of the Albanian crisis, determining the states’ positi ns in the preference distributions is 
complicated: The parties were slow to reach consensus on a venue because they 
disagreed on the nature of the crisis itself.281 Was this a humanitarian situation, or a 
conflict prevention situation? An effort to prevent a failed state, or to rebuild a collapsed 
economy? An effort to prevent the resurgence of conli t in the recently-pacified Bosnia, 
or to prevent it from spreading to neighboring Kosovo? States formed their venue 
preferences at least in part on the assumptions of different underlying issue areas. Since 
preference distributions are issue-specific, the choice of underlying issue has implications 
for how states conceptualized the role and function of any intervention and thus for the 
creation of consensus on the issue. It also influenced the set of institutions states 
considered, since not all institutions had jurisdiction on all issues. 
Pro-Intervention States 
Decision-makers in Italy and Greece generally perceived the issue as one of 
threats to their own internal stability. For them, continued economic crisis in Albania 
would lead to an influx of poor migrants, many of whom would probably be armed with 
                                                




looted weapons, and possibly to the entry of individuals connected with organized crime 
Neither of these situations was particularly attracive.  
From there, though, their treatment of the situation diverged. Greek officials 
originally preferred that NATO address the situation, and spoke openly of this possibility 
as early as March 10 though NATO’s secretary general had publicly ruled out such an 
intervention the week before. At a special meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) convened for discussing the Albania crisis, however, the NAC was only able to 
agree to a statement calling for a Government of Nation l Reconciliation as soon as 
possible; they made no reference to an intervention.282 Italy continued to call for NATO 
intervention even as late as March 13,283 even though the NAC again said in its March 13 
statement that it supported the actions of all other institutions and member states in the 
situation, and that it urged them to continue and do more.284 
NATO, however, does not appear to have been Italian policymakers’ first 
preference. Early comments by Prime Minister Romano Pr di and others suggest that 
Italian diplomatic effort was first directed at the EU. On March 6, however, Foreign 
Minister Dini noted disagreement among EU members about the urgency of the crisis, 
saying “We cannot hide the fact that in the union [sic] are Nordic countries that look on 
what is happening in the Balkans with a certain detachment.”285 When a joint Greco-
Italian initiative in the EU in early March apparently failed to reach fruition,286 the 
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Italians refocused on NATO. NATO was the Italians’ second choice, but when the NAC 
again declined to intervene on the 13th, Italian policy once again made a tactical shift. 
Prime Minister Prodi began backing off his previous insistence on a military intervention 
and calling for OSCE involvement instead.287 
The Naysayers 
Germany’s opposition to intervention was strongly contingent on the proposed 
venue; in particular, its preferences for the EU as a venue appear to be centered squarely 
on capacity concerns. Kinkel’s main argument about why the OSCE was appropriate was 
because this body – unlike the other two organizations under serious consideration at the 
time, the EU and the WEU – included both the United States and Russia.288 Kinkel and 
other German policymakers feared that the situation could turn into Bosnia, where the EU 
attempted to act alone with an unclear mission, poor military planning, and inadequate 
coordination. The resulting policy disaster was a serious blow to the confidence and 
prestige of the fledgling CFSP.289 German aversion to sending troops also echoed this 
Bosnia argument, with Kohl stating “If we send soldiers, what are we going to give them 
for a mission?”290 Outside of this, available evidence suggests that Germany primarily 
saw the situation as an issue of refugee or border cont ol; I return to this point below.291  
In summary, German preferences for using the OSCE centered on two capacity-
based elements. First, the OSCE had a higher capacity for action than the EU because it 
                                                                                                                                      
foreign policy leadership appropriate to its self-perceived role as a regional power. Despite this, however, 
Greek diplomats – including particularly the foreign minister himself – were able to capitalize on the
situation and substantially enhance their influence i side the new Albania political structure. (Pettif r and 
Vickers 2007, 39). 
287 (Italy fears refugee influx as two of Berisha's children arrive in Bari 1997); (Pina 1997). 
288 (Berger 1997). 
289 (Die EU will Albanien helfen 1997). 
290 (Kohl dubious about military intervention in Albani  1997). 
291 (Barber 1997). The possibility of refugee movement into Kosovo, and particularly the possibility of the 




could draw on the capabilities (and influence) of bth the United States and Russia. 
Second, as German policymakers argued, the OSCE as an organization had task-specific 
capabilities that it had used successfully in previous similar conflicts.292 This preference 
persisted well after the initial OSCE declaration that it was not an appropriate place for 
troop deployment decisions. 
British policymakers perceived the situation very differently than their German 
counterparts. For the UK, the evidence suggests that the Major government saw the 
Albanian crisis as an internal problem, for which international intervention was 
inappropriate.293 That said, internal politics in the UK itself eventually led to a slight 
weakening of that resistance. John Major’s Conservative Party had close ties to the 
Berisha’s DP, but in early 1997 two scandals about the Tories and the DP broke into the 
British media and further weakened Major’s governmet.294 In the face of domestic 
political challenges, and with a general election approaching, Britain’s policy of 
unconditional support for Berisha and unconditional opposition to intervention weakened 
slowly. In early March, Foreign Secretary Malcom Rifkind threatened to block foreign 
aid in response to Berisha’s anti-democracy moves, but the threat was widely believed to 
be non-credible.295  
                                                
292 See, e.g. (EU-Aussenminister erörtern Hilfsaktion für Albanien Einzelne Mitgliedstaaten bieten 
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1997); (Bevins 1997); (Alderman 1997). 
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The ruling parties in these two intervention-resistant states, Germany’s Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the UK’s Tories, had been among Berisha’s strongest 
supporters.296 At least part of the reason that these government par ies opposed 
intervention, then, was probably because any intervention was almost certain to end with 
Berisha losing office. The aforementioned Italian preference to avoid “pick[ing] sides” 
within Albania was a common sentiment in the EU, meaning that no intervention to 
“stabilize the situation” – i.e., to restore the authority of the current government – would 
be approved. The German concern over refugees, however, seems to have made it willing 
to sanction an intervention, even if Bosnian ghosts kept it from participating itself.297  
The In-Betweeners 
Three other states are of interest here: The Netherlands, Denmark, and France, 
who held leadership positions in the EU, OSCE, and WEU, respectively. Briefly, the 
Netherlands held the EU’s rotating presidency at the time. No evidence exists in available 
press sources that the Netherlands made any efforts to push the EU as an appropriate 
venue for an interventionist response, even though reports of Dutch support for 
intervention ranged from “moderate” to “strong.”298 Dutch policymakers did appear to 
believe, however, that the EU needed to offer some type of reaction or response to the 
crisis, and they pushed for conclusions on the issue at the Apeldoorn meeting.299 
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297 Greco disagrees, identifying the major deterrent as “skepticism about the effectiveness of any military 
involvement and …the fear that foreign peacekeeping troops could become hostage to the domestic 
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(Greco 2001, sec. 3). 
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In the OSCE, evidence does suggest that Denmark, which held the organization’s 
chair at the time, pushed mildly for the “strike force” option that circulated there.300 How 
this proposal for a military “strike force” related to the OSCE’s declaration that it was not 
an appropriate venue for military troop decisions is unclear, however. The Danish 
position on an intervention force – and quite possibly the Danish proposal for it – gained 
additional support from a number of other states. German leaders seemed to see it as an 
alternative to the EU, though the German press suggests that Kohl and Kinkel supported 
the proposal less for the OSCE component and more for its Danish origin.301 Additional 
reports suggest that Spain and Austria also “supported the Danish position” even as early 
as March 15, when the OSCE passed its resolution of bjection.302 
Finally, France was the most active of presidency-holding states during the crisis. 
In addition to a number of unilateral statements,303 it made several proposals inside the 
EU for intervention forces. One joint proposal with I aly explicitly allowed for a non-
military intervention.304 In its role as the presidency of the Western European Union, 
however, French policymakers called extraordinary meetings of that body’s Council to 
discuss the situation. They also tasked the WEU staff with beginning intervention plans. 
Nothing ever came of this planning, but it was an extraordinarily active response 
nonetheless, even when compared to typical French foreign policy behavior in regional 
crises.305 
                                                
300 (Berger 1997); (Ulbrich 1997). Only German sources provide discussion of this OSCE proposal prior to 
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In a final odd development, some evidence exists that e neutral states were 
among the strongest supporters of military intervention, particularly within the EU.306 
The source of this preference is not clear, and very little confirmatory evidence is 
available from these states in their own national presses.307 Perhaps the most plausible 
explanation for such a preference, if indeed the reports are accurate, is that these states 
defined the situation in Albania as primarily a humanitarian or human rights issue. Even 
so, why the EU would be the best available venue for a humanitarian or human rights 
intervention is not particularly clear. Ascertaining this motive, however, will require 
policymaker interviews and/or access to documentary records of the crisis; the available 
secondary literature and contemporaneous news coverage is insufficient. 
Unilateral and Ad Hoc Behavior 
The consensus-capacity framework suggests that states wi h greater capabilities 
are more likely to participate in ad hoc cooperation or unilateral activity. Here I assess the 
available evidence about states’ rationales for unilateral or extra-institutional activity 
during the crisis.  
Unilateral Activity 
Unilateral intervention activity was mostly diplomatic. Both the Italians and the 
Greeks sent their foreign ministers to Tirana to meet with Berisha, and both capitals were 
                                                                                                                                      
While French rapprochement with NATO in 1997 slightly increases the plausibility of a French preference 
for a NATO response, the claim is suspect for two reasons. First, Pettifer and Vickers also state (2007, 46) 
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intervention would be a blatant instance of ‘picking sides’ in the crisis, and a substantial amount of 
additional evidence supports the claim that Italy in particular was reluctant to pick sides. 
306 (Ulbrich 1997). 
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in regular telephone contact with Berisha and Fino.308 Despite the close ties that both of 
these states had to Albania – Italy at one point had controlled it as a colony and was its 
current largest source of foreign investment, and Greece was its largest source of migrant 
employment and remittances – neither were particularly effective either as bilateral 
negotiators or as mediators.  
Ad Hoc Cooperation 
Ad hoc cooperation occurred on several levels during the crisis; here I focus on 
the decision of states to participate in the Multinational Protection Force (‘Operation 
Alba’). While technically this intervention was organized by the OSCE, sources agree 
that at a practical level it was an Italian-led operation.309 The lack of any permanent 
military structures in the OSCE meant, in any case, that the military coordination 
occurred among states that were not members of a standing group, entirely outside of 
formal OSCE-supported channels. 
None of the parties had a stated preference for using a ‘coalition of the willing’ 
model to respond to the Albanian crisis. It appears to be, instead, the fallback option after 
the other institutional choices were exhausted.310 In February 1998, the Balkan Director 
of the Italian Foreign Ministry stated that “[w]e, Italy, fell back on it because of the lack 
of response from the established institutions that s ould have had primary responsibility, 
NATO, EU, UN, WEU, OSCE, you name it.”311 The ordering of the institutions is 
                                                
308 See, e.g., (EU presidency banks on political-only solution for Albania 1997), (Premier asks Albanian 
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somewhat telling – even the UN and the largely inactive WEU come before the 
institution that eventually organized the interventio .312 Italy desired an intervention 
enough to bear the brunt of the costs, but the preference for a coalition over unilateral 
action suggests that it believed it lacked sufficient capacity to intervene effectively.313  
The countries that chose to participate in the coaliti n are an odd group. Table 5-1 
showed the participating states and their troop contributions. Italy was the overwhelming 
provider, with only French contributions signaling anything near the same level of 
commitment. Danish commitment appears token – a responsibility of (as well as a link 
to) the OSCE’s presidency. No available sources shed light on the Austrian or Belgian 
decisions to participate; neither have any known direct interest in Albanian affairs, nor do 
sources suggest that either saw the intervention as primarily humanitarian. 
The cases of Slovenia, Romania, and Poland are particul ly interesting. All three 
participated in the eventual ad hoc group. Romania repeatedly expressed its willingness 
to participate in an intervention even before it had been agreed,314 and both it and Poland 
actually created crisis teams at their foreign ministries.315 The most plausible explanation 
for this behavior centers on another international organization, NATO. NATO was 
scheduled to extend membership invitations to a select group of countries at its summit in 
July 1997, and all three of these countries (along with Hungary and the Czech Republic) 
were widely seen as top candidates for invitations.316 None of these states had immediate 
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interests in Albania, but demonstrating their ability to interoperate with NATO forces and 
their willingness to participate fully in regional security activity would likely have 
augmented their cases for membership. 
 
Refugees  
The issue of intervention is primarily concerned with ssues of international 
security. To vary the issue dimension, I examine the issue of refugees and asylum-seekers 
during the crisis. This issue involves more aspects of humanitarian concerns. It also, 
however, engages some elements of internal (domestic) security for the receiving states; 
the easy availability of weapons and the strength of the Albanian Mafia in the heaviest 
refugee-sending regions were serious concerns.317 As above, I first review preferences 
over venue among major actors, and then address unilateral and ad hoc activity.318 
Venue Preference 
In 1997, no European institution had explicit jurisdiction over refugee and asylum 
policy.319 Among European institutions, the organization with perhaps the best claim to 
refugee concerns would be the OSCE, through the ‘human dimension’ of the Helsinki 
Final Act. Even there, though, no explicit claim to jurisdiction on refugee issues 
                                                                                                                                      
The Czech foreign ministry made several statements a d expressed willingness to consider a military 
intervention. (Military Interventionin Albania Pointless Just Now - Zieleniec 1997). 
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319 At this time, the 1992 Treaty on European Union governed EU jurisdiction; the “Justice and Home 
Affairs” pillar (Pillar III) primarily addressed issues of police and judicial cooperation. The Union later 





emerged.320 This absence of jurisdiction helps to explain the lack of any clear venue 
preference among key actors during the Albanian crisis. The only discussions of 
Albanian refugees in European fora seemed to be in two contexts: repeated German 
insistence that it would not take any, and later requests from Italy for assistance in 
providing for them. 
Unilateral and Ad Hoc Behavior 
Most of the states bordering Albania took unilateral actions to control potential 
refugee flows. Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece, and Italy mobilized their militaries to 
seal their borders against potential immigrants.321 Unilateral military action is typically 
highly resource-intensive. In this case Macedonia ad Greece both lacked the resources 
to block their own borders effectively; press sources spoke openly of gaps in border 
coverage or of insufficient amounts of troops or equipment to block small passes through 
the mountains. For these two states, even unilatera action that was not entirely successful 
was better than either the status quo (do nothing) alternative, in which substantial 
numbers of refugees would probably arrive. Greece, however, took the additional (and 
somewhat unusual) step of increasing its number of legal entrance visas during the 
crisis.322 This had the advantage of both easing the refugee pr ssure at the border while 
also allowing it better control over which individuals entered the country. 
Italian interdiction efforts were substantially more robust. The Italian coast guard 
and navy patrolled the Adriatic and intercepted a large number of vessels. Intercepting 
the vessels while they were still at sea helped to ensure that the refugees came ashore 
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under the control of Italian authorities.323 Still, the situation overwhelmed Italian 
authorities. The arrival of nearly 11,000 refugees in ix days,324 with around 14,000 total 
arriving since the fall of the pyramids in January,325 prompted Italy to declare a state of 
emergency and call for international assistance in providing for them. 
The German reaction to the entire Albanian crisis focused almost exclusively on 
the issue of refugees. In the absence of a land borer – or even a sea one – with Albania, 
and with the suspension of commercial flights out of Tirana, the source of German 
policymakers’ fears is unclear. No obvious rationale exists for why Germany would be 
the preferred destination for Albanian refugees who left the immediate geographical area, 
or for why Albanian refugees would be resettled in Germany. The only piece of 
information cited in the media to help explain this situation is that Germany had recently 
absorbed some 320,000 Bosnian refugees, substantially more than any other European 
state, and it was not pleased about this situation. At the EU meeting in Apeldoorn, Kinkel 
estimated that the Albanian crisis would result in some 120,000 additional refugees. On 
March 16, he bluntly told the media, “With the current situation we can’t take any 
mentionable number of refugees. Our boat is full.”326 German fears about Albania 
following the path of Bosnia probably also included issues of refugee resettlement as well 
as EU military incompetence. 
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This section evaluates the evidence for the hypotheses established above about 
consensus and capacity as state-level concerns. I begin with the hypotheses about activity 
outside of established institutions and then consider hypotheses about venue preference. 
Extra-Institutional Activity 
The refugee case results in no ad hoc activity, so I pr ceed directly to hypotheses 
about unilateral action. For the most part, behavior in this case supports Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b about the relationship of capacity to unilateral action. Greece, Macedonia, and 
Italy were preference outliers in the sense that they preferred to act promptly on the issue 
to avoid any direct effect on themselves. Most other states had no borders with Albania 
and few interests there, and so they were much closer t  indifferent on this issue.  
Italy is likely a moderate-to-high-capacity state in this context, and Greece 
probably has moderate capacity, and so their behavior relates to Hypothesis 2a.327 This 
hypothesis expected that high and moderate capacity states would be willing to act alone 
and to take high-intensity actions like military mobilization, and that states with more 
moderate levels of capacity would do so but express concerns about their own capacity to 
do so effectively. As the evidence above showed, Italian sources clearly expressed both 
willingness to act unilaterally and constraints on their ability to do so. While no reports 
exist of Greek policymakers expressing capacity concerns, media reports documented 
above suggest that it was an issue.  
Hypothesis 2b relates to low capacity states, such as Macedonia. It expected that 
these states would only be able to take low-intensiy actions. Macedonia provides mixed 
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support for this hypothesis, but its behavior does support the consensus and capacity 
framework more generally. Macedonia also mobilized its military to seal its border with 
Albania. Few outside actors had any confidence in the Macedonian military’s ability to 
do this effectively, and indeed media reports about its weak coverage surfaced along with 
Greece’s. The issue of refugee control, however, was highly salient for Macedonian 
policymakers. Even though the likely success of border operations was fairly low, the 
utility of that action was weighted by the high level of salience. The net result was a 
willingness to take high-intensity forms of unilateral action even under conditions where 
the action was not likely to achieve the actor’s ideal point. 
The intervention case showed the opposite pattern of extra-institutional activity: 
very little unilateral activity (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), and substantial amounts of ad hoc 
coordination (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). In the intervention case, we see some support for 
Hypothesis 1a, which suggested that participants in ad hoc cooperation would be part of a 
preference cluster, and moderate support for Hypothesis 1b about the expected capacity 
of acting states. 
The bulk of the states who participated in the Multinational Protection Force 
(MNF) were moderate to high capacity states. France is clearly high-capacity, and Italy 
and Spain are moderate-to-high capacity. These three states account for close to three-
quarters of the MNF troop commitment. Turkey and Greece probably classify as 
moderate capacity; Portugal, Belgium, and Denmark hve small but well-equipped and 




four of these moderate capacity states are highly integrated into NATO’s interoperable 
command structure, which may reduce or discount any disparities in capacity.328 
One unusual case of a state in the outcome preferenc  cluster who did not 
participate in the ad hoc group deserves some discussion. The intensity of Germany’s 
preferences not to see Albania collapse into a refugee-generating civil war might have led 
us to expect its participation in the intervention f rce, particularly since Germany would 
under most circumstances be a high-(or high-to-moderate) capacity actor. Its absence 
from the coalition is somewhat difficult to explain on the basis of available sources. 
Media sources, particularly in the German press, carry repeated statements by 
policymakers that they ‘did not want this to turn into Bosnia,’ but the meaning of this 
comparison is not clear.329 It may have referred to the refugee costs imposed on 
Germany, to the lack of confidence and credibility n the CFSP that the crisis caused, to 
German psychic pain that resulted from inability to st p the genocides in the former 
Yugoslavia, or something else entirely. Whatever this analogy meant to Kohl and Kinkel, 
it was sufficiently negative to block German involvement in the intervention. 
Finally, some participation in the ad hoc interventio  group appears to have come 
from states outside (or only marginally in) the prefe nce cluster and seems unrelated to 
issues of consensus or capacity for the intervention i self. Instead, the actions of Slovenia, 
Poland, and Romania – all of whom are moderate-to-low capacity actors –reflect some 
type of cross-institutional, inter-temporal signalig. Their actions appear to be motivated 
by some discounted hope of future benefits in another institution rather than by benefits 
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from Operation Alba itself. By participating in the Albanian intervention, they (probably) 
hoped to shift NATO members’ beliefs about their willingness and ability to participate 
in regional security efforts. These altered beliefs would in turn influence the 
establishment of consensus in NATO about their readin ss for membership.  
The consensus-capacity framework does not anticipate or theorize about cross-
event – and so implicitly inter-temporal – logrolling or signaling.330 It treats each event 
that emerges as reasonably separable from other events. One of the ways in which the 
consensus-capacity framework improves on earlier understandings of state foreign policy 
behavior is that it explicitly relates the full range of possible foreign policy outcomes on a 
particular event or issue to one another. This helps to close the gap between policymaker 
behavior and scholarly treatments of the foreign policy or cooperation decision making 
process. This case study draws attention to the need to expand the framework to 
accommodate the shadow of the future. States expect future relationships with each other 
in these various contexts. Concessions with implicit future reciprocation are a normal part 
of diplomatic life; future studies of foreign policy cooperation in particular should 
address this fact.  
Venue Preference 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 speak to different factors that influence states’ decisions as 
they from preferences over existing institutional fora. Hypothesis 3 suggests that 
preference-outlying states should pursue their prefer d policies in institutions where 
their votes are pivotal. In the case of intervention in Albania, German resistance to action 
through the EU appears to have been critical in causing states to consider seriously a 
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different venue. The existence of both a formal unanimity decision rule and an explicit 
national veto in CFSP meant that German threats to block cooperation were credible. 
The UK’s behavior provides somewhat contradictory evid nce. The Major 
government was adamantly against intervention. It had several opportunities to block an 
intervention, notably the EU, NATO, and the UN Security Council.331 If it were that 
strongly against intervention, why did it not use th  veto available to it in the Security 
Council? The OSCE decision rules are largely consensus-based, meaning that so long as 
no state openly objects, a decision passes. Objection in this forum, too, would have 
reached the UK’s ideal point, yet it declined to do so. In short, the UK could have 
obtained its ideal outcome through unilateral action – a veto – in any of the institutions 
that considered the matter. Instead, it allowed the int rvention decision to pass from 
NATO and the EU, where its veto power was firmly entr ched, to the OSCE, where 
veto power is weaker. The most likely explanation fr this behavior is that Berisha’s hold 
on office had weakened to the point where no British unilateral action could obtain the 
ideal outcome of keeping him in office. In that context, a veto would be obstructionist 
and unproductive, if not even counter-productive, if the crisis developed further. 
Hypothesis 4 argued that states will prefer the institution where the expected 
cooperative outcome deviates the least from their own ideal point. We see some evidence 
for this in Germany’s behavior. German policymakers wanted an outcome where 
someone intervened but they themselves were not obligated to act. An intervention 
organized through the EU would not have had these qualities. Germany would have faced 
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strong pressure to participate in any CFSP-based int rvention, and the EU’s budgeting 
rules would have assessed all member states to pay for the intervention. 
Italian behavior, on the other hand, does not fully support this hypothesis. Italian 
preferences for which institution should intervene shifted several times over the course of 
the crisis. For Hypothesis 4 to be supported in this instance, Italy would have had to be 
very uncertain (or else poorly informed) about its partners’ preferences. It would have 
had to mis-predict probable outcomes in not one but probably three institutions (NATO, 
EU, WEU), so that as states revealed more information about their own preferences, it 
could update its perceptions enough that the preferred strategy changed. 
Shifting Italian venue preferences and willingness to act unilaterally do, however, 
cast doubt on the existence of an underlying preference for cooperation among European 
states.332 While the foreign ministry official quoted above identified a number of 
European institutions that Italy would have preferred to see act, Italian officials did not 
hesitate to threaten unilateral action during the weks of frantic but ultimately 
unsuccessful diplomacy preceding the intervention. Indeed, Italy’s decision to mount 
naval patrols in Albanian territorial waters was an instance of unilateral action during this 
period that sent a strong signal to other states of its willingness to act in Albania. For 
Italy, cooperation in an institution seems to have be n a preferred strategy rather than an 
end in itself. The most preferred outcome was an intervention, but with whom and under 
what flag was an open question.333 
Mixed support for these hypotheses probably results, at least in part, from the 
absence of primary source material. The content of negotiations inside international 
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organizations rarely becomes public. Without access to policymakers’ privileged 
knowledge, establishing firm support for some of the hypotheses is quite difficult. Future 
research should attempt to draw on these sources. 
Finally, in the refugee policy issue, we find evidenc  of a different factor 
operating in states’ preference formation processes, juri diction. At the time of the crisis, 
no European organization had formal jurisdiction over refugee and asylum policy. We 
observe no efforts by states to coordinate their pol cy n this issue: The preferred venue 
was no institution. While drawing inferences from silence in the historical record is 
difficult, the very strong results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 suggest that such 
an inference would be appropriate in this case (see, e.g., Table 4-6). An institution’s 
jurisdiction appears strongly related to states’ decisions to use it. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter used the case of Albania’s collapse in 1997 to examine the foreign 
policy behavior of individual states. It drew hypotheses from the consensus-capacity 
framework about how states form preferences over the set of available venues, and about 
who should participate in extra-institutional foreign policy activity. It examined two 
issues within the case, refugee policy and the question of intervention, to multiply the 
observations and provide variation on the independent variable of issue area. 
Support for the capacity hypotheses is fairly strong. States of moderate capacity 
did express concerns about the ability of various coalitions to achieve specified 
cooperative goals, and they also expressed concern about their own inability to carry out 




publicly make these kinds statements on their own behalf, though press accounts include 
statements to that effect. Lack of evidence for this may be as much an issue of media-
source-induced selection bias as it is an issue of non-behavior by the weak states. 
Contrary to expectations, lower capacity states were willing to take higher-intensity 
actions with even a low probability of success, provided that the issue’s salience was high 
enough to compensate for the low success rate. 
Somewhat less support exists for some of the consensu -based arguments, 
however. At least in part, this seems to come from a reluctance on the parts of the British 
or Germans to exercise a public veto in the EU or, in the case of the UK, the UN Security 
Council. Other states, though, did act strategically in the pursuit of their most preferred 
outcomes. France, for example, tried to manipulate the issue of intervention into the 
jurisdiction of a smaller organization in which it currently held the chair. Using the power 
of the chair could have helped France to obtain its ideal form of intervention.  
Evidence from these cases suggests that being a member of a preference outlier 
cluster is neither necessary nor sufficient for predicting participation in high-intensity 
extra-institutional cooperation. German non-participation shows that cluster membership 
is insufficient, and the participation of NATO candidates Poland, Slovenia, and Romania 
shows that it is not necessary either.  
This chapter has explored the underlying politics of the institutional outcomes 
examined in Chapters 3 and 4. The hypothesized mechanisms of the consensus-capacity 
framework generally appear to operate as expected in the case of the 1997 Albanian 
intervention. In the absence of primary sources, thoug , and in particular without 




impossible. Future work should aim to incorporate this ype of data into the existing case, 





















As Chapter 5 showed, the international community’s re ponse to the Albanian 
crisis was a complex and multi-layered effort. It combined elements of unilateral action 
with deliberate unilateral non-action, and with cooperation both inside and outside of 
institutions. International cooperation was just one of the many foreign policy options 
states chose to manage this multidimensional crisis. Any theory of cooperation or of 
foreign policy behavior more generally must acknowledge and accommodate these 
alternatives. States choose foreign policy actions from a buffet, not a fixed menu. 
This dissertation proposed and tested a framework for explaining states’ decisions 
to cooperate that also explained states’ decisions not to cooperate or to choose other 
options instead. It establishes two necessary (but ins fficient) conditions for cooperation 
– the need for consensus and the need for capacity – and uses their presence or absence to 
predict the types of outcomes that are likely to emerge in response to international events. 
Consensus without capacity leads to collective declarations but no action. Capacity 
without consensus often results in unilateral activity or extra-institutional cooperation. 
Finally, when neither are present, no collective response occurs. 
This chapter summarizes the findings of this dissertation by first reviewing the 




the evidence for the consensus-capacity framework and assesses the overall support. The 
third section considers my findings in the context of larger debates about cooperation and 
forum shopping, and the fourth section discusses directions for future research. The final 
section concludes. 
 
The Consensus-Capacity Framework: A Summary 
The consensus-capacity framework explains state cooperation on foreign policy. 
Foreign policy cooperation is collective reactions to (or attempts to manage) issues and 
events that occur outside or across the states’ boundaries. Explaining foreign policy poses 
a challenge to arguments about the causes of cooperation because it includes a range of 
substantive issue areas, because its gains for citizens and/or states are unclear, and 
because states are protective of their sovereignty.334 Europe is an appropriate region for 
testing the consensus-capacity framework because it has multiple established foreign 
policy cooperation venues with overlapping jurisdictions and memberships. These 
maximize variation on key institutional variables while still holding important elements 
like geographic region and key member-states constant. Europe is also the only region 
that contains multiple states with sufficient capacity to act independently in world 
politics. A framework that predicts institutional cooperation opposed to other options 
such as unilateral action and ad hoc cooperation must have actors that are capable of 
choosing from the full range of possible outcomes. 
The consensus-capacity framework considers cooperation s one of many options 
that states can choose from in their foreign policy decisions. States can choose unilateral 
activity, cooperation outside of an institution, orcooperation inside one of several 
                                                




institutions. The latter two forms of cooperation are collective decisions made by the 
entire (or proposed) membership. Under the rules of most international organizations, this 
requires unanimity or consensus among the members.335 Because resources are scarce, 
states prefer to take actions for which they expect the greatest probability of successfully 
achieving their desired ends. Resources that improve the ability of states or other actors 
to achieve their desired goals are elements of capacity. 
Capacity, then, is the ability to execute policy in international affairs; consensus is 
the collective decision on what policy should be executed. Both of these elements are 
necessary – but not sufficient – for international cooperation through an international 
institution. When one or both are absent, alternate ou comes emerge. Unilateral action is 
possible under all combinations; extra-institutional cooperation occurs where capacity 
exists but consensus among all members of an institution is missing. Where consensus 
exists but capacity is missing, an institution’s memb rs will often resort to issuing 
collective declarations, but they will not be able to manage higher-intensity responses.  
 The consensus-capacity framework improves on our understanding of cooperation 
in two ways. First, it considers outcomes as interdependent, such that both substitute and 
complementary relationships are possible. States ned ot – and indeed, usually do not – 
restrict themselves to using only one form of response for a given event or issue. Second, 
the framework allows for decisions to occur at multiple points. Cooperation is a process, 
not simply an outcome. Reaching agreement requires successfully navigating a series of 
other steps where the process could have collapsed. By treating outcomes as 
interdependent (rather than mutually exclusive), and by including multiple decision 
                                                




points in the sequence, the consensus-capacity framework brings the study of cooperation 
and of foreign policy more in line with practice.  
The multi-stage nature of cooperation, and the potential for failure at so many 
points, draws our attention to the need for inferential strategies that accommodate this 
complication. At a minimum, the pool of only successful cases of cooperation is a biased 
sample; only those cases in which consensus and capacity existed could have reached the 
success point, so all success cases will be above the threshold on those variables. 
Correcting this requires a case identification strategy that does not rely on the value of the 
dependent variable (or of any independent variables) for selection into the dataset. I 
achieve that here using a newly developed dataset of 300 randomly selected international 
events.  
The second inferential complication that the consensus-capacity framework 
highlights is the need to accommodate the range of alternatives that states face. 
Cooperation is not simply “do x or do nothing”; it is “do x, do y, do z, or do nothing.” 
Failure to allow for possible substitution and complement effects risks biasing the 
analysis by omitting a causal factor, action in (an)other venue(s). I do this here by 
modeling each outcome separately by simultaneously e timating a series of seemingly 
unrelated probit models. The simultaneous estimation allows for interdependence among 
the error terms of the separate models, thus accounting for – but not coercing – substitute 





Summarizing the Evidence 
Chapter 3 inquired into the conditions that led states to cooperate through formal 
international organizations. It specifically considered the case of the European Union’s 
Common and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is a most-likely venue for cooperation 
because of its unlimited jurisdiction, but the issue of foreign policy itself is a least-likely 
issue area. The combination suggests that this is a fair test of the consensus-capacity 
framework. The lack of substantial variation in capacity measures in the EU during this 
period precludes testing hypotheses about capacity there, but hypotheses about consensus 
do quite well. In particular, Chapter 3 shows that both long-term and short-term 
consensus-building devices increase the probability of cooperation. Most, but not all, of 
the issues that the Treaty on European Union specifies as priorities of CFSP are more 
likely to receive cooperation than non-treaty issue. Treaty inclusion is an indicator of 
long-term preference convergence that occurred somewhat prior to the period under 
study. After 1999, the EU began adopting Common Strategies, which are medium-term 
statements of policy objectives and guiding principles. The adoption of a Common 
Strategy on an issue also significantly enhances th probability of that issue receiving a 
CFSP response; the magnitude of this is similar to that produced by Treaty inclusion. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding in this chapter is the evidence that states 
holding the EU’s presidency do not always adhere to the norm of presidency impartiality. 
A strong norm in the EU’s Council of Ministers calls for the presidency-holding state to 
act in the Union’s interests rather than its own during its term.336 Instead, and contrary to 
much of the CFSP and EU studies literature, Chapter 3 finds strong evidence of distinct 
patterns of behavior during the presidencies of state  that are foreign and security policy 
                                                




preference outliers. Neutral states in particular are less likely to act in foreign policy 
overall, and they are even less likely to do so on security issues.337  
On issues of conflict resolution, however, the effect is entirely reversed, with 
neutral presidencies showing a marked improvement in the probability of a response. The 
combination of a neutral presidency and a conflict resolution issue can result in as much 
as a 50% increase over non-committal presidencies and non-conflict resolution issues.338 
The difference between neutral behavior on conflict resolution and on other issues is a 
strong indicator of the strength of the presidency’s role in CFSP. Where the presidency 
disagrees with the majority, it has a distinct ability to block policy. When it agrees with 
the majority, however, as neutral states do on confli t resolution issues, a substantial 
increase in probability of response results. 
Chapter 4 then expanded the analysis to include thre other European foreign 
policy institutions, the OSCE, Council of Europe, and NATO, and unilateral and ad hoc 
activity. Adding these dependent variables allowed me to test hypotheses about when 
cooperation should occur, and also to study how the outcomes relate to one another. In 
testing the hypotheses about cooperation in institutions, models examining the role of 
capacity (as the pool of member-state resources that an institution could potentially 
access) were mixed. The number of members had a negativ  influence, as expected. The 
influence of greater capabilities – measured as either logged GDP or the Correlates of 
War Capabilities Index – were both highly significant and negative in OLS and Poisson 
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models. The hypotheses expected greater capabilities to result in more cooperation, not 
less, and it warrants further investigation with better measures of capabilities.  
When we model the full set of foreign policy outcomes simultaneously, several 
intriguing results appear. In models of Council of Europe activity, jurisdiction (formal or 
informal) strongly and significantly predicts responses. When other alternative responses 
are included in the simultaneous model, however, jurisdiction is no longer a significant 
predictor. Additionally, the Council of Europe’s behavior is related to whether any non-
European institution acted – but strangely, non-European institution activity means that 
CE activity is much more likely. A similar positive effect holds for ad hoc (extra-
institutional) cooperation among European states: If non-European institutions are acting, 
then extra-institutional cooperation is substantially more likely.339 
Finally, Chapter 5 explored the consensus-capacity framework’s predictions for 
state-level behavior and preferences. A qualitative study of the 1997 Albanian crisis 
provided an opportunity to leverage the advantages of mixed-method research, namely 
the ability to identify causal mechanisms in action a d to look for their existence in 
broader patterns. Unlike Chapters 3 and 4, the Albania study was able to look for 
evidence of states’ concern about capacity to execute desired foreign policy operations. 
Italy, a middle power, expressed willingness to intervene unilaterally in Albania, but it 
also actively sought assistance from international organizations. The refusal of German 
policymakers to organize an intervention through the EU stemmed at least in part from 
concerns about the EU’s capacity to manage such an intervention, and from the 
possibility of obtaining Russian assistance in a larger organization like the OSCE. 
                                                




This chapter also identified two important additional insights for the consensus-
capacity framework. First, issue definition is criti al when states form their preferences 
over the available strategies and institutions. Issue definition matters for two reasons. 
Because institutions differ in their issue jurisdiction, the definition of the issue can help to 
create focal points or to exclude certain institutions. Also, states use their definition of the 
issue to calculate the likely position of the other members or participants (i.e., to 
determine the preference distribution), and they use this to determine the probable 
outcome in each venue. States that define the issue differently may thus see different 
institutions as the appropriate forum, and/or may bse their preferences and expectations 
on different preference distributions. 
Second, the behavior of Romania, Slovenia, and Poland r ises the issue of cross-
temporal or cross-venue behavior. These states selected their response to the Albania 
crisis not on the basis of the crisis’s likely effect on them, but on the likely effect of their 
response on their chances of obtaining NATO membership. These states identified a 
component of their utility for action that the conse us-capacity framework did not 
anticipate. While their behavior is not inconsistent with the consensus-capacity 
framework – the framework does not, after all, predict national preferences for outcomes, 
only for strategies – it does raise further question  about the value of foreign policy 
behavior for signaling to third-party audiences. 
  
Contributions of this Dissertation  
The consensus-capacity framework and the tests of i presented here contribute to 




‘forum shopping’ in international relations. Chapter 3 makes an additional contribution to 
the literature on European foreign policy integration. 
 
Forum Shopping in International Relations 
The concept of “forum shopping” first emerged in the work of Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993). Advocacy groups seeking domestic poliy change sought venues at various 
levels (local, state, national, international) where they felt their cause would obtain the 
most sympathetic hearing. By manipulating the frame through which relevant actors view 
the issue, advocacy groups can reassign the issue to a more favorable venue. 
As Baumgartner and Jones importantly note, “the simple existence of alternate 
policy venues is more important than the distribution of advantage conferred by a 
particular venue.”340 Actors who find themselves disadvantaged in one venue can push to 
define the issue as something appropriate for an altern te venue where the structure or 
decision-making rules are more favorable. Similar processes are at work in international 
politics, as Chapter 5 showed. States defined the ‘problem’ of the Albanian crisis 
differently and had different response preferences as a result. With no institution claiming 
formal jurisdiction over refugee policy at the time, states defining the problem in this 
manner often chose unilateral action. Those who saw it as a regional security concern 
often leaned towards NATO or the EU/WEU.341 
This process of issue definition is currently neglected in studies of forum 
shopping in international relations. Existing arguments about how states choose between 
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fora have focused on the role of legal precedent,342 the influence of domestic politics,343 
and the effect of international power.344 In these cases, consensus already exists on the 
nature of the issue: trade dispute, free trade agreement, standards-setting. When the issue 
definition is contested, however, as it was in the case of Albania, actors consider (and 
bargain over) a far wider range of fora than in narrower, issue-defined cases. This 
dissertation contributes to the literature here not jus  in examining cases with contested 
issue definitions, but also by explicitly including a larger number and range of fora than 
most other studies consider as potential choices. 
In addition, the consensus-capacity framework can mke predictions about which 
of the available fora (or forms of non-institutional activity) states are likely to prefer, 
given their definition of the issue. Institutional decision-making rules influence the state’s 
preference formation process: The distribution of preferences within an organization 
interacts with the existence of veto players to make some fora more preferable than others 
for actors who want – and who do not want – a response. By explicitly considering the 
effect of collective decision-making under conditions of preference dispersion, this 
dissertation returns to a more practical consideration of forum choice than most scholars 
have previously used.345 
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Foreign Policy Integration in the European Union 
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on foreign policy cooperation 
and/or integration in the European Union. Indeed, one f the main debates is whether 
what occurs in CFSP is actually coordination (states doing what each of them would have 
otherwise done, but doing it in a concerted manner), cooperation (states adopting policy 
measures that differ from what they would have done u ilaterally but still thinking about 
policy separately), or integration (states actively thinking about foreign policy as a unit 
and working together to create common policy).346 Chapter 3’s findings about the 
influence of presidency preferences on cooperation is particularly important in this 
regard. The persistence of presidency effects – consistent ones for neutral states and 
sporadic ones for Atlanticist states – and their magnitude strongly suggests that states are 
still seeing foreign and security policy as self-oriented rather than collectively oriented. 
As the UK’s behavior in the Albania case suggests, and Michael E. Smith’s (2004) 
detailed study supports, the behavior of all states – not just presidencies – in CFSP 
includes strong elements of self-interest. This largely supports a “cooperation” view of 
CFSP.347  
Existing literature on CFSP fails to find any presidency effects. This dissertation’s 
findings suggest that the no-effect conclusion may result from the CFSP scholarship’s 
intense focus on cases of successful cooperation. Very few case studies of non-
cooperation or failed cooperation exist.348 As Chapter 2 established, the study of only 
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successful cases produces a distinctly biased sample. Omitting unsuccessful cases 
artificially truncates the sample on the basis of some underlying variable that correlates 
with success.  
In the case of CFSP cooperation and presidency effects, this selection bias has 
particularly unfortunate consequences. The selection effects argument is compelling for 
the presidency findings precisely because the direction of effect is negative. Presidency 
effects produce less successful cooperation. This means that cases where pr sidency 
effects would be most pronounced are cases that are syst matically less likely to be the 
focus of scholarly inquiry. The empirical strategy used here deliberately includes 
negative cases in approximately their true population proportion. When these cases are 
included in the model, strong, negative presidency effects appear. In earlier studies, these 
effects are masked by other variables associated with observing positive outcomes. This 
reinforces the importance of studying cooperation across the full sample of cases rather 
than only on successful cases. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Research on forum shopping in foreign policy cooperation, and in foreign policy 
behavior more generally, is still at a very early stage. By linking the study of cooperation 
to the study of foreign policy, the consensus-capacity framework is able to draw on the 
contributions of both to explain a range of behaviors under a single overarching set of 
principles. Additional work should draw more on theory developed in foreign policy 
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non-cooperation (failure to reach agreement). As a result, the non-cases that he does capture are a 








As is the case in most of the scholarship on internatio al cooperation, theory 
development in forum shopping more broadly lags behind its empirical applications.349 In 
some part, the absence of many studies examining the initial decision to cooperate, and 
then to use an institution, probably hinders this development. Without a solid 
understanding of the dynamics of intermediary phases, explaining later steps will be 
difficult. The consensus-capacity framework contributes here by linking the phases both 
theoretically and empirically in a way that allows the explanation of forum choice to be 
part of a larger process of cooperation rather thanan isolated decision. 
Despite this focus on the broader process of cooperation, the consensus-capacity 
framework continues to treat events as discrete, unrelated occurrences. With the 
exception of some formal elements of EU cooperation, it generally ignores the role of 
policy legacies generated in previous interactions. It also does not recognize the potential 
for issue linkage across foreign policy events, or across foreign policy events and other 
forms of cooperation. Development along these lines would allow the consensus-capacity 
framework to explain a broader range of behavior, such as linkage behavior across time 
as well as across issues. 
 
                                                





Three prominent issues remain for future research to address, all related to 
measurement. These are the need for better measurement of capacity, better measurement 
of presidency interests and their relationship to issue dimensions, and better data on 
policymaker and national preferences for state-level hypotheses. 
First, the need for more refined measures of capacity is evident. Current measures 
are noisy and unreflective. National GDP and the Correlates of War Composite 
Capabilities Index reflect nonspecific forms of general capacity rather than issue-specific 
capacity. Iron and steel production capacity, for example, is part of the Index, but it is 
probably not a relevant resource when encouraging other states to democratize. These 
broad, general measures are also not reflective of the capacities available to the institution 
for action at a given time. States are usually only wi ling to commit a certain fraction of 
their resources to foreign policy and an even smaller fraction to foreign policy 
cooperation. Moreover, no reason exists to believe that these fractions are the same for all 
states, or for all types of resources.350 States’ willingness to second capacity to 
international institutions and the amount they are willing to second are very different 
concepts than the sum of all resources available to all he institution’s members. 
Even with better measurement of capacity itself, however, the endogeneity of 
institutional capacity to the institution’s membership (both the number and identities of 
members) will continue to present difficulties for large-N testing. Small-N work with 
more refined indicators of issue-specific capacity is more likely to be useful in this task, 
                                                
350 If the belief that all states contributed at the same rate on each type of capability were plausible, this 
criticism would be less relevant. Including the entire GDP, for example, would then be a linear function of 




particularly in a cross-institutional context. These studies would also allow investigation 
of how uncertain access to seconded national capacity influences behavior.  
Second, Chapter 3 found strong presidency effects in he EU. These effects hold 
for some groups of states using very blunt indicators such as the state’s historical 
orientation to security policy. These measures are invariant to the issue under 
consideration, they capture only a small range of astate’s foreign policy interests, and 
they do not vary over time. More refined measures of presidency interests and their 
relation to issue dimensions would allow for more accurate testing of presidency effect 
hypotheses. In addition, these tests should also expand to other institutions to see if 
similar effects exist there. The EU’s presidency structure is quite strong; do the observed 
effects result from peculiarities of the Union’s leadership structure, or do similar effects 
exist even where leadership structures are not as powerful?  
Finally, tests of hypotheses about state preferences and behavior call for state 
level data. National security interests and strong norms of confidentiality in interstate 
negotiations mean that very little data is publicly available, nor do researchers have 
access to internal documents about recent events.351 Mixed support for the state-level 
hypotheses in this dissertation probably results, at le st in part, from the absence of 
primary source material. Without access to policymakers’ privileged knowledge, 
establishing firm support for some of the hypotheses is quite difficult. In the Albania 
case, for example, the meaning of the “Bosnia” analogy to German policymakers cannot 
be obtained from secondary research. Tests of state-level hypotheses will require 
substantial fieldwork, especially policymaker intervi wing, to be credible. 
                                                






Pettifer and Vickers bluntly describe the Albanian crisis that motivated this 
dissertation by saying, “The political incapacity and internal divisions in the EU over the 
crisis … led to the OSCE taking on a leading conflict resolution role” (2007, 39). The 
lack of capacity – both political and, though Pettif r and Vickers do not state it, military – 
in the EU resulted in the Union producing only weakly worded declarations about the 
crisis rather than decisive action.  
The framework developed in this dissertation aims to explain this behavior by 
focusing on the two necessary conditions for internatio al cooperation: the existence of 
consensus about a policy to enact and the existence of sufficient capacity to execute that 
policy with an acceptable probability of success. The consensus-capacity framework 
treats cooperation as one of a series of possible results of state foreign policy behavior. 
Other possible outcomes include unilateral action, extra-institutional cooperation, doing 
nothing, and acting through any of a set of alternate organizational venues. By linking 
cooperation to the broader process of foreign policy decision-making, the framework 
generates hypotheses about both individual state behavior and preferences and also about 
patterns in international outcomes. Cooperation is ot a yes/no decision; it is the product 
of a lengthy selection process that involves choosing between a set of interdependent, 
nonexclusive outcomes. 
To test this argument, I developed an extensive dataset of 300 observations that 
accommodates the many layers of selection bias that s rategic state interaction generates. 
I then employed theoretically appropriate models – ones that allow for interdependence 




test the framework’s hypotheses. This strategy allows for a more complete and more 
accurate test of cooperation arguments than those in the current literature.  
A number of consensus-based arguments gained support in the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses conducted here. Salience is highly conducive to states reaching 
consensus; having a preference outlier state in an institution’s leadership position often 
reduces the chance of cooperation. Capacity arguments were more difficult to test for a 
number of conceptual and methodological reasons. Nonetheless, they too gained some 
support from the evidence presented here. In particular qualitative evidence about 
German preferences in the Albanian crisis (Chapter 5) supported these claims. German 
concern about the incapacity of the EU – and conversely, about the capacity of the 
OSCE, in which the United States and Russia participated – were influential in its 
preference for the latter body to organize an intervention. 
To revisit the Albania case a final time, two unexplained elements remain: why 
states tried to act in the EU at all, and why the OSCE became the lead actor instead of 
another organization. Future research in this case, nd in others, should prioritize better 
measures of institutional capacity, state interests, and policymaker preference formation. 
Several states pushed initially for the EU to lead the response to the crisis in Albania; 
why did they attempt to organize cooperation there if German preferences to act 
elsewhere made consensus in the EU impossible? Why did the OSCE, which had no 
standing military structures or intervention experience, end up taking the lead on this 
multifaceted crisis? In a more general form, how do states choose between institutions? 
Do they choose sequentially, or simultaneously? Do preferences rely on general 




greater legitimacy), or from specific capacities of the institution itself? How do the 
differences between consensus and unanimity decision rules influence decision-making? 
The consensus-capacity framework here gave some preliminary hypotheses about some 
of these elements, but much more remains to be done.  














This appendix describes the multi-stage process by which observations entered 
the main dataset used in Chapter 3.  
 
Fully Random Sampling for Pages 
The initial method of page selection was a fully random sample of pages. 
Microsoft Excel generated six sets of 400 random nubers between the page numbers 
comprising the first substantive page of the January 1994 issue and the last substantive 
page of the December 2003 issue. Ideally, a fully random sample would produce some 
but not excessive variation in draws across months and years. The initial criteria were 45-
55% of valid page observations before December 1998 (the chronological midpoint of the 
sample), not more than ten months lost for no observations drawn, and also having 
moderate variation across months and years. Moderate variation here meant a ratio of not 
more than 1:1.5 between the lowest and highest monthly mean (across all years), and 
between the lowest and highest yearly mean (across all months). 
These criteria reflect the realities of both international cooperation and data 
analysis. The meetings of many international bodies are highly cyclical. Oversampling 
particular months, or having too many months fall out f the dataset, risks biasing the 
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data in unpredictable ways. European vacation patterns mean that European institutions 
act much less frequently in August than in any other month; only the highest-profile 
items seem to disrupt the vacation period. In most summers, the primary CFSP decision-
making body only meets two out of three months, and even then with an distorted agenda 
of high-profile items and items related to the change of presidencies which occurs each 
year on July 1. The EU’s highest body, the European Council, meets in June and 
December, and frequently in March and September or October, so that meetings leading 
up to these summits are often occupied with preparatory matters rather than substance. 
Other international organizations have similar routines.  
In addition, issues themselves may be cyclical. Conflict initiation is much less 
likely in the winter than in other seasons; hurricanes, cyclones, and other natural disasters 
which may require humanitarian aid are more likely in the summer months than at other 
times of the year. Coefficients related to institutions whose mandate or other 
characteristics make them more likely to respond to these types of cyclical events would 
be affected by samples which over- or under-sample cyclical events.  
 
Selecting a Sample 
As mentioned above, I initially generated six fully random samples (FRS). To 
select the random sample with the best properties, I proceeded by determining how many 
months from each sample contained no observations. The fully random samples had a 
median of 4.5 months where no pages drawn fell within t e month (range: 1 – 6). As this 
was promising, I began by investigating months which contained only one page 
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observation. The median number of months lacking observations rose to 9 (range: 5 – 
11), but some samples were still promising.  
I then proceeded to discriminate among the six FRS by examining the distribution 
of their observations more closely. FRS 6, which had lost the fewest months for lack of 
observations, had only 41% of its observations before the chronological midpoint. Since 
several hypotheses rely on the duration of membership/participation or the sequential 
joining of members, this amount of deviation seemed unacceptably high, and the sample 
was eliminated from contention. The two FRS with the lowest average variation across 
both months and years were FRS 5 and 1 (1.81 and 1.84, respectively), and these were 
subjected to further analysis. The selected pages in months with only two observations 
were coded to determine how many of these pages contained no observations and would 
thus risk eliminating the month from the sample. At this stage, the samples began losing 
months very rapidly, and the random sampling strategy was abandoned. 
 
Stratified Sampling of Pages 
The failure of fully random sampling strategies to produce reasonably good 
samples led to the adoption of a stratified sampling scheme. This scheme relies on 
thousands of pages as the stratification unit. Keesing’s does not have a set number of 
pages per month or year; indeed, the number of pages per month varies from 30 to 78,352 
and the number of pages per year varies from 563 to 743. Since thousands of pages do 
                                                
352 Total pages are always in multiples of four for publishing purposes, including the table of contents and
index, which double as the front and back covers respectively. Here I count only substantive pages 
containing news briefs; this excludes the contents, i dex, and any advertising for other Keesing’s products 
that the company inserts to reach the necessary multiple of four pages. 
   
201 
not coincide with chronological units, sampling by thousand achieves a fairly even spread 
of observations without forcing a specified number of observations per month or year.  
Stratification occurred by having Microsoft Excel generate 450 three-digit 
random numbers (instead of the five-digit fully random but bounded values of above). 
Each of these values was assigned an ‘observation number.’ The three-digit numbers 
were then assigned sequentially to the thousands values included in the 1993-2003 range 
– 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 – to create a composite five-digit number.353 This results 
in an equal distribution of observations across the t ousands. Because the relevant 
Keesing’s page range was 39798 to 45762, however, some of the composed page 
numbers fell outside the range and were discarded.  
While the two samples are not precisely comparable (largely as a result of the 
decision to include 1993 in the stratified sample and lso to discard composed pages out 
of the desired range), the properties of the stratified sample were substantially better than 
those of the fully random samples. The stratified sample ties with FRS 2 for fewest 
observations lost as invalid pages. Observation distribution over the duration of the year 
was the best value of all seven samples. Distribution across years for a given month had a 
suitably low ratio of averages, though the presence of more observations in the later years 
increased the ratio of standard deviations. Because the number of pages that Keesing’s 
devotes to a year generally increases over time, the second half of the dataset contains 
approximately 52% of the observations. Eight months contain no observations. Since the 
within-month deviation exceeding desired levels canbe explained largely as a function of 
                                                
353 1993 was included for future use in a study of whether the change in institutions in November 1993 
produces any effect on the probability of cooperation. It also ensures that the full range of 1994 pages is 
included in the center of the page range and does nt risk truncation. 
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the thousands-based stratification scheme, and no other criteria were substantially outside 
the tolerable ranges, this sample became the basis for all further data collection. 
 
Coding Rules for Qualifying International Events 
The purpose of the sample is to identify events or issues to which states or 
international organizations might respond by choosing to cooperate on foreign policy. 
The coding rules for identifying ‘qualifying international events’ (QIEs) reflect this 
purpose. I briefly describe the major coding rules b low. 
Instances of violence between states constitutes a QIE, as do efforts to settle such 
conflicts. Interstate tension of a political/military nature (i.e., not trade disputes) also 
qualifies as potential conflict. Strong norms for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the 
international system, and particularly among the types of international institutions studied 
in this project, make these prime targets for cooperation. 
Internal conflicts qualify as well. Civil war, whether declared or undeclared, or an 
effort to settle such conflicts, constitutes a QIE. Similarly, I code reports of refugee 
flows, or efforts by the international community to intervene. Domestic unrest at a scale 
less than civil war can qualify as a QIE if rioting or demonstrations (related to non-
economic issues) occur in which  
a) more than 25 people were killed, or  
b) the media present extensive reports of brutality or other human rights abuses 
by the authorities, or 
c) major political opposition figures are harmed, suppressed, or otherwise abused 
by the authorities, or 
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d) the non-democratic government is reported to deem the scale and scope of the 
demonstrations or riots to be a threat to its stabili y. 
National strikes are not QIEs unless they have a cle rly non-economic motivation 
(i.e., they are political in nature) and meet one of the domestic unrest criteria outlined 
above. 
Many of the institutions of interest in this project claim a particular interest in 
human rights. Major reported human rights violations thus constitute QIEs. I particularly 
code for reports of media suppression or violation of freedom of the press (Yugoslavia 
revokes all foreign journalists’ visas, 1994; India b ns six Urdu-language newspapers, 
1995), and reported violations of religious freedom r important developments in church-
state relations (e.g., Tajikistan bans religious parties, 1998). I also code instances of state 
behavior which indicate widespread lack of observance of human rights, particularly in 
the realms of due process and law enforcement restraint (e.g., the unprovoked killing of 
peasants by Brazilian and Mexican law enforcement officers in 1996 and 1995, 
respectively).354 In addition, this category includes allegations of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and action on the basis of these charges in domestic courts.  
Natural and man-made disasters also constitute QIEs. Thi  includes humanitarian 
situations such the situation of refugees, famines and epidemics, earthquakes, hurricanes 
and floods, and the like, and also man-made disasters uch as air or sea transit disasters 
killing more than 25. 
Finally, QIEs include action by institutional bodies when those actions are not the 
result of direct interstate cooperation. This includes reports released by the Inter-
                                                
354 Genocide is usually in the context of more widesprad fighting and so entered the dataset under the 
internal conflict rules rather than human rights rules. 
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governmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Health Organization, and the UN 
Food Program. It also includes indictments from inter ational criminal tribunals and 
decisions from other international judicial bodies. Reports from other blue-ribbon 
commissions are included if they have a distinctly international component. In this 
dataset, that includes the Vatican’s report on Church behavior during the Holocaust 
(1998) and the Volcker Commission’s report on the size and disposition of dormant 
(Holocaust-era) Swiss bank accounts (1999).  
Keesing’s entries do not conform to a uniform length. Longer articles have a 
greater probability of having their topic enter thedataset. That said, however, individual 
Keesing’s entries can contain more than one QIE. For example, the seven-page entry 
about the start of the 2003 US-Iraq war contains separate QIEs about the US buildup in 
the Middle East, the formation of the ‘coalition of the willing,’ Hussein’s missile launch 
that initiated ground combat, and several other elem nts. This strategy of locating 
multiple QIEs within a single entry helps to mitigate the effect of article length on the 
probability of a QIE entering the dataset. 
 
What is Not a QIE? 
Economic events, including budget announcements, mergers and acquisitions, and 
military purchases or contracts do not constitute QIEs. None of these types of news items 
are likely to provoke any response fromy other state . Loans from international financial 
institutions are excluded as well. These represent the outcome of cooperation already, and 
one which is filtered through an extensive chain of delegation, rather than an event or 
issue for potential response. Trade disputes and trde agreements are excluded as well.  
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Finally, diplomatic visits and the extension of diplomatic recognition do not 
constitute QIEs. These are most often bilateral interaction, and are also unlikely to 
provoke cooperation or, in the majority of cases, any reaction at all, from other states. A 
few high-profile exceptions may exist – for example, an Arab state recognizing Israel, or 
the North Korean leader visiting the United States or Europe – but no event which would 
strain this coding rule occurred on the sampled pages. Likewise, summits (bilateral or 
multilateral) are excluded. 
 
Distribution 
The minimum number of QIEs on a page was 0; the maxi um number was 7. The 
median page contains two QIEs. 
 
Event selection 
Pages containing no QIEs were dropped from the sample. Pages with only one 
QIE automatically had that QIE included in the datase . For all pages with more than one 
QIE, Microsoft Excel generated lists of random numbers corresponding to the total 
number of QIEs on the page. Pages were then assigned to a random number in the order 
in which the page observations were drawn (not the ord r in which the pages occur). This 
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Example 
Pages with 2 observations  Pages with 4 observations  Pages with 7 observations 
Rand Obs # Pg #  Rand Obs # Pg #  Rand Obs # Pg # 
2 8 39339  3 1 39586  5 37 40154 
1 12 43179  2 5 43065  6 97 44088 
2 13 44316  1 7 45175  4 236 43036 
1 23 40028  1 18 42677  7 268 40259 
1 25 42550  4 19 43290     
2 26 43797  4 22 39722     
 
The final sample used for analysis contains 300 events from 1994-2003.355 This 
represents 37.68% of the 796 qualifying events observed in the initial sample. 
 
                                                
355 1993 observations are not included in this analysis; they will form part of a future project. 
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